

POST TSUNAMI  
**ACEH-NIAS**  
**SETTLEMENT AND HOUSING RECOVERY**  
REVIEW

- COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE RESPONSE
- UN-HABITAT'S MONITORING METHODOLOGY AND SCORECARDS
- DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS

UN-HABITAT Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programme in collaboration with  
The Government of Indonesia, BRR NAD-Nias, the Provincial Government of Aceh and UNDP

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# FOREWORD



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Anna Tibaijuka,  
Executive Director,  
UN-HABITAT, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations, April 2009

The conclusion of the programme for the recovery and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias under the guidance of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR NAD-Nias) is an important moment of joy and reflection. When the Indian Ocean Tsunami struck, late 2004, virtually all humanitarian organisations were overwhelmed and the suffering of the survivors seemed insurmountable.


Four years later, it is of great importance to recognise that communities, governments and international organisations have rebuilt and restarted lives. Important milestones were achieved. In Indonesia, BRR was set up. It gave consistent and principled guidance. Its key concerns have been to protect the rights of the affected households and to promote accountability. BRR has also been unwavering in its assurance that international organisations were true humanitarian stakeholders and could reach out directly to communities in Aceh and Nias. For the longer term, the Indonesian Government signed a ground breaking peace agreement for Aceh and also approved a new and comprehensive disaster management law, all foundations for the protection of the people in Aceh, North Sumatra and beyond. Meanwhile, in 2008, the United National Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) became a full member of the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC). It now provides a critical role as focal point for Housing, Land and Property issues in the Cluster System and is spearheading shelter provision in various parts of the world in close cooperation with UNHCR and IFRC, which lead or convene the Emergency Shelter responses.

In Aceh and Nias, UN-HABITAT has been proud to provide assistance in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Providing shelter for all is the core mandate of UN-HABITAT. Committed staff and partners, most of them Indonesian, contributed to the establishment of a comprehensive 'People's Process' resulting in housing and settlement rebuilding in 32 communities and 6 districts. The core of our Strategic Policy on Human Settlements in Crisis is the belief that victims of disasters are owed dignity and respect and need to be encouraged and supported in their own recovery process. This is a vital ingredient in UN-HABITAT's approach towards Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction.

I wish to congratulate the leadership of BRR in supporting this publication. During the final Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias (CFAN), convened in Jakarta on 13 and 14 February 2009, BRR and its partners already explained and exhibited the consolidated efforts of people and organisations who played a role in the 'Rebirth of Aceh and Nias'. The publication is an additional contribution. It is also a reminder of the paramount importance of institutional learning.

Learning is of great urgency: natural and man-made disasters will time and again affect many people, including large urban and metropolitan communities. UN-HABITAT works 'for a better urban future'. Strengthening the capacity of urban communities, including the urban poor, requires learning from past experiences so as to cope with new urban crises. I am looking forward to working with the Government of Indonesia so that all can benefit from their collective experience and we are better prepared to handle the great challenges of future catastrophes.

# FOREWORD



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Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto,  
Director,  
BRR NAD-NIAS (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board for Aceh and Nias), April 2009

Building 130,000 houses is a severe challenge at the best of times, but doing so under immense time and logistical constraints required the hard work of thousands of people and hundreds of organisations. As the newly formed coordinating body, BRR was presented with a large institutional challenge in harnessing the hard work of so many willing hands, and had to solve problems of coordination and implementation on the go. Upholding our core beliefs of accountability, participation and sustainability, I believe that BRR can take pride in directing this international aid effort, and we have drawn extensively from the experiences along the way. We are also proud to have worked alongside so many committed organisations, including UN-HABITAT, which have made the reconstruction possible. We also appreciate that UN-HABITAT has brought together a milestone account of what all organisations and communities have endeavoured and achieved through 4 years of hard work.

I express my appreciation to the students and lecturers of Syiah Kuala University who, through field visits to inspect housing construction progress, made an important contribution and brought to light the complicated realities of settlement recovery. Their involvement is a case in point of how the recovery process has strengthened the capacity of Aceh, both its people and its institutions. Also within BRR, hundreds of staff have been trained and the capacity building assistance to local authorities is ongoing. They have their part to play in completing the yet unfinished reconstruction – drainage, sanitation, general infrastructure, maintenance, urban management and rebuilding in the conflict-affected areas.

After four years of coordination, BRR has concluded its operations, enriched with the experience of handling the ever unprecedented, and the resolve to bring lessons learned to future Government responses. Overall, we have acted to ensure that the handover to national government departments, the provincial administrations and local authorities will lead to the prosperity of Aceh and Nias and I commend UN-HABITAT for future support to institutions in Indonesia.

The present documentation supports the core vision of BRR for accountability throughout, and thanks to the Housing Geographical Information System combined with photos mostly taken by the Syiah Kuala student-monitors it is able to present a record of all housing implementation organisations. It is no less than crucial that institutions with a mandate for settlement and housing assistance after disasters should absorb the important lessons and recommendations made here.



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# GLOSSARY

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ADB	Asian Development Programme
ANSSP	Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programme (UN-HABITAT)
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning and Development Board)
BPN	Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land Agency)
BRR	Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh dan Nias (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency NAD-Nias)
CAP	Community Action Planning
CFAN	Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
ERRA	Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (Pakistan)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Organisation for Technical Cooperation)
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee (Geneva)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(I)NGO*	(International) Non-Governmental Organisation
KDP	Kecamatan Development Programme
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDF	Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (set up first as MDTF, Multi Donor Trust Fund; renamed as MDF)
NAD	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Province)
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNPM Mandiri	Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (National People's Self-Empowerment Programme)
PKPU	Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat (Centre for Justice and Care for the Community)
RALAS	Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System
RAN	Reconstruction Aceh Nias (Database)
Re-Kompak	Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Masyarakat dan Permukiman Berbasis Masyarakat (Community-based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project for NAD and Nias)
SRR	Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction
TRIAMS	Tsunami Recovery Impact Assessment & Monitoring System (WHO, IFRC, UNDP)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIMS	United Nations Information Management Service (Banda Aceh)
UNORC	United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias

Unsyiah                    Syiah Kuala State University (Banda Aceh)  
UPLINK                    Urban Poor Link  
UPP                        Urban Poverty Programme  
WFP                        World Food Programme

\*In this publication, NGOs are non-governmental organisations in general, either Indonesian or foreign with respect to their origin or legal registration. The acronym INGO is used if the discussion is intentionally limited to international ('overseas', non-Indonesian) organisations.





## INTRODUCTION

In mid 2007, the BRR Housing Deputy asked UN-HABITAT to document the post-Tsunami housing reconstruction programme in Aceh and Nias. UN-HABITAT played an important role in the reconstruction effort after the 26 December 2004 Tsunami and the 28 March 2005 Nias earthquake. Its Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programmes, funded by UNDP and ADB, have been delivering 4,490 houses in 6 districts. In addition, UN-HABITAT provided policy, coordination and monitoring support to BRR and to the more than 100 implementing NGOs and bilateral or multilateral programmes. It also contributed to spatial planning and is presently assisting in the efforts to upgrade post-Tsunami built household sanitation systems.

This book aims to be a resource for future evaluations and policy making. The evaluation focuses on two key questions: what were the success factors in achieving housing recovery in the particular context of the reconstruction in Aceh and Nias; and what can be learned about the role of government and civil society in order to achieve successful housing recovery in the future. For the latter question, the evaluation also draws from experiences in Sri Lanka (post-Tsunami), Pakistan (2005 earthquake) and Yogyakarta (2006 earthquake) – three disaster contexts where UN-HABITAT also had policy advisory or implementation roles for the housing recovery programmes. A comparative analysis has been instructive, as the Aceh post-disaster context was complex and likely unique, especially with regard to the free influx of many international organisations with more funding available than could often be spent within a reasonable time frame.

This publication is organised in three chapters each preceded by an illustrated journalistic story. In the first chapter, a broad review is provided of four years of settlement and housing recovery, starting from the formative months of early and mid 2005 up to the preparations of the exit of BRR, which has been concluded in April 2009. The evaluation in the first chapter is based on a wide range of documents and also relies on the information derived from UN-HABITAT's continuous monitoring programme on housing and settlement recovery, implemented together with the Syiah Kuala University (Unsyiah) of Banda Aceh from late 2005 till early 2008. In the second chapter, this UN-HABITAT – Unsyiah monitoring experience is documented, both methodologically and through a series of thematic scorecards for a wide range of housing implementation programmes. Finally, a directory is compiled, containing the key facts about all housing implementing organisations, as listed in the official BRR RAN database. This directory was updated until September 2008. At the end of the publication, a list of references to relevant documents and publications, selected from the on-line library of UN-HABITAT's Aceh Nias programme, is provided. Most documents were compiled from 2005 to early 2008 and remain accessible via [www.unhabitat-indonesia.org](http://www.unhabitat-indonesia.org).

The photo stories have been compiled from earlier journalistic work done for UN-HABITAT by three collaborators. Martin Aleida, a senior Indonesian journalist and novel writer, assisted UN-HABITAT in developing an information section in late 2005 and he wrote down his observations on the way people re-organised their lives in the first year after the Tsunami, by meeting in repaired or makeshift praying halls. Linda Christanty, who organised a news agency in Banda Aceh feeding news stories to many local newspapers in Indonesia, wrote a number of articles in 2007 on the way women and children dealt with the challenges of building new homes. And Diella Dachlan, who has been the information officer of UN-HABITAT in Banda Aceh, has written about communities in Nias engaging with the housing programme of UN-HABITAT. Photos were mostly taken by Veronica Wijaya, a young photographer who joined the UN-HABITAT field team in 2006 and 2007. A more complete photo and story account was already published by UN-HABITAT. In 'Anchoring Homes' and the complimentary long feature documentary movie 'Playing Between Elephants', the experiences of people and communities in Aceh and Nias have been intimately documented and interpreted through stories, photos and film.

The responsibility for the evaluation in the first chapter resides in full with its lead author, Bruno Dercon. As the Housing Policy Adviser of UN-HABITAT's Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programme, he assisted BRR and the Shelter Sector from 2005 till 2008. The opinions in this publication are not




necessarily those of the United Nations. In addition to using documents and monitoring results, the author has also drawn on many statements and insights recorded throughout the past four years in discussions with key staff of BRR and of other organisations. Where possible, endnotes refer to documents, interviews and discussions, but a full reference was at times neither possible nor desired.

Even though this publication is neither exhaustive nor a final account, it aims to be a substantial contribution, in line with the original expectations of the Housing Deputy of BRR. This book could not be completed instantly. In 2007 and even in 2008, many organisations were still providing housing assistance. Several large organisations had only started in 2007, after lengthy preparations. Other organisations, such as UN-HABITAT, had delivered early and with the benefit of the experience had received more funding to provide assistance in more remote locations, such as on the Nias and Simeulue islands. A few organisations had halted their programmes in 2006 due to failures and were amending work in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, the completion of the document was only undertaken by late 2008. Furthermore, it does no justice to the width and depth of all issues of the recovery and reconstruction programme. It focuses most on the housing programmes in a narrow sense. The housing and settlements sector also dealt with land management, resettlement, village planning, district planning and household water and sanitation provision. These issues are discussed in this publication in as far as the issues provide more insights on the key questions of success factors and of the respective roles of the government and other stakeholders. Issues other than housing implementation are not exhaustively documented.


The author wishes to thank BRR for its support and encouragement, especially Dr. Kuntoro, Dr. Eddy Purwanto and Mr. Bambang Sudiatmo. As much appreciation is due to staff in UN-HABITAT's Head Office in Nairobi and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Fukuoka and the colleagues of the Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programmes in Aceh, Nias and Jakarta. The colophon mentions people who provided direct assistance in putting the document together. The publication was possible as a result of the funding support of many donors through UNDP to UN-HABITAT, through the Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programme (ANSSP).

# Snapshot from the Field : Rebuilding the Kuala Makmur Village at Simeulue Island

by : Martin Aleida







**T**he meunasah, or traditional Islamic community centers, play a significant and influential role in the ongoing reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts on Simeulue Island. At such centers, just after the Friday prayers, the people receiving housing assistance and carrying out the construction, meet to evaluate progress. This includes compiling and discussing financial responsibility reports and punishment for those who do not fulfill their obligations. This has become readily apparent to UN-HABITAT, which has been in the process of constructing 630 houses since July last year.

As has been the case with the implementation of construction in Pidie Regency, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Nias, the aid recipients set up Housing Construction Groups (Kelompok Pembangun Rumah: KPR), consisting of 12 families each. These groups open accounts in the names of the chairmen, secretaries and treasurers, whom they have selected from among their individual group memberships. UN-HABITAT then transfers funds to each group in four installments of 20%, 45%, 20%, and 15% of the total cost of Rp 42 million per house.

“The people participate enthusiastically. Some even plan to donate two trees for planting in front of their houses. Interestingly, the financial responsibility reports are made weekly, at the meunasah community centers, right after the Friday prayer. This is what the people have chosen to do,” said Binod K. Shrestha, Project Manager, Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Programme, UN-HABITAT in Banda Aceh. This citizen of Nepal has previously worked in aid projects in conflict areas like Afghanistan and Sudan.



The financial reports compiled by the treasurers are posted on a bulletin board for all members of the community to read. This is also the case with the construction reports compiled by the secretary. If they fail to complete a transparent and informative report on time, they will be reprimanded. If no improvement is seen after three reprimands, they will be replaced. And if the quality of the work is not properly maintained by any member of any given group, the disbursement of funds will be stopped pending improvement. Anyone opposing this process will have to return the funds already received. For this reason everyone is careful to monitor one another.

“Up to now, there has been no need to punish anyone,” said Bima Indra, a community development expert from Banda Aceh, who is working for the habitat assistance body in the capital city Simeulue Regency, Sinabang.

Yet there are challenges. At the beginning of last February, at the “Al-Muttaqin” meunasah community center in Silaguri, Desa Ganting, Bima and his colleagues came face to face with a young man who charged.





“UN-HABITAT is irresponsible. They haven't explained to me why I am not on their list for recipients of the first installment of funding. Don't come in here and stir up divisions in the community,” he said acrimoniously.

The mood in the community center suddenly became very tense. However, the participants immediately expressed their disagreement with the accusation set forth. Fortunately, Bima and his colleagues could calm the situation with a clear explanation.

“The problem lays with you. You refused to provide a small part of the front section of your land for a drainage ditch although all of the others had agreed to do this. Then, when we held a field meeting, you did not attend. Besides, you are not the only person whose fund disbursements have been delayed. Others are also having to wait for the funds because they have requested a location change. And that, of course, is a constraint because it will take time to get permission from our central office in Banda Aceh,” Bima explained patiently.





## Bringing in bathrooms and toilets

The UN-HABITAT field team works very carefully. They make an effort to ensure that no jealousy occurs among the members of the community being assisted, in part by making sure that the construction carried out for each member of each group and for each group as a whole is being done at the same time with the same level of concern and attention.

“If one family in one group starts digging the foundation for their house, then the other members should be involved in the same process on their plots of land so that everything is done and finished up at the same time. Nobody should have to ask 'When will my house be built?' We make a concerted effort to ensure that no one is left feeling envious or left out,” said Bima.

For that reason, in Kuala Makmur, around 20 km from Sinabang, for example, the foundations for all of the houses are laid out like carpets, all at the same level in the construction phase. The aid recipients are all victims of the March 28, 2005 earthquake. Some 85% of the aid recipients in Simeulue are earthquake victims. The 36-square-meter aid houses are being built where the victim's old houses once stood, or very nearby.

The work is carried out cooperatively and communally without the hiring of contractors. The aid recipients do the best they can to keep costs down so that when the construction is done they will have some of the funds donated to them by UN-HABITAT left over for contributing to the development of infrastructure for the benefit of the entire community. Not to mention the repair and upkeep of the meunasah community center. And it appears that the expectation of maintaining that vital part of the community is not an empty one because the UN-HABITAT assistance body is providing a donation of around Rp 5 million per household for infrastructure. Besides that, UN-HABITAT, in cooperation with the Dutch Water Sector Support for Northern Sumatra (SAB-SAS), will construct water supply facilities, water distribution and drainage channels, as well as sanitation facilities, including a public septic tank, while also providing training on the operating and maintaining of this infrastructure.





Up until now, spatial planning has been neglected in villages, so the ongoing reconstruction effort is an ideal way to establish this kind of organizational approach to development. Sanitation is the main issue for most villages in Simeulue, even though there is an adequate number of plenty of fresh water sources. According to one report, the vast majority of the existing houses there do not have indoor toilets.

“Through this ongoing project, we will overcome this problem so that outbreaks of diseases spread through water can be prevented,” said one of the UN-HABITAT field facilitators. Up to now, people have been defecating and urinating in bushes or wooded areas. We are now building bathrooms with toilets at the rear of the aid houses,” he explained.

“The earthquake ruined our lives, but now, it seems, it was a blessing in disguise. We will now have a neat and orderly village,” said Sumali from Ganting village. His old house, which was flattened by the earthquake, was not far from the ocean. Now, he is waiting for the completion of his new house, which is further inland. “Once I have enough money, I will upgrade it for my children and grandchildren,” he added.

UN-HABITAT is implementing this project with funds provided by AEDES and SGHI through UNDP. AEDES is the Dutch umbrella organisation for public housing corporations and often provides funding and technical assistance to poor communities outside the Netherlands. For Indonesia, it has been cooperating with the partner organization SGHI. Once the construction of the over 600 houses is completed on East Simeulue Island, the eastern coast will feature rows of concrete houses with shiny ceramic roofs, all neatly maintained and standing proudly in the area stretching from Kuala Makmur through to Ganting, Sambai, and Sibao.



# Chapter 1



# Looking Back : 4 Years of Housing Reconstruction

The Indian Ocean Tsunami claimed between 130,000 and 167,000 lives in the Province of Aceh and displaced more than half a million people. Entire communities were wiped out and more than 120,000 families were left without any shelter at all. Three months later, on 28 March 2005, a severe earthquake killed several hundred people on the Island of Nias. Ten thousands more families were made homeless or were afraid to return to their damaged timber houses.

The Indonesian Government was forced to provide housing and planning responses with institutional processes which were not set up to deal with a catastrophe of this scale. It took months for the settlement and housing recovery strategy to establish clear contours. Given the unprecedented scale of the disaster, the response strategy was shaped as much by actions on the ground as by policy decisions.

## RESETTLEMENT : THE EXPECTED PLANNERS' RESPONSE TO THE UNEXPECTED

The provision of temporary shelter for persons rendered homeless as a result of the disaster was the most pressing need faced by the government and its initial responses were highly controversial. Faced by the displacement of around 600,000 people, the government put up camps for about 65,000 people, first with tents and then with barracks. The camps supplemented the many other modalities of temporary shelter adopted by households and communities: some had stayed, usually briefly, in public buildings or had put up tents in public locations while more than 150,000 people had put together any form of quick-fix shelter with tarpaulin or debris materials at or near their destroyed homes. Furthermore, half of all displaced people relied on community solidarity and had fled to the premises of kin and other hosting families.<sup>2</sup>

For the sake of safety, the camps had been often put up at a considerable distance from the coast. An outcry against feared forced displacement was extensively conveyed in reports and the press. The protests had deep roots, as people were fearful of being stuck in barracks. A vicious armed conflict between the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement had been perpetuated for three decades and the camps and barracks reminded people of the forced evictions that had been practiced at times by the army to enforce more control on areas in Aceh. Moreover, the barracks initially provided poor protection, especially to women, children and the elderly. The structures had been put up in haste, with bad timber and initially with little or no sanitation. In some, humanitarian assistance was well organised, while in others people mostly had to fend for themselves.

It took months to bring the shelter situation in Aceh and Nias under control. Basic life saving shelter protection had been guaranteed after the first days in accessible areas, and everywhere else within a couple of weeks. A remarkable, bold and cooperative humanitarian rescue operation had been organised by the government, Indonesian and foreign military, hundreds of humanitarian organisations and thousands of volunteers. But overall, the emergency shelter assistance showed the same problems as in other post-disaster contexts: the over-supply of assistance at easily accessible areas yet much less or only basic assistance in remote locations; inept and unaccountable procurement of materials and land, causing additional environmental damage in various ways; and fast action to build temporary and transitional structures but few or no provisions for maintenance and operational services. For Aceh and Nias, the initial bad press on the shelter situation would set the tone for a deep distrust among victims for the government with regard to shelter and housing recovery, not only during the next months, but for the four years to come.

To make matters worse, government bureaucrats were not always helpful in overcoming public anxiety and sometimes a mood of collective panic.<sup>3</sup> For instance, an early proposal by a government technology agency was circulated, naively proposing that the entire Aceh coast line be turned into a green zone with mangroves only, without built-up areas. Fishermen would have to move permanently a few kilometres to the interior. However, other initial policy thinking was promising: clear ideas for a strong community based rebuilding programme circulated early. Key officials with housing competency in BAPPENAS were in favour of a people-centred, participatory housing programme for recovery and reconstruction. These were sanguine and hopeful ideas originating from the ranks of the new administration of the first directly elected president of Indonesia.

Housing assistance is an attractive political proposition in many contexts, more so for the young and idealistic Indonesian democracy, which had been shedding a dictatorial but also corporatist legacy since 1998. Housing assistance to individual citizens now presented an opportunity beyond the narrow life saving humanitarian obligations of the state: it became a right for protection of, and support to, private citizens which leaders had to respond to. Showing respect for this right in a region where the Indonesian state had caused so much war suffering in the past was the ultimate ethical litmus test of the newly elected leadership and for the civil society contributing money and effort.




But many were uncertain of how to proceed. A large community based housing programme was untested. The unprepared government planners were equally traumatised with the destruction and the loss of life at the scale just experienced in Aceh and Nias. Even though most of them did not like to be associated with the legacy of forced eviction, they still generally subscribed to a strategy establishing protective buffer zones. Of course, when policy makers set out buffer zones and resettlement areas in the early planning, the optimistic early ideas about participation remained vague and moot. Participation and community involvement were no more than social safety guards allowing people to be consulted about the planning of their resettlement.

The established public housing practice gave no leads. Policy makers had first hoped that 'building back better' was about building a sufficient number of social housing projects, with row houses of starter homes and street grids accompanied with basic amenities. Rather than searching for a new departure, the planning officials simply relied on the models and modalities of the known social housing practice in Indonesia. This practice had delivered hundreds of thousands of small houses in the 1990s to the emerging middle class in industrialising Indonesia. Private contractors or at times local authorities acquired land and the contractors did the land development and the housing construction. The smallest houses were sold to factory and low-level service sector workers and to civil servants, who were all given access to subsidised low-interest loans. In the best of cases, pleasant and non-congested garden city neighbourhoods delivered the modern dream of healthy housing that would replace the more overcrowded and underserved urban kampongs. Something similar was thought suitable and capable to deliver restitution after the Tsunami – that is not necessarily the restoration of the original property but compensation in the form of ownership of a similar and better property. One government minister went so far as to advise, almost as a cherry on the cake, that the capital of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province could be transplanted to the interior. Building new government centres, e.g. in newly established districts or provinces, was a common practice and doing that for a destroyed province capital was a logical suggestion.<sup>4</sup>

Reconstruction and resettlement were conceived as two sides of the same coin. The emergent planning strategy in the first three months after the Tsunami sought to overcome the shelter crisis in three phases: first through temporarily sheltering people in camps in safe areas; next to add shelter opportunities in 'rehabilitated' housing, i.e. in repaired dwellings that had been outside the worst impact zone and therefore only damaged but not destroyed; and finally, to add more shelter through 'reconstructed' permanent housing, which would follow, but at a later stage and in newly opened resettlement areas safely outside the impact or buffer zone. This was the initial programme for the respective rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing and settlements.<sup>5</sup>

Government documents of early 2005 show that the affected households would be obliged to pay for reconstructed housing in resettlement areas and would be given access to housing loans. The government would provide a grant to cover the down payment on the loan and subsidise subsequent interest payments. It was not expected that humanitarian aid would or could pay for the reconstruction of housing nor was it imagined that housing reconstruction would proceed by and large through grants rather than loans to households. It was not anticipated that the reconstruction of housing through grants would become the political cornerstone of the assistance to the affected households, based on the insight that the cash injections in the household economy were an efficient stimulus for the recovery of the local economy and a vital condition to speed up a more lasting protection of people.<sup>6</sup> Only if the cash injections had been made conditional to the acceptance of forced resettlement, the buffer zones could have been upheld. But soon, the Indonesian policy makers understood that they had neither the political mandate nor the power and authority to enforce a conditional funding of recovery.





## THE RIGHT TO RETURN EARLY

The early plans indeed never worked. In February 2005, prior to the set-up of BRR as the ultimate coordinating body, broad planning and consultation processes were started, both in Jakarta and Banda Aceh. During March and April, various government agencies started to set the principles of a workable process rather than a desired outcome. With regard to land and housing, the national government basically guaranteed restitution for all people who had lost residential property or had seen it damaged. This applied to either or both their houses and residential land. The government worked out the Master Plan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (North Sumatra), which set out principles and targets for the reconstruction.<sup>7</sup>

Resettlement away from buffer zones was upheld as a basic policy in the Master Plan. The final version contained detailed planning directives on their establishment and their repercussions on inland land use changes accommodating new built-up areas. The buffer zones allowed for mangroves, other green zones and limited built-up areas for fishing communities. The Master Plan was in line with similar policies upheld in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Most criticism was about the risk of loss of livelihoods and the fear of land grabs. These risks were very real in Indonesia, but it was also true that the land use regulations of the buffer zones were unlikely to be enforced. The Indonesian State has always exercised limited controls over land and the detailed prescriptions of its use, especially for private or customary held residential land. Compensation in cash or through resettlement has never been easy in the country. Even expropriation for land clearing for genuine public works is cumbersome and often unsuccessful. In earlier decades, the regime had many times turned to illegal and even violent means of forced eviction – explaining the ongoing fear of land grabs. Therefore, the establishment of buffer zones was a policy fraught with fears but also doubts from the start.

The establishment of BRR in late April 2005, with a clear mandate and an ambitious and idealistic staff, changed the equation. Responding to the fears for permanent displacement, the newly appointed BRR director, Dr. Kuntoro Mangkosubroto, immediately articulated the principle stand of the agency: if forced to choose, the rights of people were to be stronger than the wants of government. God had given this land to the Acehnese, so the risk to live on it was an issue between the people and God, he proclaimed in a meeting with Acehnese officials in May 2005 – even though the Indonesian Land Law of 1963 puts the State as the final landowner, in the interest of the 'the People'. Dr. Kuntoro's accommodating assurances were often published in the press and became a forceful signal. Encouraged by them and as fear and grief were overcome, people indeed returned to their hamlets and neighbourhood wards, first as a trickle of day time visitors and as day labourers doing debris clearance, and later in greater numbers in order to retrace the





lost property boundaries of their village lands. BRR had put the decision to resettle in the hands of the affected communities which by and large opted for the security of tenure of the land they had rather than the more insecure promise of a plot in a future resettlement area.

As such, a process slowly started whereby communities re-established land boundaries and drew up village and neighbourhood maps. In Jakarta, however, the thinking was still about resettlement. The National Land Agency (BPN) was drafting a complicated inter-departmental Presidential decree to organise the restitution of land properties. The restitution process required first to re-equip the provincial and district-level BPN offices and to restore damaged or retrace lost land documents. Next, it would work out a process to plot out the land holdings of people in the buffer zone and provide restitution by giving them a land title at no cost in a new resettlement programme outside the buffer zone. To make the restitution work legally, people had first to get a free land title for their plots within the buffer zone, which would then be exchanged in the cadastre records for a free land title in a resettlement project. For non-residential land or land lost to the sea, other but equally complicated principles and processes were being elaborated. Ample funding would come through RALAS, the first project of the Multi Donor Fund (MDF). Not surprisingly, the deliberations on the decree dragged on and it was eventually only signed in 2007.

Yet as part of RALAS, and almost in the margin of it, BPN also agreed to the principle of community-based land adjudication prior to the agency doing formal surveys and issuing formal titles, as a stop-gap solution to sort out land matters provisionally. Possibly without realising, BPN thus condoned the process of re-establishing land boundaries as was being tested by several communities with assistance of a number of humanitarian organisations. Moreover, by signing up to execute RALAS, the agency had also to start with the issuance of free land titles within the buffer zones. In absence of a signed Presidential decree, it could not proceed to deal with implementing the land management for resettlement, as the legal framework for exchanging a land title inside the buffer zone with one outside of it was not yet available.

The official blessing for community land adjudication was probably one of the key advances in getting the recovery started in Aceh. Even though the issuance of free land titles even within the impact zones would go through severe implementation problems, RALAS sent a signal of security of tenure to all concerned. If the government was willing to issue free formal land titles for land even in the heavily affected areas, and if prior community land mapping was approved of as well, then there ought to be no further qualms about returning and setting out erstwhile plot boundaries of land parcels that had been privately owned in the past based on customary notions. Building new homes on those plots was simply a logical next step.

Almost on the run, a policy of early return had been formulated for Aceh and Nias. It empowered people in their decision to return and rebuild. Resettlement programming was still implemented in the

following years but became a secondary activity of the government, in order to provide housing especially to those who had permanently lost their land to the sea.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the Aceh and Nias experience could become a testing ground for the contemporary social concepts of early return and community involvement driving post-disaster recovery. Both principles are generally deemed important to allow people to reclaim property, restart livelihoods and allow local institutions to remain cohesive and functional to the fullest extent possible. Early return and community involvement allow 'early recovery' or 'seamless recovery', encouraging households and communities to resume daily life and limited local livelihoods activities, even though local government services and the regular economy may not yet be capable of taking up normal functions. In Aceh and Nias, voluntary early return became the corner stone of the de-facto policy, even though it has remained controversial for those policy makers who perceive it as incompatible with better planning and building back better in general.

## SUSTAINABLE SETTLEMENT RECOVERY AND THE MASTER PLAN

The Master Plan listed nine governing principles: a community oriented approach and community participation; sustainable development; an holistic approach; an integrated approach; efficiency, transparency and accountability; efficient monitoring and evaluation; compliance with provincial autonomy; priority for the most vulnerable; and priority for the affected areas. BRR's mission was to make sure that the targets of the recovery and reconstruction were reached within a four year period in line with these governing principles. Overall, the principles conveyed the aim to built or rebuilt settlements in a long lasting and integrated manner. The key organisational drivers for decision-making were efficiency, transparency and accountability. BRR worked hard to set up coordination, disbursement and project management systems as well as data and asset recording systems which all emphasised the concern for these latter principles.

The Master Plan was not really clear on the right of early return. It still endorsed the initial concept of a response in phases, through sheltering, rehabilitation and resettlement. Early return is of course an issue of process and less one of outcomes. However, community empowerment and participation are also issues of due process and were not controversial. The key message of Dr. Kuntoro was that the right of people to choose for early return was in line with the principles of the Plan. It was in essence a rights-based approach, even though not acknowledged in such language in the Master Plan.<sup>9</sup>

In terms of outcomes, the Master Plan clearly put forward expectations for integration and sustainability. To achieve these outcomes with regard to settlement recovery, one needs environmental planning and management of land and natural resources and the adequate provision of public and municipal services. Early return is only the first step, an essential ingredient to set the process of settlement recovery in motion. Furthermore, sustainable settlement development also requires working on issues beyond the boundaries of the hamlet and the neighbourhood, spatially and institutionally. Focusing on hamlets and neighbourhoods is only possible in the most rural areas. Elsewhere, the organisation of public and municipal services, like water provision and solid waste disposal, require planning and coordination at larger levels. Initially, the expectation to 'build back better' encompassed these expectations. Yet achieving integration became a challenge during the reconstruction of settlements in Aceh. At a spatial level, this was because of the Peace Agreement; at an institutional level, because of a lack of institutional preparedness.

The Helsinki agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement was signed on 17 August 2005, four months after the formulation of the Master Plan. The Peace Agreement set mandates for the national and provincial authorities for post-conflict peace building and social-economic development. The agreement gave in no way a mandate for BRR to rebuild post-conflict Aceh, obliging it towards a stronger singular focus on localised interventions in Tsunami-affected areas.<sup>10</sup> In order to comply, BRR had to scale back the initial expectations that it would or could build back better Aceh as a whole, making the affected areas not a 'priority', as stated in principle 9, but the one and only focus of the



## The Guiding Principles of the Master Plan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (North Sumatra) 2005<sup>11</sup>

The Master Plan for Aceh and Nias Reconstruction states that the rehabilitation and reconstruction for the region and people in the Provinces of NAD and Nias Islands, North Sumatra Province, are to be implemented based on the following principles :

1. **Community Oriented Approach and Community Participation**
2. **Sustainable Development** : giving priority to the balance of economically viable, socially acceptable, and environmentally sound aspects.
3. **Holistic Approach** : the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias Islands must take into account all aspects of life and needs to be based on a comprehensive strategy.
4. **Integrated Approach** : effective coordination and strategy to guarantee the consistency and effectiveness of sector- and regional- programs both at the national and regional levels.
5. **Efficiency, Transparency, and Accountability.**
6. **Efficient Monitoring and Evaluation.**
7. **Compliance with Provincial Autonomy** : in accordance with Law Number 18, year 2001, regarding the Special Autonomy of the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Law Number 44, year 1999, regarding the special characteristics of Aceh.
8. **Priority for the Most Vulnerable** : priority will be given to the protection and assistance of the most vulnerable community members affected by the disaster, particularly to children and widows, to disabled persons, to people who lost their houses and property, to those who lost their families' breadwinners and to underprivileged communities.
9. **Priority for affected areas** : regions affected by the disaster will be prioritized in the implementation of The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan for the Region and People of the Province NAD and Nias Islands, North Sumatra Province.

organisation and its partners. This shift was actually further reinforced by the fact that most donors had already allocated their funding for Tsunami areas and Tsunami-affected communities. Implementation actors had often no choice than to focus on Tsunami-affected communities, both for practical management reasons and because of funding stipulations.<sup>12</sup>

The Indonesian and international institutional experience was no help either. As said, the Indonesian social housing experience had mostly been about building housing projects. The institutional capacity to plan and coordinate was very limited. Moreover, the privatisation and market-driven development of housing in many developed countries, as practised in the past decades, had generally de-institutionalised housing and for sure not encouraged or assisted the development of strong housing institutions in Indonesia. Of course, all these issues were entangled: donors often lack insights in the institutional and spatial dimensions of shelter and housing; they often decide on shelter funding on a stand-alone basis; but at the same time they expect integrated and sustainable development outcomes. A legal provision, such as in the Peace Agreement, is not seen as an impediment or challenge, but as an opportunity to keep things simple.





In this context of issues, settlement recovery in Aceh and Nias became driven by a myopic focus on the hamlet and the neighbourhood. The focus became a string of enclaves of communities in the affected 800 km strip of coastal land. For emergency assistance, the locus of operations had obviously been this long string of affected localised community settings. Yet afterwards, as a result of the Peace Agreement and the 'focus of mission' of both BRR and its partners, the same logic was to stick for recovery and rehabilitation. It became acceptable to deal with the micro issues pragmatically without being bound by wider coordination, for instance with local authorities.<sup>13</sup> This meant that a range of principles in the Master Plan became secondary by consequence: community empowerment through local institutions, sustainable development, holism and integration now became issues to be upheld for hamlets and neighbourhoods. Housing reconstruction in Aceh remained by and large a localised set of building operations.

This focus showed limited opportunities for institutional capacity building, learning and developing institutional preparedness. It has been a missed out opportunity. Regular processes of social and spatial planning should deal with risk reduction and disaster impact mitigation. Protocols for participatory planning should allow stakeholders to consider issues of security of tenure, access to livelihoods and reduction of risk. Admittedly, reducing risk through social and spatial planning is a contentious point also internationally. The weaknesses of Indonesia's institutional processes are no isolated problem. It is a challenge faced by many countries and change will come slowly. Adapting planning processes to crisis situations is a gap in many education curricula and in the know-how of most planning professionals.<sup>14</sup>

## **INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES EXPOSED: TRANSITIONAL SHELTER AND LANDLESSNESS**

The limitations of the conventional housing policies in Indonesia have already been exposed. The main tool is landed developments. The main aim is to increase homeownership including a land plot. People without land or shelter need to find rental accommodation, either in houses or rooms in the traditional kampongs. The last resort is to squat in shacks on marginal public land. Policies and government programmes rarely focus on incremental home improvements or on land reform for the poor. Therefore, the lack of institutional and professional preparedness for a situation as faced in Aceh and Nias explains to a good extent why the issues of transitional shelter and landlessness proved to be traumatic to such an extent for most policy makers.

Initially, the issue of transitional shelter was most in the spotlight. Providing transitional shelter was







seen as the wrong approach by many. Different stakeholders perceived different risks. Ordinary people were afraid that they would be forced to remain in barracks and similar shelter provisions with insecure tenure. Indonesian officials were not looking forward to a situation whereby the camps could potentially be managed for an extended period of time by internationally mandated agencies. Inexperienced humanitarian organisations announced large permanent housing programmes simply because it was brave and popular, and to justify that their fundraising, which had reached unprecedented levels, had not been done in vain. Providing ten thousands of transitional shelter units to exhaust their funds was thought more difficult than erecting a few thousand permanent houses. Some organisations such as UN-HABITAT did have experience in other contexts and knew that transitional shelter, especially in the context of managed camps, can disenfranchise communities from the planning and rebuilding of their own neighbourhoods, leading to the breakdown of social structures and reducing the longer term opportunities for sustainable reconstruction. Post-disaster and post-conflict camps in many countries had often sustained displacement and turned into slums. And finally, the conventional construction sector feared that funding would be diverted into transitional shelter projects.

Only by September 2005 was a way forward established, and a Plan of Action was fully developed jointly by BRR, the Provincial Authorities, the United Nations and IFRC.<sup>15</sup> This dovetailed with the political promise of the Provincial Government and BRR to ensure that people would no longer live in tents by the first anniversary of the Tsunami. Several organisations on the ground had also realised that transitional shelters were required in the hamlets or neighbourhoods in order for rebuilding to start. Only then could people help out with debris clearing, setting out land boundaries, working with organisations to agree upon priorities and conditions, and help in coordinating contractors and builders. Many people had already starting commuting back and forth, sometimes daily, between the camps or lodgings with hosting families and shelters in their home villages. Throughout 2005, the camps were more secure at night and were provided with more reliable humanitarian services. Humanitarian handouts were also reaching the host families. The humanitarian system responded to the increasing numbers of returning people: first, food distribution started also to cater to people in shacks and shelters in villages; then, smaller barracks were set up in the hamlets; and finally a large transitional shelter programme of individual shelters was conceived and implemented.

The transitional shelter programme, coordinated by the United Nations and implemented by the IFRC, consisted of the provision of one-room steel frame shelters, with imported timber cladding, costing around \$5000 net a piece. The first batch arrived by Antonov planes in December 2005. The transitional shelters were set up throughout 2006 and 2007, while in many locations permanent housing was gearing up fast. For many remote locations and communities, especially on islands, permanent housing was difficult to organise or not started until 2007-2008, and the shelters, even though over-engineered and costly, became a pragmatic and useful alternative. Yet for all the talk about community empowerment, one could as well

have distributed materials and tool kits worth \$5000 a family, which would have been obtained much faster and allowed people much more flexibility to incrementally upgrade their shacks into liveable accommodation. The aid-giving bureaucracies, however, wanted to see shelter units, fulfilling all international engineering standards. They feared the liability in case people would sell or barter the materials or would put up unsafe structures. Most Red Cross movements, which had collected tremendous amounts of donations for shelter, including for tens of thousands of basic housing units for which there was no organisational precedent, also took on transitional shelter as an opportunity to start acting on shelter issues in an orderly and organised manner. By doing so, they could justify to delay their permanent housing programmes for two years or more.

Overall, the transitional shelter issue was a near-debacle, undertaken at great cost. Humanitarian organisations have learned a lot of the experience. The humanitarian reform and its cluster system within the IASC resulted in an institutionally better prepared Emergency Shelter Cluster, led either by UNHCR or IFRC.<sup>16</sup> Contemporary temporary sheltering strategies focus on the distribution of materials, tools, household items and cash – all with the aim to allow people to hold on to their property and assets and to utilise their own capacities to initiate recovery.<sup>17</sup>

But the issue also showed long running institutional shortcomings in Indonesia. The search for workable processes to deliver permanent housing early was done by many humanitarian programmes. BRR, as will be explained later, imposed few controls and limitations on options for house sizes and budgets. This exacerbated the fear among beneficiaries that taking up transitional shelter might harm future benefits for permanent houses which were also being offered. For example, beliefs propagated that receiving a strong steel shelter would relegate priority for the receipt of a brick house.

It is not clear what lessons have been learned on the provision of transitional shelter. Indonesia took on the approach to distribute materials after the earthquake in Central Java (2006) and West Sumatra (2007), but with haphazard institutional protocols. Humanitarian organisations tried to provide bamboo shelters of \$200 a piece in Central Java, but this was by and large a failure as the government was very successful in establishing a permanent housing reconstruction programme early and fast. Also this is explained later. Yet in cases where people cannot provide sheltering sufficiently through self-recovery, no agency has come to fore that is capable of intelligently organised assistance bridging the emergency and permanent stages. The best option is probably for local authorities to be made responsible for distributing building materials and tools, or providing cash grants for people to procure such materials locally. The new disaster management law would allow such approach. But an institutional system with clear guidelines and standby financial modalities has not yet been worked out.

The same institutional shortcomings showed on the issue of landlessness. Many were surprised that the Indonesian Government was initially strict on the issue that people who had squatted or rented premises before the Tsunami could not be resettled. The State had no responsibility in helping landless people to a free plot of land. This stand showed a great concern for social order. Both officials of the central government and in the province were very sensitive to maintaining the status quo. But also within communities, there were instances where poor renters were not allowed to join community meetings. Initially, a conventional solution that had been tried out in past Indonesian social housing programmes was again put forward: in this case, to give rental accommodation to erstwhile renters, preferably in walk-up flats. The provincial administration was an enthusiastic early supporter for this approach. With humanitarian organisations juggling to provide housing to people who had a ready plot of land, the provision of rental flats was perceived as the rightful territory (and budgetary perk) of the provincial government. However, these projects had always been costly, poorly maintained, or of outright bad quality from the start. They had often been built on locations difficult to access and with little transport or other services. If a good location was selected or such services were sufficiently provided, they tended to become gentrified housing inhabited by families better-off than the original poor target groups. And they had only been built in the metropolitan centres of the country and never in Aceh.

By late 2005, various alternate solutions were suggested, such as giving a user right rather than a freehold title to resettled renters, or giving them simply smaller houses. A guideline was also circulated which provided a series of suggestions for village level mediation, with the aim of achieving secure shelter for the poorest and the landless. The provincial administration, however, refused to endorse these



approaches. In 2006, BRR suggested giving cash packages to the affected beneficiaries, but this concept never left the drawing board. Beneficiary lists of renters were very questionable and likely inflated, so deciding on an adequate budget for this programme was difficult. Moreover, cash handouts would cause rental costs to inflate due a shortage of housing. Finally, only in 2007, the only workable solution was accepted, by giving renters small plots and small houses in resettlement locations.

The lesson here is that in crisis situations, it is unlikely that novel ways will emerge to undo social problems and faltering social services. So far, urban policies in Indonesia still opt to push poorer people away to suburbs where they can afford to acquire or lease cheap land. Rental apartment schemes are a rare but no better alternative, as explained above. Only a few local authorities are experimenting with schemes for comprehensive urban neighbourhood upgrading programmes which explicitly also target rental accommodation for the poor, for instance by providing home expansion loans to homeowners. It is evident that more experience in urban programmes is urgently required in order to build preparedness for future post-disaster responses, especially in relation to disasters affecting the larger urban centres. Responding to the need for protection and durable shelter, defining renter rights and dealing with landlessness remain large challenges in such a scenario.

## ONE BRR AND TWO GOVERNMENT HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES

The transitional shelter programme did not stop the swell of permanent housing construction activities. The Peace Agreement had convinced everybody that it was safe to start building and by late 2005 construction of permanent housing took off in earnest. For newly built housing, the Master Plan had clearly provided a guaranteed 36 m<sup>2</sup> landed unit – 15 m<sup>2</sup> more than what was common in the subsidised social housing programmes but on a very tight budget of a maximum of three thousand dollars. The guarantee of size and the related cap on costs were important: from the on-set, the government was concerned about equity, not just among Acehese families needing shelter, but also between Tsunami victims and other present and future need groups in the country. The size was the result of public pressure building up in Aceh. The standard one-bedroom 21 m<sup>2</sup> starter units of the Indonesian social housing programmes were deemed too small for the average Aceh family and unfit to provide privacy to female family members. A 36 m<sup>2</sup> unit could provide two bedrooms. The Jakarta policy makers insisted on the cost cap for the sake of prudence, even though the outline budget was not really sufficient to build units of 36 m<sup>2</sup> in compliance with the requirements for earthquake resistance expressed in the national engineering standards.

Prior to the building, however, decisions had to be taken about the funding – even more so as early pilots convinced organisations that the capped unit cost dictated by the Master Plan was not realistic. The funding decisions and the related strategies explain why so many different and competing approaches would ensue. Already in early 2005, it was evident that very large Tsunami donations had been made or pledged. Yet it took many months before broad and firm clarity was achieved whether these funds were earmarked for emergency assistance only, or whether the pledges to hundreds of international organisations were sufficiently firm to be relied upon for recovery and reconstruction also. Many policy makers were also puzzled by the unprecedented pledged amount for shelter in particular. By early April 2005, the Humanitarian Information System of the United Nations already recorded US\$ 900 million as donations and pledges for shelter only, five times more than for education, the second best funded sector.<sup>18</sup> Soon afterwards, the government also started to set aside large amounts of funding for housing reconstruction. As a result of the Paris Club agreement which postponed foreign debt payments, it had US\$ 2 billion in accrued cash available for reconstruction in Aceh and Nias.

The emphasis on housing on the side of the Indonesian Government happened for the political reasons highlighted earlier – as a response of a young democracy and a new cabinet to people in a war zone hit by an unimaginable disaster – but also so for several pragmatic reasons. Firstly, up to late 2005, the government was rightfully uncertain about the firmness of the commitment of foreign pledges through





INGOs. Secondly, it was also uncertain about the final level of need, up to late 2006. Thirdly, it faced an expected political necessity to show that local contractors and government programmes could deliver, even if there was a learning curve. And lastly, it initially favoured a controlled uniform process of delivery as more conducive to assure an equitable, fair and accountable distribution of reconstruction assistance. For all those reasons, the government needed to pool funds.

The Indonesian Government was by and large right on all four counts. The first reason of uncertainty was obvious: past disasters had shown that pledges were often empty promises and that after the emergency assistance, little help followed; moreover, if the Peace Agreement had not been signed, many organisations may never have started capital intensive programmes in Aceh. On the second issue, it was prudent for the government to be careful on estimating the need, especially as political promises for housing had been made. It was widely known that beneficiary counts always remained highly approximate, even after the signing of the Peace Agreement. About 25% of the population of the province legitimately claimed displacement at one point in time. The need levels also fluctuated, making accounting even more difficult. Short term displacement as a result of the Tsunami was intertwined by longer term displacement as a result of the war and by more ordinary seasonal migration related to livelihoods. Right after the Tsunami, the government had urged and facilitated the move of women and children to relatives in unaffected villages, so that children could continue to attend school. These migrations opened up the likelihood for double counts as a result of separated families. Furthermore, communication between communities and local authorities was fraught by distrust due to the conflict context, and producing fabricated statistics was common on either side. Some beneficiaries simply felt safer to register two claims in the hope to get at least one responded to. Only by 2007, BRR would succeed in setting up a province wide single beneficiary registry of a reasonable quality. By consequence, those involved in 2005 in setting the funding strategy for the Indonesian Government realised that needs numbers were unreliable and that it would take time to bring the issue under control.

On the two last issues, the government's treatment of NGOs as development partners with limited capabilities was fair and logical. It rightfully claimed that virtually all NGOs lacked the experience needed for the government to entrust them with housing reconstruction projects. Also INGOs had little prior experience in large scale housing reconstruction, so they would go through a learning curve as anybody else. Moreover, many donors and developing countries had just signed the Paris Agreement on Aid Effectiveness, agreeing on the principle for systematic national implementation through national budget systems. Furthermore, national NGOs had no capacity for capital intensive housing development; advocacy and soft development assistance were the most that could be expected from them. The Indonesian Government had however a reasonable legacy in channelling social services through government programmes, such as through the Kecamatan Development Programme and the Urban Poverty Programme.<sup>19</sup>







For all these reasons, a government programme for housing reconstruction was a logical endeavour and thus funds for it were needed, and set aside. Surprisingly, however, the more principled objective to deliver equitable, fair and accountable housing assistance by means of a single, large scale and uniform programme was not upheld. The government even ended up itself with two entirely different implementation approaches. These were Re-Kompak, which expanded the Urban Poverty Programme and applied a community based cash grant approach, and a much larger contractor-lead programme largely implemented by BRR itself, which contracted out housing and settlement construction packages to Acehese and national builders.<sup>20</sup>

In the first months of 2005, Re-Kompak was formulated as the back-bone housing reconstruction programme to be run by the national Public Works Department and the World Bank. It was to be spun off from the existing national community contracting programmes that had delivered neighbourhood infrastructure in the past, including in Aceh. Through it, modest permanent shelter could be built by communities themselves, under the supervision of the facilitators employed by the Public Works offices. In June 2005, the programme was submitted to the MDF for funding to build 50,000 new houses. Already at the proposal stage, it encountered resistance. UPP had never provided housing construction before and had a relatively modest track record in Aceh. Moreover, the cash grant programmes had proven to be more effective and accountable in rural areas than in urban areas, but the rural cash grant programmes had not been managed by the Ministry of Public Works, but by the Department of Home Affairs. There was no resistance to the idea that the Indonesian Government would demonstrate the preferred approach to housing reconstruction, as a matter of policy, and then encourage large international programmes to engage in the implementation by replicating the pilots. However, by proposing a massive target of 50,000 housing units, the programme simply appeared to compete against the non-governmental organisations. After objections of the MDF, only a first stage of the programme was approved – still good for 25,000 new houses.

If Re-Kompak had started off fast and strongly once it was approved, it could still have become the de-facto policy benchmark. Unfortunately, this never happened as it had to overcome many hurdles. The Public Works Department clearly was not ready to scale up UPP quickly. It also needed to experiment with viable approaches in the same way as other programmes, for instance promoting complete neighbourhood re-planning in Lembang, Banda Aceh, while supporting piecemeal rebuilding following existing plot boundaries in other city wards. To become the benchmark programme, Re-Kompak should have been the trend-setter in terms of desired processes and outcomes, but the Public Works Department was too inward looking to take on the roles of public advocacy and know-how dissemination. Re-Kompak was simply not designed to respond to these needs in Aceh. Its promises for assistance to communities were not seen as more credible than the promises made by humanitarian organisations.

More worryingly, however, was that Re-Kompak had also little real support from the Acehese political elite and the high-level provincial public works officials in office in 2005 and 2006. Local politicians and bureaucrats did not see cash grant programmes as suitable vehicles for accountable and empowered public service delivery. Living in a conflict zone, few in Aceh believed that local neutral facilitation of village communities was anyhow possible and were not willing to hand over sizeable cash grants to communities 'of the wrong camp'. Many simply favoured conventional local contractors to do conventional building with neither the proper oversight nor accountability. So, for most of the Acehese decision makers, it was not about choosing between a government programme and the assistance of INGOs. In 2005, they simply hoped that INGOs would automatically spend their money through local contractors. The political will to prioritise Re-Kompak was clearly missing.

When it became evident that INGOs were initially slow and hesitant to put out commercial contracts, the Provincial Human Settlements Department started contracting out the first batches of permanent houses directly, even though it did not dispose over sufficient budgets to do so at a considerable scale. Very soon, it forced BRR, with its broad mandate and access to central-government funding lines, to show goodwill and put out more contracts with the local contractors. In the last quarter of 2005, BRR started off with funding a modest few hundred small contractors, from which there were very mixed performances. In 2006, what was started as a compromise and goodwill gesture became a massive programme in its own right and with massive management problems.

In December 2005, BRR concluded that it needed to leapfrog over the many messy problems it perceived, such as the fear that people were resettling in outright dangerous areas, the slow and questionable performance of INGOs,<sup>21</sup> the problems of Re-Kompak, the dead-end approach of working through a few hundred hand-picked local contractors and the insufficient mobilisation of labour and materials from Java and North Sumatra. BRR decided that it was time to embark on bolder endeavours and that it was capable to change gears. It started to pursue a solid contractor-built programme, with professional planning preparation, not to achieve resettlement for all but to organise the rebuilding of hamlets and neighbourhoods, based on improved land divisions and with new housing systems. It wanted to enhance the village planning efforts, to encourage far reaching land use changes and thus property swaps within villages in order to make their plans more efficient in terms of land use and service delivery. It wanted to introduce building systems to build houses more quickly and of better quality than had been achieved by small inexperienced local contractors or self-built housing paid for by NGOs. BRR also endeavoured to bring in the larger national contracting companies, many of which are state owned. Meanwhile it had to develop data and other systems to support and coordinate beneficiary selection, land acquisition, progress of land mapping and village planning and other core coordination matters.

The ambitions were too numerous. Some of the ensuing failures had to do with naivety of professionals from Jakarta operating in unknown political territory. A well meant open contractor registration call went awry as thousands of mostly Acehese contractors suddenly appeared, almost out of nowhere. And even the national contractors were in a for a false start in March 2006: Waskita Karya, a large government owned contractor, which started early to take on housing related contracts in Aceh, was immediately blacklisted by BRR – it had subcontracted all works to brokers and incapable small contractors, keeping much of the contract value to itself. Other failures were simply due to the fact that planning and housing professionals had never dealt with large scale upgrading programmes of informal housing and neighbourhoods. Small-scale micro approaches to kampong improvement programming had fizzled out in the late 1980s in favour of integrated urban macro-infrastructure improvement programming in large cities. Community housing programming had only been tested in small-scale pilots.

By mid 2006, a full blown contractor programme mushroomed in parallel to Re-Kompak. Rather than opting for a single approach to housing delivery, BRR both opted to spread risks by supporting two entirely different programmes and became an implementation agency itself. Yet often it looked like that risks had not been spread but multiplied. So much effort was required to manage these multiple programmes and ambitions, from beneficiary selection to overseeing contracting in thousands of locations, that BRR at times was more like an overburdened housing developer than a broad policy and coordination government agency. BRR was never able to lay out a truly equitable and community-driven policy for housing recovery or even to achieve an orderly overall housing reconstruction programme. Its main focus



simply became the completion of housing construction, with the help of over 100 implementation partners. Of the approximately 125,000 houses built by late 2008, BRR had taken on a hefty one third. Eighty three percent of what BRR funded was built by conventional contractors. Re-Kompak saw its share reduced to only about 8,000 units, as cost inflation hollowed out its budget in 2006. Re-Kompak also funded the repairs of another 7,000 units, addressing a gap in the response of many other organisations.<sup>22</sup>

## INDONESIA'S FOREMOST HOUSING AND SETTLEMENT REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

The rocky times for the BRR Housing Department lasted till late 2006. By early 2007, BRR opted for a more pragmatic approach. For the remaining two and a half years, until mid-2009, it decisively proceeded in trying to get things done on time, without sacrificing fair judgment and with the sense of pragmatism on par with the overall strategic decision making that BRR at large had ascribed to from the beginning: handing out building programmes to better contractors; working with proven non-governmental programmes to fill gaps; forcing slow international organisations to get their building programmes started while assisting them in overcoming bottle-necks, for instance in relation to access, transport or land; getting a sufficient number of re-settlement projects started so that also ex-renters could obtain a new house; and setting up reliable data systems, including one which took the best possible shot at achieving an exhaustive beneficiary list. With much pride, BRR also succeeded in 2008 to build up a GIS-based database of all housing built, including what was provided through its partners. Its geospatial database system was given a technology award by the Singapore Government. By late 2008, BRR had grown into a de-facto housing and settlement authority, dealing with the issues above but also with standards, compliance, supplies, market regulation, water and sanitation, spatial planning, gender mainstreaming, advocacy and coordination in general. Various national and international agencies were engaged in many of the tasks, but BRR was the authority in charge and the meeting point for all.

Setting and upholding constructing standards was a challenge all the way through. Already in early 2005, the government made attempts to formulate local construction standards compliant to the national engineering standards. The Public Works department put together a new Building Code specifically for the Tsunami-affected areas. Issued in June 2005, this Building Code had two sections: one on construction standards for earthquake safe rebuilding and the other on resettlement planning.

Hardwood timber is the traditional building material in Aceh and Nias – bamboo is not commonly available – and timber is still most common in rural areas. By mid 2005, it was thought that early rebuilding would mainly apply timber. Soon, however, it became clear that good quality timber was not available in sufficient quantities, especially timber originating from legal and sustainable sources. Highly skilled carpenters were also not around in large numbers, as the war had disrupted traditional building as much as any other economic activity for many years. By late 2005, both beneficiaries and housing implementation organisations settled for reinforced concrete structures with brick infill as the more desired modality. Materials were more readily available, the environmental impact on the forests of Aceh thought to be less pronounced – even though the locally made bricks are burned with firewood, but environmental advocacy groups had not figured that out – and people saw brick houses as the better, nicer and perhaps also safer option. A brick house is a safe house, in many ways. It can stop bullets and cannot be easily burned down – perceptions not without relevance in a war area.

In Indonesia, construction standards are not commonly enforced for small residential properties where small builders usually use a reinforced concrete structure and brick infill but cut back on steel size, cement content and good detailing. 'Building back better' was expected to deliver over and above the quality of the usual small contractor work in Aceh and Nias. The engineering standards of the code were based on the strictest interpretation of the national standards. Yet the expectations were hard to achieve. The earthquake hazards in Aceh, especially along the west coast, put stringent demands on the detailing of reinforcement steel. Only experienced workers from North Sumatra and Java who had worked on





modern multi-story buildings had some understanding of the requirements.<sup>23</sup> Good materials were also in short supply. Due to the prolonged war in Aceh and the fallout of the Asian economic crisis, the building sector had been severely depressed, both locally and nationally, so the surge capacity of experienced contractors, labourers and quality suppliers was quasi non-existent, for sure in Aceh. Few training or certification programmes were institutionally available outside the major cities in the country.

Many suppliers of construction materials got away with dumping sub-standard materials. BRR often attempted to improve the supply of materials. Already in late 2005, BRR succeeded in supporting the supply chain, for instance by strongly endorsing the inter-island shipping service of WFP, requesting UNHCR to provide free timber in Nias and arranging for tax-free import facility for the benefit of INGOs.<sup>24</sup> At times, it simply applied minimal approaches such as making sure that key suppliers, such as cement manufacturers, did not manipulate the prices by under-supplying local vendors. With only a few manufacturers controlling distributing networks, BRR knew whom to deliver a stern message to.

For other building materials, the market structure made informal pressure ineffective. So BRR conceived an initiative to allow the private sector to purchase quality materials from vendors with vendor pre-financing and a payment system supported by Bank Nasional Indonesia, a large Indonesian state owned bank. In 2006, it was approved in principle, but was never realised. The context had become too fickle: after the Peace Agreement, substantial parts of the supplies of local raw construction materials ended up being controlled by GAM related groups and gangs, assuring an instant and easy peace-time livelihood for the members of GAM but not an open market nor a predictable investment environment. A longer term outlook for the warehousing scheme was also lacking: the building boom would be over soon and future demand would be limited in a province with only one million households. The warehouse plan was a fair proposal though and in other provinces in Indonesia it could have succeeded.

Assuring compliance to the Building Code was difficult and supervision was never tightly regulated. In a country with a weak regulatory environment in general and a province where the rule of law was often under pressure, both before and after the Peace Agreement, one could expect this to be an issue. To further complicate matters, BRR established the dual roles of programme regulator and coordinator on the one hand and programme implementation organisation on the other hand. Adding the role of chief compliance agency proved a role too many. So only when contractors grossly under-performed or when a







humanitarian organisation established a pertinently slapdash implementation programme, BRR would blacklist the contractor from future contract opportunities or admonish the organisation to halt its housing implementation activities. The very worst-case incidents were reported to the police, but with little effect. Compliance was mainly provided through internal supervision mechanisms set up by responsible agencies. The threat of adverse publicity in the local or international press was an additional pressure. UN-HABITAT provided a sector-wide quality monitoring tool, through field surveys covering 81 organisations jointly conducted with the Syiah Kuala University of Banda Aceh, as is recounted in the next chapter. But the monitoring was only indicative, as it was based on relatively small samples and queried also progress and process quality, including the social dimensions of satisfaction, accountability and settlement-wide sustainability. It was not designed to provide supervision controls.

Water and sanitation was another concern. Early on, 'building back better' expectations had been fed by the many humanitarian INGOs who often are specialised in the provision of clean drinking water. As said earlier, the Building Code was not only about construction standards but also covered rules for settlement planning. The latter part was again inspired by the practice of Indonesian social housing. Site planning was about delivering the suburban housing estates of at most a few thousands houses at a time. Overall, settlement planning had always been a marginal practice, especially outside the major urban metropolitan centres of Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian residential area developments have always been informal or lightly planned and incrementally serviced, after people had plotted out land and built houses. With resettlement unwanted by the majority, the settlement planning component in the Building Code was, in the end, relevant only for the few standards about water, sanitation and drainage. And even for these, BRR had to develop new directives, such as for the provision of sanitation in water logged low lying areas. BRR published ambitious technical implementation guidelines, requiring a two-room septic tank and a filtration yard or a planted leach field.

But the technical realities were cumbersome: traditionally, urban people used a simple soak pit while toilets were not common on the countryside. Making new water tight septic tanks required strict construction supervision, which was a rare expertise both before and after the Tsunami. In waterlogged areas, new lightweight fancy plastic septic tanks even floated up due to the upwards water pressure. The social realities were often even more cumbersome: except where high-quality contractors were paid to put in a small number of systems at a high cost without asking people, or where social facilitators put in tremendous efforts to educate a small number of households, the change from very poor sanitation

provisions to state-of-the-art amenities was perceived with incredulity or even rejected. Simple hygiene education had to come first, but by that time, tens of thousands poorly built septic tanks had been put into the ground. Organisations like IOM and UN-HABITAT, with support of BRR, Red Cross organisations and ADB and in collaboration with the provincial Human Settlements Departments, have lately started to amend the problems, but this will be a long process.

The BRR Housing Department also dealt with issues of land management, spatial planning and community infrastructure delivery through the commissioning of significant amounts of consulting work and the mobilisation of capital funding through a large number of decentralised coordination and project units. These activities were done in the shadow of the building programmes and often in cooperation with local authorities. BRR's work on land management was a good case in point. In 2005, the provincial and the local authorities had done quick and often irresponsible land acquisitions, in the expectation that a large scale resettlement programme would soon start. A number of areas were eventually developed, but many sites were waterlogged or otherwise inaccessible and would have required staggering landfill or access infrastructure budgets. The BRR director of land worked for four years on the selection, documentation and certification of sites, making the best of them available to BRR or partner organisations.

The land section had also to support RALAS, even though it was implemented by BPN. Earlier it was explained that the unintended consequence of this programme had become massive early return. So what were the activities of RALAS? For the few urban areas, it restored damaged or lost land titles through document restoration and on-site re-measurements. For the majority of rural and informally built-up and adjacent areas it would simply issue formal land certificates for custom held land plots. After community members had defined the land boundaries and agreed on the identity of the owners, professional enumerators would redo the measurements and identification in order to update the cadastre and issue the titles, stripping out mistakes. In addition, RALAS also had several explicit and implicit goals, founded on classical land economy: formal land titles would allow people to establish business and livelihood activities on land with secure tenure; they would allow people to take out secondary mortgages to provide working capital for the rebuilding of livelihoods; and their very large number would create an open and free market of tradable land.<sup>25</sup>

The RALAS programme has remained problematic and slow since its inception. The National Land Agency saw no urgency and acted as a bureaucracy eschewing change and openness, while BRR, at its core, was driven by the opposite. Moreover, once everybody was convinced that security of tenure was assured, there was no real mass demand for papers stating land ownership. The economic justifications for the creation of a market for the trading and collateralisation of land titles assumed a modern economy, not a post-conflict one. RALAS may show its benefits in a generation or so, but the immediate impact of putting out land title certificates for residential plots remains questionable.<sup>26</sup> The short-term risks should also not be neglected. For instance, people were at times afraid to get a certificate in fear of having it stolen. Women also discovered that while in the customary system land was in effect controlled by extended families along the female line, official land records were now on the name of the husband. Here BRR was able to act: it supported a change of the rules assuring that all ensuing land titles would be on the names of husbands and wives. With deft publicity, BRR also advocated that this innovation become applicable nationally.

The gender issues around land titling and also the sanitation experience shows the odd reverse universe in which BRR often had to operate: with hundreds of agencies and NGOs doing large amounts of nuts-and-bolts implementation work around it, BRR often became the ultimate advocacy agency. This is in contrast to the usual proceedings of governments delivering services and NGOs providing advocacy. However, BRR's advocacy on gender and secure tenure and on safe sanitation could not overcome the social realities and the need for slow and persistent development work. Moreover, it was bound to be short term. The role of advocacy is now again reverted to local authorities and local NGOs.

The tasks of spatial planning faced the same limitations. BRR and partner institutions such as the ADB put a lot of effort into drawing up sub-district spatial plans and strengthening the capacity of district level planning officials, so that they could assist in local programming based on updated, localised, spatial plans. This was important to re-establish a sense of order and to prioritise decisions for the rebuilding and upgrading of local infrastructure. The new Spatial Planning Law of 2007 requires districts to also update



their plans. An example of promising institutional support was provided to the city administration of Banda Aceh and the district government of neighbouring Aceh Besar. GTZ not only provided significant support to sub-district level spatial planning, but also developed GIS systems which allow for better future urban management, including municipal management issues relevant to Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar jointly. Cross-boundary municipal management will be more often required in the future, for instance once a newly developed sanitary land fill will be operational at Blang Bintang, at a location stretching into both districts.

In 2006, UN-HABITAT entered into a partnership with local government institutions and non-governmental organisations to achieve a spatial plan for the most heavily destroyed urban sub-district, Meuraxa in Banda Aceh. A community radio programme and a community forum were organised during the planning exercise. Newsletters were published to facilitate the dissemination of information. A community centre was constructed for the standing forum, to accommodate the planning team and to house and conserve spatial planning information for a longer period. Making use of the standing forum, UN-HABITAT's spatial planning exercise applied a strong participatory approach. It was a time consuming undertaking in order to sort out neighbourhood issues and build linkages with the planners of the city administration and the infrastructure engineers of BRR.

UN-HABITAT aimed not to rush the completion of legal land use plans. Instead it facilitated consensus building on such issues as the basic spatial structure, infrastructure reticulation and general visions and scenarios – elements and levels where the participation of the survivors proved to be possible. In the years before the Tsunami, strong divisions between the city planners and stakeholders groups had come to the fore. The community planning in Meuraxa proved an opportunity for conflict management based on the development of common visions, goals, and a forward-looking focus. It provided an institutional contribution, even though it covered only one sub-district and thus only gave a hint how to connect and empower local planning with district level decision making in challenging times.

Improving spatial planning and linking it to better programming and budgeting are ultimately long-term endeavours. Recent regulatory changes in Indonesia are trying to fill in the gaps.<sup>27</sup> A high BRR official admitted, in late 2008, that the capacity of local officials to prioritise infrastructure spending was still very limited. For instance, a new provincial head of department discovered that the majority of required road and neighbourhood upgrading works specified in the medium-term development plan of the province were questionable.

Forums like in Meuraxa were set up at various places to provide coordination. Community groups and government departments dealt with a multitude of issues and INGOs, creating a situation which required continuous and laborious forms of coordination. Government planning functions could only deal with the constant and long-term issues, while most community forums and local consultation mechanisms could at best consolidate short-term decision-making. Local forums were indeed helpful, but required a lot of assistance. They were set up initially where they mattered most, at the village and the sub-district level. In many places, they were simple coordination meetings between various stakeholders. Over time, a few grew into more institutional engagements, including the Kabupaten Recovery Forums, which brought together BRR, INGOs and district level stakeholders, with assistance of the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC). These experiences with time consuming coordination beg the question whether so-called 'area based development', whereby multiple recovery tasks within a specific geographic area would have been allocated to a single agency, could have been the better strategy to bolster recovery programming. The lack of an area based approach meant that there was a great need to re-integrate the many disjointed issues and thus to uphold a variety of weakly empowered committees and ad-hoc forums at local levels.

Whether an area based approach would have been a better alternative, is now a hypothetical question, as it was rarely tried out. The many humanitarian actors, with different background and degrees of experience, created an environment of competition rather than of coordination allowing the allocation of tasks. Bureaucratic forces within donors and large INGOs and between departments overseen by BRR had also given rise to a compartmentalisation of assistance by sector. Funding had been given for a specific purpose to an often specialised organisation and was coordinated by a specialised deputy within BRR. Within BRR, budgets were tied to sectors and overseen by sector deputies – who together with the





director were appointed by the President. The agency continuously tried to bolster the roles of local coordination offices, but apart from localised procurement offices, it had only limited success. If the IASC cluster system had been applied, it may have fostered a more controlled cooperation environment, but the cluster system was conceived after considering the setbacks of the post-Tsunami assistance; and it now subscribes first to sector-driven coordination while it experiments cautiously with area-focused coordination. In retrospect, the wisdom of sector based coordination has never really been questioned, even though one could point to very successful holistic programmes such as of UPLINK or to the merits of cross-sectoral programming done by a number of more conventionally operating humanitarian organisations such as CRS. These examples put weight to the argument that area based approaches are more comprehensive, integrated, holistic and probably sustainable. They also allow easier and potentially better planning.<sup>28</sup>

The issue of coordination is thus unresolved. BRR set a new standard for persistent, large-scale and accountable coordination and implementation in Indonesia. It managed to deal simultaneously with a multitude of issues, in collaboration with a large number of stakeholders. This is quite an achievement in Indonesia. But the record on strengthened and empowered local planning is ambiguous at best.

## NGO IMPLEMENTATION AS A PROXY FOR COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

So far, the discussion has by and large focused on issues of principles, policies, standards, coordination, planning, logistics and organisation building. Limited attention has been given to the housing reconstruction process on the ground itself and on the role of the NGOs, Red Cross movements, bilateral engagements and United Nations programmes involved in the implementation of housing. As mentioned above, two thirds of all houses built were funded and implemented through these programmes.<sup>29</sup>

For the foreseeable future, it will actually remain uncertain whether the massive NGO involvement was an institutional aberration or a stroke of luck for Aceh and Nias. Western governments had fostered the role of NGOs in international development for decades, on the presumption that they could often better connect to local communities and their local social institutions than official government administrations. It also allowed governments to do away with the fraught relationship between tied aid and social development. NGOs have spearheaded community participation in development, happily assuming that their very organisational setups and culture embodies community empowerment. For the past 20





years now, NGOs have also spearheaded humanitarian assistance, through their know-how for direct assistance on the ground. They established systems of funding, mobilisation and delivery which function on much goodwill, lean budgets and short time frames.

A British senior aid official admitted that the Tsunami suddenly expanded the systems beyond their stretching capabilities, putting at risk decades of policy efforts to nurture the NGO role and potentially causing the donating public to put the blame for failure not on the Indonesian Government but on their own governments, for not sufficiently supporting the INGOs. As said earlier, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 put the responsibility back with the governments and local institutions where aid and assistance is delivered. For Aceh and Nias, the Multi Donor Fund functioned as an institutional meeting place between donating countries, multilateral organisations and the key Indonesian response institutions, which included of course BRR.

Yet the hundreds of humanitarian organisations in Aceh and Nias did strongly shape policy on the ground, aided by experience gained in places such as Gujarat (India) and Bam (Iran) after the earthquakes of 2001 and 2003 respectively. Critical contextual advice and experimenting on the ground also came from a small group of Indonesian community housing specialists who had tenuously build up experience within small community-based projects in the past. By early to mid 2005, while policy makers in Jakarta agonised on the design of a proper housing reconstruction programme, these small groups had been working out the process logic within communities: to set up village committees and to re-establish leadership (most often limited to replacing deceased leaders), to do the community based land mapping (most often simply re-establishing pre-Tsunami plot boundaries), and to do village planning (usually not more than working around obstacles caused by the Tsunami, such as roads lost to the sea). So by August 2005, it became evident, including to the BRR key operatives on the ground in Aceh, that the process logic made sense, at least for the preparation prior to building and perhaps for the housing rebuilding itself. BRR published four guidelines which essentially contained the brainstorming and recommendations of these field teams.

Of course the reality was much more chaotic than what the guidelines presented. The village committees had many other tasks at hand, such as tracing lost family members, supporting the re-issuance of identity and other crucial documents and organising the distribution of humanitarian support to the community – food, water, tents, school kits and other services supporting vital needs. The village leaders themselves were often travelling back and forth between their neighbourhood and barrack or other shelter locations, at times as far away as in Medan, North Sumatra. For the prioritisation of households entitled to receive a new house, there were few rules at the start; seniority and status often took precedence over vulnerability. Furthermore, there was uncertainty over how to deal practically with land which had no direct claimants, either due to displacement or death. So, experience and confidence grew organically. Bit by bit, more humanitarian organisations took on the steps of the process of land mapping



following by elementary planning and leading to house construction. Many organisations learned on the spot and through trial and error.

By about September 2005, most organisations had agreed to adhere to the principles of the four reconstruction guidelines of BRR. Organisations could show their house designs to local Public Works departments for technical advice and endorsement. Organisations had to work out agreements both with their head quarters and with the target communities. Delays were common and resulted in other organisations offering a housing programme to the same community. 'Flag planting' – competition to claim communities in accessible locations, fomented by the fact that organisations had collected funding for more than 200,000 housing units – became a systemic problem during late 2005 up to the end of 2006.

Real building started off slow. By September 2005, there was almost no building activity to speak of. BRR set the ambitious target of finishing 30,000 houses by the end of the first year. Eventually, 16,000 were reported finished and as many under construction. Continuous reporting throughout 2006 revealed that this was over-optimistic self-reporting by implementing organisations. Probably only about 8,000 units had been finished by the first anniversary of the Tsunami. But additional information on the progress of the preparatory process of land mapping and of the number of housing starts showed that by April 2006 reconstruction was good and well underway.

Donors liked the improved outlook and continued to pledge funding for new housing in Aceh and Nias well into 2006. However, the real risk of over-supply was overcome as price inflation hollowed out budgets early. Double-digit inflation kicked in strongly by late 2005 when fuel prices doubled nationally, disrupting overall cost expectations and starting a bidding frenzy for materials and labour. While inflation rose twofold in Indonesia to between 15-20% during late 2005 and much of 2006, it jumped to levels between 25% and 40% in Aceh.<sup>30</sup> As said, the policy target was to build 36 m<sup>2</sup> homes for about US\$ 3,000 per unit, which was a difficult target for full brick houses in compliance with the reinforced concrete standards of the building code. US\$ 3,500 to US\$ 4,000 would have been more realistic, before inflation set in. By late 2007, average costs had escalated to range between US\$ 6,500 for 36 m<sup>2</sup> units put up with local labour, mostly through community based programmes, and over US\$ 13,000 for 45 m<sup>2</sup> houses commissioned by many Red Cross organisations and built by national contractors.<sup>31</sup>

The hope for equity had been given up early as a result of the confusion on standards and budgets throughout 2005. Already in August, a high BRR official had formulated the pragmatic solution to let organisations decide how to build houses of minimum 36 m<sup>2</sup>, on the grounds that the Indonesian state had not really the right to limit donations from private organisations to private citizens. BRR stuck to its principles: equity was a policy concern, but the rights of people could not be infringed as a result of a principle which the state, providing housing through several conduits itself, was very much unlikely to uphold itself. On the whole, the reconstruction of housing was made possible by the ample funding; the Peace Agreement; the pragmatic steering of BRR; and the resilience of a system where many NGOs each competed to provide a relatively small numbers of houses, from less than 100 to a few thousand. Failing organisations exited, new ones entered and all those working slowly achieved higher standards of delivery, yet at ever higher costs. Luckily for Aceh, the reconstruction boom brought local jobs, supported local business, got many GAM fighters in the economic mainstream early and in the end provided a large new housing stock. Numerous Acehnese got invaluable work experience within BRR or the many humanitarian organisations.

But, as suggested at the start of this section, was the assistance of so many NGOs also a stroke of luck for Aceh and Nias? Indeed, having come in such a large number, the Indonesian Government saw no other policy than assuring openness to them. Moreover, many smaller organisations – acting as if under the radar screen of officialdom – started working on the ground and progressed onto workable solutions to making early return possible. Social dynamics also played a role. The NGOs were visible and stood for voluntary action. These are two out of three key social ingredients of 'commitment' – the key issue both communities and policy makers feared that would witter away after the generous outpouring of assistance in the first weeks. To reinforce commitment, NGOs also focused on the delivery of shelter, especially permanent housing. Delivering houses of bricks and mortar shows commitment very clearly. Indeed, social acts of commitment should not only be visible and voluntary, but also irrevocable.<sup>32</sup> Nothing is more irrevocable than a house of bricks, especially in the eyes of communities who had their houses washed





away. The Indonesian Government realised that in the future event of disasters, it would have to show the same swift, clear and easy-to-understand commitments. After a traumatic event, it will need to come forward with concrete, visible and both fair and generous promises for recovery, backed up with the certainty only governments can provide, i.e. the provision of services on a basis of equality, the guarantee of the security of tenure and other basic rights, and the application of a fair rule of law.

## SEARCHING FOR SUCCESS FACTORS

But commitment is only a policy stand. Achieving results requires also the right approach. With the government running two different housing programmes and over 100 NGOs often doing their planning and programming with only a perfunctory compliance with the BRR guidelines, the question arises what worked and what failed. In 2006 and 2007, UN-HABITAT and the Banda Aceh based Syiah Kuala University conducted settlement monitoring surveys. The monitoring programme in more than 150 villages is explained at length in the next chapter of this publication. It tracked 81 different housing implementation organisations, including the programmes of BRR. The results are summarised in Table I.1.

TABLE I.1 : HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN ACEH EVALUATED (SCALE 0 TO 10) (246 samples\*)

	Construction Quality	Satisfaction among beneficiaries with the process	Perception of transparency among beneficiaries	% of all samples
Aceh	7 ± 1	6 ± 2	6 ± 3	
1a. Contractor -built	7	6	6	75%
1b. Community -based	7	6	7	25%
2a. Small organisations	6**	6	6	25%
2b. Large organisations	7	6	7	75%
3. Early realisation	6***	5	5	7%
4. Low satisfaction	6***	3	4	20%
<b>Cut-off values</b>	7.5 = compliant to the building code, relative to the earthquake zone	7 or more indicates high satisfaction	8 or more indicates a very transparent process	

\* A sample is the implemented programme of a housing implementation in one particular village

\*\* Reduced quality is due to a significant proportion of houses built with less durable materials (timber, panels)

\*\*\* Early realisation: programmes which were started and completed early (in 2006); Low satisfaction: programmes which scored significantly low on the satisfaction indicator, for most or all of their sampled implementation locations.

The table differentiates a variety of approaches: housing programmes designed by professional consultants and contracted out to registered contractors; programmes implemented by communities, through so-called community contracts as applied by Re-Kompak and UN-HABITAT or through empowered community decision making on planning and procurement; programmes run by either small or large organisations; programmes which kicked off very early in 2005; and programmes which scored very poorly on the key indicators of satisfaction and accountability.<sup>33</sup>

A number of issues stand out in this evaluation :

- Overall, the reconstruction, through a process using many non-governmental organisations



resulted in modest construction quality and only modest satisfaction, including on the issue of transparency.

- The evaluation is basically similar for organisations employing contractors or applying a community-organised process.
- The evaluation is also basically similar whether for small organisations or large organisations.
- When satisfaction is significantly lower, construction quality is not necessarily bad as well.

This evaluation begs the question whether any success factor at all was at play in the housing reconstruction in Aceh. There were clearly organisations which on average did much better than others. Well known failing programmes were Save the Children's and Oxfam's, one executed by contractors and the other a programme with reasonable community involvement. Persistently great results were scored by a few programmes, especially UPLINK, which was a brilliant community-based initiative supported by the Urban Poor Consortium of Jakarta and experienced community practitioners from Gujarat. Most organisations, however, worked in areas where at times the programmes had excellent outcomes and then engaged in other areas where problems were compounded. Competence and due process were no guarantee for a flawless process. Furthermore, the size of the organisation or the layout of the process it implemented cannot explain the success or failure of its housing implementation programmes.

Looking at the organisations in terms of their capacity to achieve satisfaction among beneficiaries gives some more insight. The next table counts the number of organisations in terms of their size and of their capacity to assist communities in a satisfactory way, in the perception of those assisted communities. It shows that the majority of the housing organisations in Aceh accomplished overall satisfaction among beneficiaries (51 out of 81 organisations). Table 1.2 already indicated that beneficiaries assisted by only 1 out of 5 organisations (20%) were truly dissatisfied across the board. The other 80% of organisations had beneficiaries who were either generally satisfied or in doubt. Therefore, housing reconstruction in general went reasonably well, given the circumstances. However, on the impact of those organisations delivering poorly one can only speculate. Considering the problematic social post-conflict environment of Aceh combined with the total information openness upheld by the Indonesian Government, would a low number of bad experiences have created a vicious spiral leading many actors, including people in Aceh, to lose confidence in a non-governmental reconstruction effort in which they had vested their hope for recovery? In other words, by allowing a number of NGOs to jump into the fray without much preparation, was harm done to the reconstruction process as a whole?

A further complicating factor has been that many Indonesian organisations delivered poor results. The one large organisation scoring very poorly in Table 1.2 is BRR itself. As previously discussed, in 2006 it enlarged its programme amidst fears that the NGOs were failing and for many other intricate reasons. Table 1 indeed indicates that many early realisations were below expectations, but unfortunately BRR was not capable of providing a better alternative. Only by 2007 and 2008, there was an overall improvement of performance discernable, including within the BRR programmes.





TABLE 1.2 : DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HOUSING ORGANISATIONS IN ACEH

Assistance provided by...	Proportion of communities being dissatisfied with the assistance provided by a particular housing programme				subtotals
	most or all	many	some	none	
<b>Small organisations</b>	14	8	0	34	56
<b>Large organisations</b>	1	7	5	12	25
<b>Subtotals</b>	15	15	5	46	81

The proportion is against the total number of communities being assisted by that particular housing organisation. For instance, ABC assisted 6 communities, with 4 communities being satisfied and 2 communities dissatisfied, then that organisation is scored under 'some'.

Yet other Indonesian organisations and initiatives also did poorly, as Table 1.2 shows. Of the 14 small organisations listed as leaving communities 'always dissatisfied', 11 were of Indonesian origin, including 3 Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives of Indonesian companies. Prompted by the very generous inflow of charitable funding coming from inside and outside the country, many Indonesian NGOs came in early and tried to work quickly, often as ad-hoc groups. Again, the effect of these failing programmes arguably put a shadow on the recovery engagements as a whole, including on those Indonesian programmes that did very good work and received high scores in the UN-HABITAT surveys. Examples of such strongly performing organisations have been UPLINK, PKPU (an Indonesian relief organisation), Mamamia (an Acehese NGO), Budha Tzu Chi (an Indonesian-Chinese philanthropic organisation with strong business connections) and the Indonesian Red Cross movement.

The above discussion, highlighting the frequent failures of the earliest housing programmes, seems to indicate that the general recipe of promoting early recovery did not work well in Aceh and Nias. However, was it institutional preparedness which failed, both on the side of the government and of NGOs? To achieve real early recovery, a more pro-active policy is required to prepare institutions and non-governmental organisations – including organisations sponsored by the private sector – for a meaningful role in community-organised post-disaster housing reconstruction. Preparedness should include training in land and property rights, safe building standards, the provision of improved access to water and safer sanitation and fast-track community-based procurement of materials and labour. Organisations and institutions should have protocols on how to deal with gender and protection, allowing women and vulnerable people to be focused upon systematically but sensibly. And training should include issues of environmental impact and mitigation. Indonesian NGOs could take on many roles to foster shelter and housing recovery after disaster, but one needs to invest in them from now on. Otherwise, the Tsunami experiences will be repeated.



## OCCUPANCY WORRIES

Throughout the past years, there have been persistent worries that large numbers of houses were built but not occupied. Donors and implementers were concerned that the combined organizational and financial assistance was leading to empty houses. Bad quality, the rebuilding on locations dangerously close to the sea, or over-building were quoted as possible reasons that the reconstruction programme had failed as a whole that is was overhasty, ill planned or overgenerous and mismanaged. Of course, there were always a limited number of projects grossly faltering at any point in time. Oxfam had to close its initial programme due to mismanagement. Save the Children and Care also experienced serious problems. A project of the Turkish Red Crescent in Aceh Besar was ominously deserted, even though another one in Banda Aceh was very popular and well accepted. Many transitional shelters in Banda Aceh were unoccupied or were immediately modified as warehouses or prayer rooms. On the other hand, in November 2006, UN-HABITAT monitored sites of the Canadian Red Cross in Aceh Jaya, finding full occupancy of the steel frame transitional shelters even though families complained wryly about the lack of decent sanitation and social facilities.


Because of the worries, UN-HABITAT reported in late 2007 on the occupancy issues to BRR. Drawing from the results of its monitoring programme conducted jointly with Unsyiah, it provided an analysis of the recorded vacancy levels and on related matters and advised BRR to continue its pragmatic approach, solving problems where such was possible.

### I. Vacancy levels have decreased sharply. Only 10% of finished housing units are vacant for technical reasons.

The graph shows that occupancy levels went up sharply and undoubtedly from early 2006 till mid 2007, from 52% to 73%. In early 2006, it was difficult to get the picture and, simply said, there were still a myriad of reasons why people had not yet moved in, including bad quality of the earliest realisations. By mid 2007, the main reason had become simply 'no reason in particular' (9%), which was a reply like 'I don't know why my neighbours are not here'. Overall, the data stated that only 10% of the houses remained empty for reasons of technical default (bad quality and no infrastructure).

FIGURE I.1 : LEVELS and REASONS of VACANCY 2006-2007

Survey of + 20,000 new houses in Aceh excl. Simeulue



## 2. A normal vacancy rate starts to appear.

A minimum vacancy level is NORMAL in a housing market, just like a labour market needs a certain minimum level of joblessness in order to avoid labour cost inflation and to ascertain the workings of supply and demand, which allow people change jobs and pursue careers. If all houses are occupied, rent levels shoot up and people cannot move when they need to. Houses are also unoccupied due to seasonal reasons. It is not evident to state the normal 'natural' vacancy rate. In the US over the past twenty years, it was around 6% (owner and rental homes aggregated); in Taiwan in the 90's, it was 11%. In Aceh, with an instable economy and post-conflict migration still on-going, one could easily accept a level of 15%, even though there are no empirical data from within Aceh or from comparable areas, with a similar post 'complex disaster' context, to justify a more precise percentage. Moreover, it is unlikely that such a long run vacancy rate in Aceh would already have been reached in 2007, due to the dynamics of people only slowly moving in upon house completion and while infrastructure works are still on-going. There is a strong likelihood that by mid 2008, a normal level is reached. If not, then the instable economy is probably most to blame, as well as the lingering demographic impacts of the tsunami. (See also point 5).

## 3. Vacancy due to bad quality was only an issue at the start, in early 2006.

Respondents in only a limited number of sampled communities mentioned bad quality as a main reason. Overall, as the above graph showed, it was an important reason for leaving houses vacant only in the very first months when a mixture of transitional and permanent houses was completed. This is the full table with cases where bad quality was quoted as the main reason for leaving houses vacant :

TABLE 1.3 : CASES WHERE BAD QUALITY WAS QUOTED AS THE MAIN REASON FOR LEAVING HOUSES VACANT

round	organisation	district	subdistrict	village	completed	occupied	vacant
2	TERRE DE HOMMES GERMANY & KKSP	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK NIE	43	1	42
2	BALAI KESELAMATAN SALVATION ARMY	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK RIBEE	654	500	154
2	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	COT DARAT	60	0	60
2	TERRE DES HOMMES NETHERLANDS	PIDIE	KEMBANG TANJUNG	JEMEURANG	25	25	0
3	MEDCO-JENGALA	BANDA ACEH	MEURAXA	BLANG OI	30	30	0
3	BRR	BANDA ACEH	MEURAXA	PUNGE JURONG	116	58	58
3	SAVE THE CHILDREN	PIDIE	PANTE RAJA	MESJID PANTE RAJA	76	5	71
4	BRR	BANDA ACEH	MEURAXA	GAMPONG BLANG	70	35	35
4	BAKRIE GROUP	BANDA ACEH	SYIAH KUALA	DEAH RAYA	204	10	194
4	CRS	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAMLUMPU	270	108	162
Total					1582	772	778

Well known cases are:

- Terre des Hommes, Habitat for Humanity, Save the Children. They have been remediating their early mistakes.
- BRR in Banda Aceh: this was the small-contractor programme, which resulted in many vacant and/or poorly built houses.
- Bakrie: a case of suspected asbestos use.<sup>34</sup>



- CRS: an anomaly, where supervision went wrong. As far as I know, CRS itself stopped the finishing works.

It should be noted that these most problematic locations still show an occupancy level of 50% on average.

Vacancy levels in BRR funded projects (BRR/small contractors and BRR/Re-Kompak) are about 5% higher when compared to all non-BRR funded projects, which is not really significant. As for other projects, vacancy levels within BRR projects dropped by half over the past year, from approximately 50% to 25%.


**4. Hand-over issues are no real problem, but may distort the perception of 'heavy non-occupancy'.**

At any point in time over the 18 month period from early 2006 to mid 2007, about 10% of the houses which were finished had not yet had their keys handed over. A personal visit may make anybody think that they are part of problem cases, but that is more a matter of appearance than fact. UN-HABITAT suspects, from various sources of information that only for three projects keys may not get handed over at all in the near future : a China Redand two Turkish Red Crescent projects. But there is no firm confirmation about this at the point of formulating this report (in 2007) and further inquiries by BRR were advisable.

**5. Vacancy levels are a demographic and economic problem.**

The graph below clearly shows that vacancy levels decreased quickly everywhere in Aceh. At the East Coast they were already 0% by mid 2007. It could have been that in the other areas, vacancy levels remained relatively high for many months or longer. As said, quality is not a good explanation. More likely causes are : (1) the higher mortality rate, leading to more building within extended families not due to a present need but for future requirements, leaving them living together in one or more of the houses which were built for entitled family members while other units were left for future use, for instance when daughters would marry<sup>35</sup>; and (2) the higher damage to livelihoods which cause people to look for

**FIGURE 1.2 : SUB - REGIONAL VACANCY LEVELS**  
(Excluding in areas where “unfinished” and “no key hand-over” are main reasons)







options elsewhere, even if that is temporarily. That leaves BRR with an agenda 'to clean up', to fix the problem cases (first-wave BRR, Oxfam, Save the Children); and to spend as much as possible of the still available funding on infrastructure.

**6. No strong evidence of the impact of local conflicts on vacancies.**

In the 2007 UN-HABITAT Unsyiah monitoring programme, a question was added whether serious land related conflict had arisen within the community where responded were living and receiving a new house. There is only a weak correlation with the issue of vacancy. Vacancy levels are only marginally higher in communities where land conflicts are reported.

TABLE 1.4 : LAND CONFLICTS REPORTED

	# houses	Occupied	Vacant
Land conflict	2210	70 %	30 %
No land conflict	6502	80 %	20 %

**7. Conclusion :**

By the time BRR would have set up programme responses addressing the issue of the vacancy of houses, most of these problems will have already remediated themselves, barring economic and demographic difficulties. Many of the identified problems simply need steady progress on local infrastructure which would in turn improve productivity in the local economy. Better urban management is required, as are adequate rural-urban transport, good schools and health posts and working capital to open up plantations. There are housing specific issues, such as neighbourhood security, security for women staying alone, safe play areas and of course a better quality of water provision, sanitation and power provision would strongly help. Within its mandate, BRR can still channel money to these causes and to local authorities which will need to deal with them in the long run.



## YOGYAKARTA / CENTRAL JAVA : RE-EMPHASISING THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT FOR EARLY AND PARTICIPATORY RECOVERY

In 2006, an unexpectedly destructive earthquake hit the Yogyakarta and Central Java provinces, in the heartland of Indonesia, destroying more than 250,000 homes and killing over 5,000 people. The Indonesian Government immediately assured 'commitment': it made known that people would get money to rebuild their houses, fast. Contrary to the response in Aceh, the government set up a uniform government-led programme of cash grants to community groups, as Re-Kompak and UN-HABITAT had done in Aceh. A clear policy was developed and the implementation of the programme was remarkably fast and consistent. After the damage assessment and the registration of beneficiaries, groups of entitled beneficiaries signed contracts with the government, committing themselves to build core houses or core structures compliant with earthquake safe engineering standards. The government took full responsibility for the provision of funding to groups of beneficiaries or communities. The groups managed their own procurement of materials and labour. Government-appointed facilitators guided them through the construction process and the simple administrative paperwork. NGOs also often provided social assistance, for instance to vulnerable groups, such as widows and very poor families. In Yogyakarta and Central Java, the government provided little or no technical training, on the grounds that the earthquake had happened in the heartland of Java, where semi-skilled labour is easily available and good quality materials abundant. Moreover, the process could rely on well organised local authorities with a strong affinity with the affected village communities. Building on a long tradition of cooperation between the local authorities and NGOs, including on issues of disaster relief, the Yogyakarta authorities also succeeded in finding a useful cooperative relationship with NGOs.

This successful programme finally proved that institutional learning, as yet, had been achieved nationally. To illustrate why and how the response was more successful, it was subjected to the same scorecard-type of monitoring based evaluation performed by UN-HABITAT and the Unsyiah University.

Contrary to the entangled problems of Aceh and Nias, the context in Yogyakarta and Central Java was much more conducive for recovery: intact infrastructure; undisturbed land boundaries; no waterlogged sites; no displacement to speak of; functional local institutions in a cohesive peaceful environment; and abundant labour and materials of reasonable quality. So it is to be expected that monitoring results in Yogyakarta and Central Java (Klaten district) would be better than in Aceh. Overall this is indeed the case. The qualitative outcomes are not perfect, but still remarkable given the scale and





speed of the reconstruction. The UN-HABITAT survey in Yogyakarta and Central Java showed that the construction quality was reasonable although still rarely fully compliant with the Building Code for that area. The beneficiaries were quite satisfied with the process and the outcomes and were very appreciative of the transparency of the process. Both scores in Table 1.5 are indeed much higher than in the earlier shown results for Aceh.

TABLE 1.5 : HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN YOGYAKARTA AND CENTRAL JAVA (KLATEN DISTRICT) EVALUATED (SCALE 0 TO 10)

	Construction Quality	Satisfaction among beneficiaries with the process	Perception of transparency among beneficiaries	Number of focus groups of 5 beneficiaries in one village
Yogyakarta	7 ± 1	8 ± 1	9 ± 2	30
Klaten	7 ± 1	8 ± 1	9 ± 2	22
<b>Cut-off values</b>	7.5 = compliant to the building code, relative to the earth-quake zone	7 or more indicates high satisfaction	8 or more indicates a very transparent Process	

The numbers indicate good progress in the institutional capacities to achieve disaster risk reduction while rebuilding housing. The process resulted in much safer houses than before. Most of the destroyed structures had systemically no safety whatsoever. Even though poor people had started to adopt load bearing brick wall structures in past forty or so years, they had had little knowledge about safety features when applying load bearing walls or were unable to pay for the additional features, e.g. good timber ring beams tying up the wall structures, walls with a sufficient thickness, mortar with cement rather than chalk only or stiff and good foundations on good soil. After the earthquake, people were admonished to build in accordance with new thorough earthquake standards, with solid engineering safety factors built in. As in Aceh, most people did not achieve compliance with the standard, as the score indicates. But by starting to use cement and reinforced steel systematically, they were building houses that were much stronger than before. A repeat earthquake will no longer have a similar devastating impact.

In addition, the government systems coped well this time. Delays due to the slow mobilisation of resources by ill prepared government bureaucracies are common after disasters. However, within one year the Indonesian Government had disbursed 96% of the allocated budget for housing reconstruction. The expenditure for the sectors of infrastructure and livelihoods only reached 26% and 16% respectively



at the end of the first year, even though the budgets of these programmes were smaller than for housing. The infrastructure and livelihoods programmes did not share the cash grant and community-based approach of the housing programme.

It is worthwhile to also further include comparisons of the experiences of Sri Lanka and Pakistan with Aceh and Central Java, after the respective disasters of 2004, 2005 and 2006. The housing reconstruction programmes in the three countries have a number of commonalities: large numbers of houses were completely destroyed, the reconstruction was often handled by providing cash to individual families or groups of families and NGOs took a prominent role. Table 1.6 provides a fact sheet.

The best overall results were achieved in Central Java and Pakistan. For Central Java, the score card was earlier provided. For Pakistan, UN-HABITAT documentation shows that of the 3.5 million people rendered homeless, 90% got a reconstructed house for the winter 2007/2008 through a community-based programme. Engineering oversight was provided by the Army. Training was provided by NGOs and monitored by UN-HABITAT. Recent information of the reconstruction agency ERRA shows that about 50% of the erected constructions are structurally compliant, against a set target of 80%. While maintaining its policy of an equitable delivery of cash assistance, ERRA set flexible technical guidelines, which made sense both for people living in valleys with better accessibility and those living in remote mountain areas. ERRA allowed both modern reinforced techniques and traditional 'dhajji' timber frame structures, a technique known in Kashmir and with proven earthquake resistant qualities.<sup>36</sup>

TABLE 1.6 : DISASTER NEEDS AND RESPONSES (VARIOUS SOURCES)

Location	Date	Houses destroyed (approx)	Government role for housing reconstruction	NGO involvement in housing reconstruction
Sri Lanka	26 Dec 2004	88,000	<b>Hybrid</b> : Matching loans or grants	Matching grants
Aceh and Nias	26 Dec 2004	130,000	<b>Hybrid</b> : government or NGO assistance	Various forms of direct implementation by +100 individual NGOs
Pakistan (rural)	8 Oct 2005	600,000	<b>Uniform</b> : Grants to community groups; quality control	Facilitation and training
Yogyakarta Central Java	27 May 2006	250,000	<b>Uniform</b> : Grants for core structure to community groups	Information and limited training

Meanwhile, the reconstruction programme in Sri Lanka did not use the straightforward modalities of government-financed and community-organised housing rebuilding. The government introduced a range of reconstruction modalities, depending on the land status of the beneficiary. As was also experienced in Aceh, dealing with landless victims was a policy challenge. But the Sri Lankan complications had as much to do with planning: after the Tsunami, the government first strongly proclaimed a buffer zone yet it reviewed and scaled back the rules several times. This created extensive confusion about the future location of reconstructed housing. Many resettlement projects had been already planned and these decisions were not reversed. The problems were further compounded as the government authorities set out different financial housing compensation packages, defined in function of the (unclear) buffer zone status and the need for relocation of affected families. The government also insisted on matching funding with non-governmental agencies extending housing grants. To make matters even more complicated,



matching funding could be loans or grants, depending on the beneficiary status, which in turn depended on the definition of the buffer zone. It all resulted in bureaucratic mayhem, trying to let programming and planning decisions prevail over the capacity of people to move on early by themselves.

Compared to the Sri Lankan experience, the policies set out in Aceh and Nias opted for resilience through working with many approaches and actors while avoiding complicating interdependencies. A few strong principles were set and upheld, but organisations were free to figure out the best way to implement and to reach the target of housing completion. A number of community-driven programmes, such as UPLINK, excelled – it was awarded the Dubai Best Practice Award in 2008 – but conventional contractor built programmes eventually put together by organisations such as CRS or the British Red Cross also achieved very decent housing and community amenities in many parts of Aceh. Unfortunately, the flipside was that a significant number of programmes failed or did poorly.

The Pakistan and Yogyakarta/Central Java reconstruction processes and to some extent the experience gained from Aceh and Nias are clear evidence that early and participatory recovery can act as a powerful remedy to overcome disasters. The housing programmes in Yogyakarta and Pakistan have shown that community based cash programmes can be a strong mechanism to achieve early and participatory recovery. Moreover, the successful use of cash grants for post-disaster housing reconstruction demonstrates that the institutional hardware allowing fast financial transactions to communities is in place in many Asian developing countries. Furthermore, communities and groups of affected people can channel these funds into construction, even in times of crisis. The grants also stimulate the recovery of the local economy. A peculiar learning point is that grants, even when they are merely promised by a government or a very credible humanitarian organisation, quickly start to trigger vendor financing provided by local material suppliers and micro loans for labour payments from people with savings in communities to those without. UN-HABITAT experienced that even in conflict areas along the east coast of Aceh, vendor financing became available to beneficiary groups once communities signed up their agreements with UN-HABITAT.

These are clearly powerful mechanisms for recovery. Admittedly, the Aceh experience in itself often did not offer clear cut lessons. The many conflicting approaches and the complex context make a clear evaluation difficult. However, the wealth of experience is trickling down and has been impacting more recent approaches. For Indonesia, there is however still a long way to go to absorb the critical issues and translate them into predictable policy.

## FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON PARTICIPATORY AND SUSTAINABLE RECONSTRUCTION

The above discussion clearly highlights that community-based housing reconstruction can respond quickly to urgent needs and provide relief at an early stage. The experiences have shown that community participation has important social and economic benefits beyond the mobilisation of funding. Community-based approaches mobilise solidarity among the members of a community, creating social capital; they allow women to be a part of the reconstruction work; they strengthen local institutions; they can achieve good local planning; they educate people in the way they can best respond to disasters and make them less vulnerable for the future; and they can be done with good monitoring and thus achieve transparent accountability. A community based approach allows programmes to scale up and to make maximum use of local institutions. Community-based reconstruction experiences have also shown the least mistargeting of beneficiaries. Well facilitated community participation in the reconstruction process achieves good construction quality and satisfaction. It is community participation, not construction quality and access to sanitation that increases the likelihood for early occupancy. Vacancy due to delayed contractor handovers can be much reduced if communities are empowered.

The challenges are also clear. Community participation processes require time and ample public communication, which are both in short supply in the chaos and urgency after complex disasters. The lead-time is however often compensated by the speed and satisfaction in the later stages. Failures in the

community-based approach have often been caused by the fact that the initial mobilisation required more time than planned, leaving little time for the participatory process during the implementation. An aggravating factor is often that donors require detailed upfront social and technical assessments and inherently undermine a community-based process that requires mobilisation, empowerment and gestures of trust and commitment. In some cases there is a genuine shortage of capacity to conduct a community-based approach, despite genuine good intentions to satisfy the aspiration of the community. The shortage of capable community facilitators is often a serious issue, and there is a clear need to train more facilitators quickly prior to disaster and at the start of the future responses.

Community participation is antagonistic with the command-and-control modes of conventional crisis management. Moreover, trusting the capacities of people to find multiple solutions to recover is a challenge and a risk for politicians and bureaucrats in charge, who are as traumatised themselves and culpable if things don't work out. Routine participatory processes are now common in non-disaster planning procedures, but are less well understood and mainstreamed in post-disaster contexts. Furthermore, levels of urbanisation and of societal complexity have increased, making the endeavour to 'build back better' ever more challenging.

UPLINK'S work in the sub-districts Peukan Bada (Aceh Besar) and Meuraxa (Banda Aceh) represents well a coordinated housing reconstruction process based on community participation. UPLINK started to organise the community-based process in March 2005 and construction took off in July 2005. Within five months, including the Islamic fasting month, 1,700 houses were built. Experienced facilitators from Gujarat and from within Indonesia were engaged from May 2005. They trained local engineers and architects in community facilitation. Weekly intensive training in masonry and the monitoring of construction quality started in August 2005, both for women and heads of households. At the same time, community clusters conducted workshops for the utilisation of steel and for the production of earth compressed bricks; these efforts helped beneficiaries face challenges relating to livelihood and the rising cost of construction materials. In April 2006, more intensive training was done for architecture facilitators, who lived within the community and accompanied the later stages of the building process.

UPLINK facilitated communities in 24 villages to build 3,500 houses of very good construction quality. The organisation provided various forms of assistance to entire villages, largely avoiding complications resulting from the activities of different actors in the same village. It also minimised logistic costs through early bulk purchase of building materials. Furthermore, by serving 24 villages concentrated in a stretch of land only 10km wide, UPLINK was able to coordinate and share lessons through verbal community exchanges. It supported the formation of an elected inter-village community development committee, encouraging local governance going again within and in-between the previously war-torn villages.

The facilitation of UPLINK made a special impact in Lam Geu Eu, a small village in the Peukan Bada sub-district of Aceh Besar and bordering to Banda Aceh. The community of Lam Geu Eu returned early but was divided. Different wards sought assistance from different aid organisations. UPLINK failed to mobilise the community as a whole. The experienced facilitators of UPLINK engaged the community on the design of new houses and the procurement of construction materials, building trust along the road in a number of village wards. In contrast, the Al-Imdaad Foundation failed to do proper facilitation in preparation of building homes in other wards. The people of either wards returned at the same time. Both groups started rebuilding their homes around the same time between May and June 2005. The units which were built had each a cost of both about \$4,200 and were both built by a local contractor employing local labour. The houses were all completed simultaneously.

However, the monitored outcomes were strikingly different and so the example shows that early return alone does not guarantee successful recovery if communities are not empowered to organise recovery and are not assisted through a well organised programme which has capable and experienced community facilitators. In the wards assisted by the Al-Imdaad Foundation, the construction quality was low and the satisfaction very low. People did not trust the way materials had been procured. It was the general opinion within this ward that it was better to stay in the barracks as long as possible, even after the houses were finished. In contrast, the ward where UPLINK was active achieved high quality of construction





and the people were reasonably satisfied about the process. People saw neither mischief the way the programme had been organised nor how materials or labour had been procured.<sup>27</sup>

There is obviously a need for a good understanding of the terms 'participation' and 'community based'. A minimum standard of community participation is required. The level of participation (from mobilisation to decision making) can be conceptualised as a progressive 'ladder', from passive roles to strong empowerment.<sup>28</sup> There is a wealth of experience that can be used and adapted. Community Action Planning (CAP), as practiced by GTZ, UN-HABITAT and the World Bank is a good example and widely documented. The cash grant approach, taken up by UN-HABITAT, the World Bank but also the Indonesian Government is another clear case in point. Participation can also be specified for different aspects and stages of the reconstruction process, such as the organisation and social mobilisation, the planning of houses, villages, settlements and cities, and issues of procurement, construction and evaluation.

In August 2006, Professor Bobby Setiawan of Gajah Mada University of Yogyakarta further elaborated on the lessons learnt: 'We must also be realistic about both the pluses and minuses in the process of community-driven development. The lesson learned is that community-based reconstruction is not all rosy and smooth. Not all communities are as romantically communal as we thought. We just have to be rational to deal with them in order to make community-based development work. Although communities are not 'ideal', it is however proven that negative prejudices are not all true either in Aceh. We need to be responsive to the varying communities. Facilitators need to be trained in that respect. They need to be able to respond to unexpected varying demands, and capable to coordinate various clusters of resources.' He added that a community-based approach requires that the government makes policies to support, regulate and encourage this training. 'Community-based' does not mean 'leaving the government authorities behind'. The Yogyakarta experiences delivered such proof.

## CONCLUSIONS - HOUSING IN SUPPORT OF EARLY RECOVERY

Recent large disasters confronted many governments and specialised institutions with unexpected policy questions in relation to housing reconstruction. The various roles expected from government in relation to shelter and human settlements – physically protecting people safely and in dignity, upholding tenure rights, planning for future prevention and preparedness and governing a process of settlement recovery and reconstruction leading to sustainable outcomes – were difficult to square.

Governments should have learned by now that leaving people for an extended time in temporary shelters is no option, economically, socially, politically and for the protection of human rights. Even though disasters are perceived as unique opportunities to reshape the environment in a safer and better way, the thrust of the directly affected people is to return and rebuild. Most public funders of reconstruction, including donors, would like to see that housing is also rebuilt in a safe manner after disasters. However, the data from Pakistan, Yogyakarta and Aceh show that construction quality is merely modest irrespective of the processes opted for. The findings in Yogyakarta compared to Aceh are even more surprising: on average, the quality is broadly the same.

Fortunately, the reconstruction of housing is increasingly seen as an 'early recovery need', necessary to put people, communities and local institutions back on their feet in order to take reconstruction forward. Where planning (and governance in general) had been weak prior to disasters, it is likely to fail after a disaster. In such contexts where prepared processes are not at hand, harnessing the inventiveness of the people through early recovery is not an option, but the only choice. The discussion has shown that community based cash grant approaches are a viable response, but they benefit more if capable institutions are around and even more so if institutions and organisations have gone through prior training. Community-based cash grants are also effective to achieve shelter assistance and housing

recovery: they allow vulnerable households to be targeted in a socially supportive manner and expenditures to be maximally absorbed within the community, creating social and economic multipliers beyond the actual cash injections. This was already known before, but the recent experiences have shown that the approach is also robust even after complex disasters. Overall, the key components of successful housing reconstruction policies allowing early recovery apparently are: (1) a policy of guaranteed return to the fullest extent possible; (2) clear, simple and equitable commitments with respect to entitlements and the delivery of future housing; and (3) a credible division of tasks between governments and non-governmental organisations, based on competencies and not in function of preferential access to funding. Whilst Yogyakarta and Pakistan fulfil all three of these components, Aceh succeeded only in satisfying the first, casting light on the relative success of its recovery programmes.

In Indonesia, in the first two months after the Tsunami, the conceptual model for settlement recovery was that it ought to be guided by a half-way transitional phase of planning and programming, referred to as 'rehabilitation', during which the government would assure minimum service guarantees to the affected communities. There was no doubt among senior government policy makers that people would participate in the reconstruction. However, what was meant by 'participation' was the involvement of communities in the planning of a new and safer built environment. Meanwhile, during the transitional phase, people would still be sheltered in temporary or transitional shelters, or in rehabilitated houses in safe locations. BRR allowed a broader understanding. Recovery was increasingly seen as a seamless range of actions assisting formal and informal institutions taking on the reconstruction proper. Planning, programming and early reconstruction were allowed to run in parallel, as a long chain of loosely related actions, rebuilding the fractured parts back into a functional whole. Internationally, institutional policy frameworks have also taken on board these principles. They are found in the frameworks 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development' (LRRD) of the European Union and other donor think tanks and in the platform for 'Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction' (SRR) of UN-HABITAT. Doing the opposite, such as prolonging the displacement of people for the sake of better planning and programming or disenfranchising people to recover assets and livelihoods, are recipes to create aid dependency and prolong the crisis.

Yet planning during and immediately after a crisis is always difficult. Little conceptual agreement exists on how to make participatory and sustainable planning and programming acceptable institutional processes in the aftermath of disasters. Contrary to popular views, disasters are not unique opportunities to start afresh. Crisis managers know that disasters can only be overcome if institutions and communities had gone through prior learning and training how to confront a sudden collapse and a situation of trauma. That is a high hurdle for many locations in the world. Poverty, migration, conflict and social divides affect social and institutional cohesion and make good planning difficult under regular circumstances, let alone in the stressful times after a disaster. There is also a much higher awareness of the possible loss of human rights in a post-disaster situation thanks to a more articulate civil society, not the least in many democratising and rapidly developing low-income countries. The travails and principled stand of BRR bear witness to this awareness and to the arduous governance of such a coordination institution set up after an extraordinary disaster.

Improving the capacity to overcome shelter crises after disasters is not necessarily done within the institutions dealing with disaster preparedness or disaster response. Housing processes are too complex to be framed narrowly within the perspectives of disaster management and risk mitigation. But decades of privatisation and market-driven housing development have for sure not brought about strong housing institutions in many countries, so the options are not manifold. However, what gains can be expected if humanitarian organisations specialised in crisis response need to become proxy housing institutions, simply because of a large institutional gap? What is now required is to build or strengthen housing and urban development institutions which are capable of dealing with safer and involved planning and safer building as part of the mainstream urbanisation processes and which can organise future housing recovery after a disaster. A special challenge will be for poorer urban communities to be involved. They are most at risk to lose family members and assets as a result of disasters. They will require clear rights, access to finance and a shared responsibility in re-planning and re-development. The recent Tsunami and heavy earthquakes in Asia notwithstanding, solid experience how to deal with large urban disasters is unfortunately still scant.



**Notes and Credits : this section partly contains writing from two earlier publications :**

- (1) "Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction in Asia. A Brief Review of Recent Experiences.", by Bruno Dercon, in: "International Technology and Knowledge Flows for Post Disaster Reconstruction", edited by Happy Santoso, Muhammad Faqih and Erika Yuniastuti, Eindhoven University of Technology Architecture, Building and Planning in cooperation with Institute Teknologi Surabaya 10 November; March 2008
- (2) "Two Years of Settlement Recovery in Aceh and Nias: What Should the Planners Have Learned?", Bruno Dercon and Marco Kusumawijaya, in: "Planning Studies and Practice; Journal of Singapore Institute of Planners, September 2008; first published as a paper at the 43th ISOCARP Congress (2007).

1 Dercon, Bruno, Veronica F Wijaya, et.al., 'Anchoring homes: UN-HABITAT's People's Process in Aceh and Nias after the Tsunami' = 'Proses Masyarakat UN-HABITAT di Aceh dan Nias Pascatsunami'. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, 2007; Aryo Danusiri (director), et.al., 'Playing Between Elephants'. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, 2007. DVD 9 89 min. Bahasa Indonesia and Acehnese spoken. English and Bahasa subtitles.

2 As of early May 2005, estimated on the basis of various assessments, there were 1 16,880 destroyed homes. 574,000 persons were counted as homeless and displaced, of which 518,459 directly displaced by the Tsunami alone.\* Of them, 65,228 were living in temporary living centres (barracks), 153,477 in self-settled tent camps and 299,754 with host families. Quoted from the United Nations Shelter Sector Factsheet on Shelter of 5 September 2005 (UNIMS). (\*Note of the authors: actually, others had been displaced due to loss of livelihoods or were already displaced before the Tsunami.)

3 The issue of collective panic is important to consider: the impact of two successive earthquakes and the Tsunami set off a fear, even among scientists, of worse to come. In 2005, there was continuous anxiety due to the many aftershocks of the two earthquakes, seismic activity recorded in mountains in the Leuser National Park in Aceh and volcanic activity of Mount Talang near Padang (West Sumatra). The latter city was considered to be at a very high risk to a repeat Tsunami. New research found that Lake Toba, in North Sumatra, was a sleeping super-volcano. Bad policies were thought to have made people and planners forget about these risks. A moot point was how the risks of one-a-generation earthquakes had to be considered against the risks of natural disasters with a much lower frequency. Research was published in 2008 in Nature indicating that Tsunamis had been hitting Aceh only every 650 years. Nonetheless, a smaller Tsunami hit south Java in 2006. Serious earthquakes with magnitudes of over 6 on the scale of Richter did hit the central areas of Java and West Sumatra in May 2006 and March 2007. See 'Medieval forewarning of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand', by Kruawun Jankaew et.al., Nature, Issue 455, 1228-1231 (30 October 2008).

4 The statements on the Indonesian social housing practice are based on the professional experience of the author, regularly acting as a planner and housing advisor in Indonesia since 1986.

5 Rehabilitation and reconstruction is the terminology used for respectively recovery (April 2005 – December 2006) and reconstruction (July 2006 – December 2009), as mentioned in the Master Plan (chapter 2). 'Early recovery' has been a terminology mainstreamed after the Tsunami, correcting on the more conventional view that after a typical 1 to 3 month timeframe after a disaster, normalisation had proceeded to such an extent that the regular institutions could be functional again and proceed with recovery. Presently, there is a wide acceptance that the 'phases' of early recovery, recovery and reconstruction overlap, to the extent that they are not really phases. For instance, poor households may require early recovery support as they have no savings, which otherwise could be used as a reserve fund while waiting for the benefits brought by normalised local economic activities. Moreover, they may also require much longer 'early recovery' support, as the recovery and reconstruction activities of regular institutions cannot impact on them sufficiently, enhancing their vulnerability and risks unfairly. In situations of complex disasters, where often disaster impacts are exacerbated by conflict situations, the number of vulnerable people is usually so high that broad early recovery programming needs to be part of the basic policy package of recovery and reconstruction.

6 It was also the cornerstone for the assistance giving by the Indonesian Government to Central Java, after the earthquake of 26 May 2006.

7 Rancangan Rencana Induk Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Wilayah Aceh dan Nias, Sumatera Utara, BAPPENAS, 2005.

8 The subsidence was due to either massive erosion caused in some places by the Tsunami or by subsidence of the Aceh land plate; for both reasons, the lowest land areas in Aceh and Nias vanished into the sea.

9 Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process. These principles are: universality and inalienability; indivisibility; inter-dependence and inter-relatedness; equality and non-discrimination; participation and inclusion; and accountability and rule of law. Quoted from 'Issue Paper: What Constitutes a Rights-based Approach? Definitions, Methods, and Practices', UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, [http://data.unaids.org/Topics/Human-Rights/hrissuepaper\\_rbdefinitions\\_en.pdf](http://data.unaids.org/Topics/Human-Rights/hrissuepaper_rbdefinitions_en.pdf).

10 Indirectly, BRR hoped that its organisational focus on openness and accountability would inspire other institutions in Aceh to follow suit. It also aspired, increasingly so towards the end of its mandate, that its proprietary management systems would be re-used nationally, as best practice in the business of government.

11 Government of Indonesia, Master Plan, chapter 3, April 2005 (reference see earlier footnote).

12 By late 2005, all actors running implementation programmes preferred a narrow approach, as the constraints 'to get things done' were perceived to be already hard enough in the hamlets and neighbourhoods where their programmes were operating. A macro programming scope, dealing with issues comprehensively and holistically, was beyond the capacity of most implementation partners.

13 As a result of the differing impact of the 26 March 2005 earthquake, the BRR Nias office operated outside this predicament of limitation and a separate study would be worthwhile to evaluate the opportunities and challenges of the broader mandate. Yet the very remoteness of Nias presented another form of isolation.

14 The experiences and the outcries in New Orleans after Katrina underscore that this is indeed also the case in developed countries. Land use regulations and planning processes are however not the only tools to reduce risks spatially. Disincentives to the continued or increasing use of land at risk can be many: higher permitting costs, higher land taxes (to mitigate future crisis responses), reducing the development of new infrastructure and amenities, the obligation to buy catastrophe insurance, more stringent environmental regulations to emphasise low-density developments. A regulatory environment instituting risk reduction measures such as these cannot, however, be established overnight. It requires institutionalisation and public acceptance prior to disasters. Moreover, a good place to start is to overhaul planning education.

15 In late October 2005, a 'Guideline for Temporary Shelter' was finalised and approved by the Governor of Aceh in November. The guideline, outlining a Plan of Action, was developed jointly by UNORC and BRR with assistance of UN-HABITAT. The Guideline concludes with reiterating that the 'critical issues for the implementation of temporary shelter... [is to] provide temporary shelters in the place of origin or as near to the place of origin as possible in order to bring communities back together to strengthen social and economical viability; provision of suitable land for resettlement; planning and provision of adequate



infrastructure and services simultaneously with the implementation of temporary shelter plan of action.' The Plan of Action set out to organise the provision of transitional shelters, but also improved the provision of services in temporary living centres (TLCs, which were the barracks or camps). It had first been drafted in June 2006. Initially, it appealed for new tents and some form of transitional shelters. In July 2006, the key emphasis was on the provision of the shelters. By August, a more comprehensive approach was formulated, encompassing TLCs, shelters in villages and support to displaced people residing in host families. There were strong objections raised in using good quality shelters, with a prospective life time of 4 years to replace timber barracks. These sites would become permanent transitional shelter camps. By December 2005, when the first steel shelters started to be imported, a consensus was achieved that the majority of shelters were to be set up in villages and hamlets to which people had returned or were returning. The fact that the transitional shelters were difficult to prefabricate and thus arrived very late and in batches, gave time to set up a supply chain that could deliver these shelters even in remote villages. The delay also allowed BRR and WFP to set up a shipping service which transported most of the shelters to West Coast and island villages.

16 Within the IASC, the emergency shelter cluster has UNHCR as the lead agency for conflict and post-conflict contexts and IFRC as 'convenor' for post-disaster responses.

17 In recent disasters, the Emergency Shelter Clusters convened by IFRC have adapted such a 'component approach'. See for instance to the response to Cyclone Nargis, which hit Myanmar in May 2008. See <http://myanmar.humanitarianinfo.org/Shelter/default.aspx>, specifically the documents in the Strategy section.

18 See 'Aceh Post-Tsunami Reconstruction. Discussion Paper: Forward Planning For Reconstruction –

19 What's In The HIC-Data?', Bruno Dercon (Adviser to DFID) – April 2005 (version 2).

20 The Indonesian bureaucracy had never nurtured NGOs neither at the national nor for sure not at the local level. Even after the political changes of 1998, the government tended to view NGOs with suspicion – as populist, naive and a general negative force. In other countries, such as India, decades of government support to non-governmental organisations have in effect created a parallel social service delivery circuit. In Indonesia, a system developed which preferred a government-controlled approach to social support and service delivery. Take for example the stabilisation of food prices facilitated by the government logistics agency BULOG and in more recent years, through the development of cash grant programmes. The latter programmes, the Kecamatan Development Programme and the Urban Poverty Programme, had been piloted in 1996 and were turned into nationwide poverty alleviation programmes, with World Bank support, during the 1997-2001 Asian crisis. They are presently becoming national social support programmes, under the acronym PNPM. Indonesia has also introduced unconditional and conditional cash transfer programmes to poor individuals, for instance in response to fuel and food price shocks in recent years.

21 BRR also oversaw a flexible programme financed by the Asian Development Bank. The ADB channelled some of its funding through the contractor-led approach and also worked with UN-HABITAT and four INGOs.

22 'Self-built' housing, in the Indonesian informal context, means either the construction of houses and huts using local natural materials or the construction of cheap brick houses, often with a slender concrete column and beam structure, or a so-called 'confined masonry structure', built by local semi-skilled masons and carpenters.

23 Press release. November 2008. [http://www.multidonorfund.org/documents/2009\\_01\\_07\\_Pidie%20-%20MDF%20release-Eng%5B1%5D.pdf](http://www.multidonorfund.org/documents/2009_01_07_Pidie%20-%20MDF%20release-Eng%5B1%5D.pdf)

24 The Building Code also provided standards for timber buildings. The writers of the Building Code had of course not predicted the shift from timber as the primary material to reinforced and brick and may have thought that only large contractors building resettlement housing at a later stage would need to comply with the demanding standards of the code. Unfortunately, Aceh's building tradition for non-engineered structures relied on hardwood only. Columns are put on footings – traditionally, rock cones. After the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, much more efforts were made to base the rebuilding on a code in line with best practice of traditional non-engineering rebuilding.

25 In March 2005, UNHCR was requested to close down their Aceh operation, due to heated national politics in relation to UNHCR's work during the 1999 referendum of East Timor and in a context of human-rights violations of the Indonesian Army. UNHCR was allowed to restart its programme by in early 2006. One of its actions was to organise the procurement of larger batches of timber in other areas of Indonesia and the free delivery of these to Nias.

26 To execute RALAS, the programme provided BPN Aceh also with funds to restore its working capacity. The programme would pay for new state-of-the-art buildings and equipment, but BPN was very slow to procure these and at times did not want to procure goods and services following World Bank procurement rules.

27 The Indonesian Government, at times with support of the World Bank, has supported land titling programmes in other areas of Indonesia for many years. The programmes have been considered successful for residential land in modern Indonesian inner-cities, where tenure protection is really dependent on the quality of the land cadastre and the availability of titles. In rural areas, certification has also been considered important to modernise the cash crop economy and make economically productive land holdings tradable and thus more productive, including those land tracts belonging to smallholders. Land titles also allow the latter to obtain bank credit at better conditions, as the risk of the banks decreases due to the availability of clearly documented collateral. However, in a semi-modern environment, residential plots are not considered tradable, as they are core family assets that should never be lost under any circumstance. Providing land titles for residential plots in the Aceh contexts thus probably overrid the need to create a sense of legally secured tenure.


28 The regulatory changes in local budgeting cover four areas: direct elections of all local leaders and council members; mid-term development planning formulated and endorsed at local level; participatory programming ('musrenbang') from the lowest level upwards; and connecting spatial planning with programmatic planning. The regulatory framework is now logically comprehensive but difficult to implement for many local authorities lacking the know-how and experience or simply having difficulties keeping up with ever more new regulations coming out.

29 The success of the IASC Cluster Approach is rightly highlighted as a successful achievement of the so-called Humanitarian Reform initiated in 2005. More recent disasters have seen a much more orderly multi-sector response. OCHA has also developed much more institutional approaches. Yet the core issue remains. The Cluster Approach is derived from good practices in contemporary crisis management; it is the best shot at widely accepted 'gold-silver-bronze' structures, differentiating a layered response capacity and providing such typical functions as strategic steering (gold), command-and-control centres (clusters) (silver) and field response teams (NGOs) (bronze). This structure can overcome crises starting from with the immediate response and can gradually evolve into early recovery and recovery coordination, up to the point that normal institutional processes can be in command again. But the cluster system remains a response modality which is driven by what the responders can supply. It is not demand-driven and does not easily engage local institutions. The end result is therefore still often centralisation and sector-driven approaches, rather than decentralisation and local empowerment.

30 By 31 December 2008, BRR reported that 127,402 houses had been completed. This was very close to the pledges (133,000) recorded by UN-HABITAT in its milestone reporting of 1 August 2006. The milestone reporting was done by UN-HABITAT at a time when the tracking by RAN was not yet at cruising speed. UN-HABITAT tracked about 120 programmes, by simple 'telephone monitoring' by a dedicated staff. By August 2006, 16 NGOs had exited without realisations. But 22 had completed their work, while 18 were moving ahead towards completion. 36 NGOs were making slow progress or were struggling. Several programmes of multilateral organisations were progressing well. The struggling programmes were those of BRR (including Re-Kompak and the housing funded by ADB) and the 13 Red Cross movements which had made pledges. By 2008, the ADB programme was almost completed. To achieve such progress, ADB partnered with a number of NGOs and with UN-HABITAT. The programmes of Red Cross movements



FIGURE I.3 : ACEH - NIAS HOUSING PROGRESS



were generally also moving on well, but their completion was expected to stretch towards the end of 2009 and possibly into 2010. The graph shows the progress as recorded in mid 2006.

31 'Aceh Economic Update', October 2008, The World Bank & Bank Indonesia, supported by the MDF.

32 The construction of houses larger than 36 m2 was supported by a number of humanitarian organisations, such as CRS and Red Cross movements. The justification for this was said 'social' (square meters per household member). The SPHERE standard states 3.5 m2 as a minimum provision, while the Building Code prescribed 9 m2. The prudence of many decisions in relation to cost and policy were often influenced by the fear of organisations to be held liable of poor standards or quality. Many large organisations had moreover the luxury of their large budgets to make decisions 'on the safe side' with regard to liability limitation. Over time, it had little to do with prudent social policies or disaster risk reduction.

33 On the sociology of commitments, see 'Sensemaking in Organizations', Karl Weick, 1995.

34 These indicators are fully explained in chapter 2.

35 The Bakrie project had used panels in which 'white asbestos' was applied. A long public debate arose whether the housing complex was safe, leading people not to move in. Many countries forbid the use of white asbestos, but curiously not all. For instance Canada promotes the use of this mineral and exports it to Asia. See 'Hazardous hypocrisy', The Economist, Oct 23rd 2008. Entitlements were for houses for core households, even if such household had only one survivor, adult or minor. Acehese families, however, rely strongly on the extended family. For instance land plots in villages would have multiple houses of both parents and married daughters and their family. Moreover, traditional customary land ownership expects that land is used properly for it to be owned by individuals or households. Leaving land idle without a house built on it was thus culturally an uncertain tenure scenario, opening the possibility that the household or even the extended family (in case the household had died) would face a reduced claim over the plot of land. So, entitled households soon started to claim the benefit of a new house, even though they had no intention to immediately occupy it. Daughters would claim so they obtained an asset ready for when they would marry. Extended families who had lived under one roof before the Tsunami would now claim two houses. Relatives of a deceased household would tweak the land status of a plot, claiming it as their 'family land' and therefore requesting the destroyed house to be rebuilt, possibly for a relative who did not live in Aceh. Therefore, the vacancy rate was strongly related with the cultural endeavour to retain land assets within households and extended families, for which it was necessary to have a house built on it to re-enforce the land claim. It was an asset-recovery strategy not intended nor foreseen by the official entitlement policy.

36 The guidelines are published on <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/contacts/v.php?id=3586>.

37 The monitoring results for Lam Geu Eu were (scale 0 to 10) :

TABLE I.7 : DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HOUSING ORGANISATIONS IN ACEH

	Construction Quality	Satisfaction among beneficiaries with the process	Perception of transparency among beneficiaries
<b>UPLINK</b>	7.5	5.0	7.8
<b>Al-Imdaad Foundation</b>	6.1	2.8	3.9
<b>Cut-off values</b>	7.5 = compliant to the building code, relative to the earth-quake zone	7 or more indicates high satisfaction	8 or more indicates a very transparent process

38 Arnstein, Sherry R. 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation,' JAIP, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969, pp. 216-224. The 'ladder' was adapted by Davidson (Habitat International) and present as different levels of community control over project decision-making. From a high to low degree of community control, the range is presented as empowerment, collaboration, consultation, informing and manipulation. The issues of community control are about programme initiation, project implementation initiation, project financing, project design, construction and post-project alterations.



# A Home, a World

by : Linda Christanty

**M**ERY KASMIJAR was seven years old when she ran into the hills with her mother and other villagers in Tengoh, Aceh Besar, after hearing panicked cries of “the ocean is rising, the ocean is rising ...” They slept on the hilltop three nights waiting for the water to recede. In Mery’s village, 250 people were swept away to be forever lost at sea that morning. The village suddenly felt way too big and silent.

“I saw water as high a coconut tree,” she told me. She wept continuously. “Because I am afraid and sad,” she said softly.

There house was gone. Everything they owned was missing. Mery and her mother fled to Mata le, almost two hours by car from Tengoh. In such an uncertain and difficult situation, they set out on foot. They were following groups of other refugees who feared that the water would once again rush in from the ocean. Together, the refugees passed by mountains of debris, destroyed homes, and piles of corpses as they made their way. Mery’s mother carried her.

Maswin, Mery’s father was not at home with his wife and child when the disaster struck, because he was driving some passengers to Tapak Tuan, South Aceh. At the time, he was working as a rental car driver and would be at home for two days, then out on the road for two days at a time. He didn’t learn until much later that the tsunami that killed more than 200,000 people in Aceh had swept away his own village. Tapak Tuan is located far inland.

It was not until a month later that the family was reunited. “My husband thought that we had died,” said Hasmiati, Mery’s mother.

She was sitting in the doorway of the family’s temporary housing, holding her youngest child, Muhammad Rizki Aulia, 11 months old. Her husband, Maswin, was not at home. As usual, he was out with a load of passengers. Mery stood at their side, listening intently to our conversation. Mery is a bit shy. The questions I directed at her were frequently responded to with a timid smile, until Hasmiati gently prompted her to answer. She was wearing her school uniform, a white T-shirt and red skirt. The sun was shining brightly; it was a hot day.





After months in a refugee shelter, they had finally moved to a tent. Each night, Mery would ask her mother when they would be moving into a house. “Mom, everyone else is getting a house. Why don't we,” she asked sadly. Mery did not feel comfortable in their surroundings. One tent held three families, 12 people altogether. He was afraid to talk to her mother about all kinds of things, especially having to get ready for bed in such crowded quarters. She didn't like other people hearing her, especially as related to things she considered private matters. But she trusted her mother implicitly.

When the family finally got to move to temporary housing, Mery was so excited about being able to live in a “house” again. But it turned out to be just one space; there were no rooms. The residue of thick smoke on the plasterboard walls made midday feel even hotter. This house was not a comfortable place to rest in. Mery could not concentrate on her storybooks even though after school reading was one of her favorite pastimes. What she really wanted was a house that really felt like a home. A house with rooms in it, a place of her own where she would not be disturbed when reading, a space to get away from the frequent attentions of her mischievous little brother; a place where she could invite her friends to visit.

“Mery used to have a close friend named Evi. She only wanted to spend her time with Evi. They went everywhere together. Evi died in the tsunami. Now Mery has to be friends with just anyone,” said Hasmiati, adding that her daughter had now become much quieter.

Mery, now 10, is in the fourth grade. She wants to become a doctor.

“There is a promise from ADB (Asia Development Bank) to build us a house. The work is supposed to start in March,” said Hasmiati, hopefully as she gazed at her daughter. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the house they are living in is not their own. It is on loan from a neighbor named Soriah. “It is not comfortable having to stay too long in someone else's house,” Hasmiati added.

That was February 2007. Three months later, I heard that ADB had built 60 houses in Tengoh.



**Y**ULIANA lived near Mery. She ran the fastest when she heard the ocean water was rising. Her mother, Salbiah, panicked when she could not find her, asking the other villagers: “Where is my daughter? Where is she?” Her mother had not seen her take off as if shot from an arrow.

Yuliana was one of the luckier ones that day because her home was near the hillside and she found safety there. From the top of the hill, she watched the sea swallow Tengoh village.

When the water subsided even her home was gone. Her father had been carried away in the waves; his body was never found. Yuliana, her mother and older brother had to live in a makeshift kiosk they built themselves. Yuliana's older sister left with her husband to live in Kalimantan for awhile. Yuliana is the youngest of the three.

“We were jammed in there with the merchandise,” she said, recalling what it was like to live in the kiosk.

From the kiosk, they moved to emergency barracks. “One space, one family; the space was divided off by our belongings,” Yuliana, now 11 years old and in fifth grade, remembers.

She was sitting cross-legged on the floor with Hilda, an older classmate, and me. Her two-year-old niece, Fitri Wulandari, toddled back and forth holding a piece of paper. Her mother, Salbiah, would look over from their kiosk about eight meters away, filling in gaps in the conversation. Salbiah would burst into laughter any time Yuliana said something funny.

After living in the crowded barracks, Yuliana finally got to move into a Type-36 house built for her family with funding through UN-HABITAT.

“I really have my own home now, because I have my own room. A house has more space. My thinking is more peaceful,” she said seriously.



Having a house to call a home is, indeed, a basic need for every human being. A psychologist and humanist, Abraham Maslow, illustrated basic human needs with a pyramid, placing the words air to breath, food and water, on the higher levels, with the word rest at the base. Maslow deliberately used the word “rest” instead of “house”.

According to Maslow, rest was the basic human need because it was the basis for controlling human thinking and behavior. If any one of the needs illustrated on the pyramid was not being met, a person would experience discomfort. A person's character and the future developments in their lives would begin with these things. What happens when these basic needs are simply swept away in a moment? How does a child like Yuliana face such a thing?

“At first, I was always afraid that the tsunami would come back,” she said. She had never heard that word before the disaster; neither had her mother. Nobody in the village had ever heard that term before, ever. But after the disaster struck, she had two new terms added to her vocabulary: tsunami and NGO.

It was an NGO that taught the word tsunami to her. Yuliana later found out more about tsunamis from a book. “From the school library,” she explained. “But the teachers never told us to read that book. It was a donation from Japan. It tells how to save yourself,” said Hilda. They took the initiative to read the book themselves. “After reading the book, I wasn't afraid of another tsunami coming anymore,” Yuliana said.

Both Yuliana and Hilda love to read. They used to borrow storybooks from a traveling library that doesn't operate anymore. Hilda still remembers a story about a small Java deer that was so smart it could overcome any problem. Besides that story, she is particularly fond of folktales. Yuliana reads to calm her mind, but she doesn't like sad stories.

“We don't want to cry,” she said, a serious look on her face.



# Chapter 2



# Settlement Recovery Monitoring : A Final Review

The post-Tsunami Master Plan of April 2005 listed efficiency, transparency, accountability as key principles, together with and supported by effective monitoring and evaluation.<sup>1</sup> The previous chapter explained that in the early months of 2005, it was unclear how rebuilding would take shape; that by mid 2005 only the basic procedures were established; that an unexpectedly large number of implementing organisations rushed forward to build new houses; and that by mid 2006 a building rush got underway.

In August 2005, UN-HABITAT took up a policy support role to the Housing and Settlements Department of BRR. The newly established BRR department required assistance in the set up of its information management and compliance management systems. Some kind of assistance to monitoring and evaluation was therefore expected, even though the format and substance was initially not yet defined. BRR was already establishing the information management framework at large with the introduction of Project Concept Notes. These eventually developed into the project tracking system of the RAN database. However, it would take until late 2006 before RAN was producing truly reliable data. Moreover, RAN was designed to track the progress of all activities in all sectors and consequently did not cover many specific issues in relation to shelter and settlement recovery. Meanwhile, the queries and worries about shelter and housing were manifold.

The monitoring assistance of UN-HABITAT aimed to address this strategic gap. This chapter explains how UN-HABITAT developed its monitoring programme for housing recovery and how this programme also contributed to the monitoring of settlement recovery in line with the expectations of the Master Plan. The establishment, the layout, the investigation tools and the reporting tools of the monitoring programme are explored in turn. Monitoring scorecards are provided by way of example. To enhance the relevance of these scorecards for future evaluation, they have been selected and reprinted as thematic sets: for instance, large and small organisations, contractor programmes and community-based ones, Indonesian NGO and Indonesian CRS engagements, the various programmes run by the government, realisations of several Red Cross movements and the work of UN-HABITAT.

## ESTABLISHING THE MONITORING PROGRAMME

### An Independent, Third-party Monitoring Programme

By 2008, BRR had set up a number of monitoring systems. The RAN database had become the core tracking instrument, accounting for all implementing organisations and Indonesian government programmes. When in mid 2008 UNORC re-tallied all new housing with the assistance of its growing number of field offices, it found broad agreement with BRR's data. A geographical information system was also set up within BRR, accounting for all the houses built, whether 'on-budget' or with NGO funding.

Of course, in early 2005, the situation had been different. The Humanitarian Information System had initially provided decent '3W' data (Who does What Where), superimposed on a good map set of Aceh. But the information only tracked emergency assistance. The data systems supporting coordination effectively faltered by April 2005, after UNHCR as emergency shelter lead had been expelled by the Indonesian Government and when OCHA was lacking a clear mandate for continued coordination.<sup>2</sup> The Government wanted to take over coordination, but this was delayed as a result of the Nias earthquake and the time needed to set up BRR.

The Shelter Working Group, set up during the emergency phase, had continued meeting in Banda Aceh and other key locations in April and beyond. But leadership in general was weak, including from UN-HABITAT. In collaboration with the Aceh Housing and Human Settlements Department, it was collecting an approximate list of pledges, by value and units. The pledges were continuously changing and thus deemed highly uncertain.

Luckily, by mid-2005, the coordination situation started to improve. BRR, the World Bank and UN-HABITAT had established a steering group for housing reconstruction. UN-HABITAT was firmly leading the Shelter Work Group as of September 2005. But on the data front, progress was slow. BRR was supporting a simple but province-wide survey, tracking housing pledges and housing starts in the field, together with an Acehnese organisation 'Garansi' and the provincial authorities, first in September and then in November.<sup>3</sup> However, by December 2005, the overall data environment on shelter and housing was still deemed very unreliable. Even though the 'Garansi Survey' had recorded an impressive number of housing pledges in specific villages and listed a significant number of housing starts, the overall perception was that these data could very well indicate unfulfilled promises and suggest a 'false start'. The trust in the promises from NGOs was decreasing by late 2005. Numbers never seemed to add up. As explained in the previous chapter, more than 200,000 units had been pledged while only about 120,000 were probably required. The implementation hurdles were considered too numerous – land security, availability of timber, very poor initial quality and volatile costs amongst others – and the security environment remained uncertain. The capacity of a local organisation like Garansi to survey issues in the field objectively was also met with some incredulity.<sup>4</sup> The newly appointed UN Recovery Coordinator was dealing with the problems of the tents and the need for transitional shelter and would only establish a data centre by 2006.

Against this background of missing data and decreasing trust, UN-HABITAT proposed to the members of the Shelter Working Group to collectively engage in much more detailed tracking. The presumption was that the nascent RAN database could not provide a dynamic picture of progress, as it was only tracking pledges and physical progress. For instance, ongoing preparatory steps such as land mapping and village planning were in themselves indications that the process of settlement and housing recovery had started in a community. Progress on these preparatory steps in a particular village was also a sign that an implementing organisation was overcoming the initial hurdles, at least in that location. First hand field information, which was available from organisations such as Oxfam, UN-HABITAT and UPLINK, confirmed these assumptions. Shelter Work Group members agreed that the preparatory activities needed better tracking.

Organising the data management was the next challenge. Self-assessments and self-reporting were the modalities for the data feed of all organisations into the RAN database. The intention was that the member organisations in the Shelter Working Group would collect the additional field information on the progression of land mapping, village planning and the various stages of housing reconstruction. The





collected data were to form an additional tracking module within the RAN database. The plan was however quickly aborted. The IT teething problems of the RAN system, both with regard to hardware and software, were considerable. Moreover, RAN struggled to get reports from many organisations, a situation which continued well into 2006. In general, self-assessment during crisis situations is often problematic. The psychology of omission in a situation of stress causes individuals and organisations to avoid honest reporting about their own work, especially when progress is poor.

As a result, UN-HABITAT stepped away from its plan to collect the data through self-reporting and to feed them into the RAN database. It started to pursue a stand-alone monitoring provision and sought the assistance of the architecture department of the Banda Aceh state university Syiah Kuala ('Unsyiah'). Even though the capacity of the department to do the monitoring was limited, the choice had several critical advantages. The department could provide monitoring by Acehnese citizens and so fulfil the expectation for third-party monitoring and accountability, which was a strategic objective of the young BRR. Furthermore, the questionnaire was designed in close cooperation with a team of lecturers and students, providing an opportunity to absorb local knowledge and sensitivities in the monitoring programme. And the monitoring programme became an opportunity for local institutional cooperation and capacity building. UN-HABITAT brought in experience from professional monitors with exposure to other countries and situations. By late 2006, the most experienced Unsyiah monitors were absorbed as staff in UN-HABITAT, but the field monitoring continued to draw on students of both the architecture and engineering departments.

The initial questionnaire was formulated in October 2005 and a test run made in November. The first published results were released in early February 2006. The programme continued until mid 2008. The critical monitoring rounds were done in early 2006, mid 2006 and mid 2007. In addition, special monitoring rounds were done specifically for Red Cross housing programme locations in Aceh Jaya and for all housing that had been provided or was being completed by UN-HABITAT.<sup>5</sup> Table 2.1 provides the details about the timing and the locations.

TABLE 2.1 : UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH PROGRAMME - TIMELINE AND LOCATIONS

Monitoring	Month	Districts	Organizations	Villages
Round 1 (test)	Nov 05	Banda Aceh		16
Round 2	Jan - Mar 06	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Barat and Pidie	34	66
Round 3	May - Jul 06	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, Pidie, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara	50	75
UN-HABITAT Housing	Oct - Nov 06	Nias and Nias Selatan		2
Aceh Jaya Housing (various Red Cross organisations)	Nov - Dec 06	Aceh Jaya	3	12
UN-HABITAT Housing	Dec 06 - Feb 07	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh and Pidie		17
UN-HABITAT Housing	Apr 07	Simeulue		3
Round 4	Aug - Sept 07	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara	43	73
UN-HABITAT Housing	Early 2008	Simeulue		3

## Monitoring Progress and Sustainable Recovery

The monitoring programme was not created on the basis of a grand design. It was a pragmatic undertaking, developed locally and incrementally. It encountered the normal challenges of stand-alone monitoring exercises in crisis contexts. It was dealing with a complex context but was expected to come up with swift and clear information. It had to track a multi-year process, which had barely started when the monitoring programme was conceived. Worse, it had to evaluate progress on the ground against outcome expectations which were not well defined yet. For instance, would the rebuilding programmes of NGOs only deliver core houses, or rather completely rebuilt settlements? And it had to cover issues involving diverse stakeholders – Acehese and Nias beneficiaries, local authorities and NGOs – for whom collaboration was new, even more so on issues of housing.

An early conceptual problem for the monitoring programme was to define the different dimensions of settlement and housing recovery. Housing recovery relates to the repair and reconstruction of houses themselves. Settlement recovery requires a range of works to be completed: debris cleared, land mapped, village mapping done and infrastructure and amenities developed. These activities are like a long pipeline of things to be done. Settlement rebuilding both precedes and follows upon the reconstruction of houses proper. No monitoring programme could track intertwined actions and events truly separately, but had to consider their progress together in an intelligent way. In settlement building and rebuilding, many parties have to work together. The rebuilding of any neighbourhood or hamlet in Aceh and Nias needed coordination between, amongst others, village councils, sub-district officials, contractors, institutions dealing with land issues, utility companies, local authorities repairing infrastructure and irrigation and education departments rebuilding schools. Many things had to come together.

Therefore the question was how to measure progress, in absence of a simple linear project cycle, or how to detect trends considering many interdependencies? The monitoring programme simply started with questions about the early activities on the ground, such as community meetings, the land mapping, the village planning, the identification of beneficiaries, and the construction of the foundations of the first houses. Additional questions queried the viability of the early engagements: were people living inside or outside the hamlets, and in what kind of temporary accommodation; was any other form of assistance effectively reaching villages and neighbourhoods, including social, health and educational support; was there any targeted assistance for vulnerable groups; were formal village cooperation agreements signed; were specific activities such as land mapping preceded and concluded with signed-off documents; were crucial amenities such as drinking water being promised or provided; was assistance responding to genuine needs expressed by people and could people take charge of the critical decisions over what to prioritise and how to proceed?

The monitoring programme tried to establish the density of activities of recovery in a neighbourhood, ranging from social support to land preparation, planning and infrastructure restoration, even if the housing implementing organisation had no direct role in these matters. The density of activities was supposed to indicate whether a community-wide recovery process was taking hold or not. The assumption was that the denser the local recovery activities were, and the more was accomplished in the early phase of the pipeline activity, the greater the chance became to accomplish housing and settlement recovery in full – even though no foundations had perhaps been dug yet. Obviously, the monitoring programming also sought information about the outstanding and unmet needs in a community, for transitional shelter, housing, basic amenities and social support. This feedback was directly useful for organisations capable of providing more support, but also indicated whether the humanitarian assistance that was being delivered and recorded during the monitoring was sufficient and reasonably targeted.

Other principles of the reconstruction as expressed in the Master Plan – community involvement, sustainability, a holistic approach, integration and prioritisation of vulnerable people – needed also to be queried. The programme, for instance, queried the extent to which public amenities were available and accessible, even if these were amenities not affected by the Tsunami (e.g. a secondary school incidentally located in the sub-district but not close to the sea). Without functional amenities, it would be difficult to occupy houses and people may prefer to hang on living in the camps. While recovery was ongoing, more questions were added to get a better picture on whether the recovery was deemed sufficiently sustainable. A few questions delved into particularly sensitive issues such as the integration of ex-combatants and



conflicts about land within communities – questions which the student-monitors themselves hesitated to ask, in fear of stirring up emotions and getting themselves in trouble.

## Monitoring Quality and Fostering a Compliance Culture

The monitoring programme needed to track not only progress but also quality. As said earlier, progress was tracked both directly (e.g. housing starts) and indirectly (e.g. the density of preparatory activities). Monitoring the quality, however, was not a matter of measuring the sum of all recovery activities. Moreover, in a complex process of recovery, quality is also about more than construction quality only. So what were valid measures of quality?

A possible approach could have been to measure the process and outcomes against a universal measure of quality. On issues of housing, there is some guidance on this subject. The fulfilment of the universal right to shelter is sometimes measured against indicators in relation to 'adequate shelter'.<sup>6</sup> The key indicators are the capacity of shelters and houses to provide protection against the elements, the degree of overcrowding inside and their structural safety. Secondary indicators are the degree of providing secure tenure, personal safety and protection, durability, affordability and the degree of vulnerability with regard to disasters. Also the provision of safe drinking water and safe sanitation and accessibility are vital concerns.

In Aceh and Nias, the prevailing Building Code gave information about structural safety, durability and access to safe water and sanitation. Both the Building Code and the SPHERE guidelines provided standards against overcrowding.<sup>7</sup> Monitoring against these standards was thus possible and provided a measure of compliance. But on the other issues, without yet considering the added dimension of settlement recovery, few standards served as a clear reference. 'Monitoring-against-standards' was thus not possible with regard to all issues. Moreover, the broad but vague expectations as expressed in the principles of the Master Plan – cohesion, inclusion, sustainability – also needed consideration. Monitoring settlement recovery needed to remain broad, with a focus on the long term. Setting a few hard standards and measuring compliance against them was neither possible nor desired.

On a general level, recovery outcomes after complex disasters should indeed not be expected to be fully compliant-against-standards. A strict compliance regime carries risks in itself. It is well known that in complex social processes where no individual stakeholder is in full control, errors, opportunism and foul play seep in undetected and put the collective environment at risk. Making the regulatory environment more complex usually does not lead to more rational responses by actors but rather increases the likelihood of either extreme risk avoidance or of a collapse of communication and collective evaluation. Typical remedies are prescribed under the label of 'fostering a compliance culture': making continuous risk assessments, fostering of an open environment that allows early signs of failure to be spotted and promoting communication without fear. These are cornerstones of modern accountability.

As a strategic tool set, the monitoring system sought to pursue the complementary objectives of compliance; that is both compliance-against-standards and the stimulation of a compliance culture. From the start, the programme measured construction quality against the Building Code, as an indication of compliance-against-standard. But fostering a compliance culture was at the heart of the ambition of the monitoring programme in 2005 and 2006. It focused on providing qualitative indicators on beneficiary satisfaction, the transparency of the process and it reported relative performance during implementation against other implementing organisations. The indicators gave a measure of early success or failure of individual programmes and thus of the risks faced by programmes. The aggregate information also informed about the prospect and the risks for the housing recovery programming as a whole. Moreover, the use of student-monitors and the quick publication of the results in an open and not-threatening fashion, by means explained later in this chapter, served the purpose to stimulate open and fearless communication.

By 2007, however, the emphasis shifted from reporting performance to reporting sustainable recovery. By late 2006, the performance of many implementation programmes had become better across the board. Moreover, the challenges and complexities to moving beyond building housing units became




much more evident. Achieving sustainable settlement recovery became the overriding programmatic objective, rather than providing protection and roofs. Construction quality, satisfaction and transparency only remained a subset of indicators. Additional categories were highlighted, including the progress and relative quality of the planning, infrastructure and amenity provision, environmental remediation and

## LINKING RECOVERY, POVERTY REDUCTION AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

The monitoring programme design fundamentally acknowledged that settlement recovery would be a long process. The monitoring approach had to capture and pay attention to each aspect of this stretched out process. As an example, UN-HABITAT's methodology of its own Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programme (ANSSP) showed that the construction of shelter was only one phase in a long process. UN-HABITAT has strongly endorsed a holistic settlements recovery approach.

FIGURE 2.1 : PROCESS OF MONITORING SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

### MONITORING SETTLEMENT RECOVERY : A Very Long Process



livelihoods recovery. This will be further explained in the next section about the design of the monitoring survey and reporting tools. The challenge was to monitor the performance and outputs against standards. The question was of course: which standards about which issues? In absence of a single official approach to housing recovery, this was bound to be difficult.

Through monitoring, UN-HABITAT aims to contribute to achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), in particular MDG targets 7-10 and 7-11.<sup>8</sup> Acting in the MDG spirit, UN-HABITAT published the Guideline for Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction, considering guiding principles endorsed by experiences and recommendations of practitioners. The Guideline states that disasters can provide opportunities for sustainable development if rehabilitation efforts are integrated into long term development strategies. Sustainability requires permanent links between the emergency relief and reconstruction on the one hand and the development of local government capacities on the other hand.

Furthermore, it requires the development of productive economic activities, the development of broad-based and long-term reconstruction and shelter strategies, the protection of land and property rights and long-term solutions for land and property disputes, vulnerability reduction and disaster management, the securing of tenure in line with Pinheiro Principles,<sup>9</sup> and the enforcement of equal rights for women. Last but not least the creation of strategic partnerships and alliances at all levels must be fostered.

The international community became aware of the necessity of a shift from disaster management practices towards an integrated disaster risk reduction approach within the framework of sustainable development.<sup>10</sup> An integrated disaster risk reduction effort should be a systematic creation and application of policies, strategies and practices which minimise vulnerabilities in a way that decreases losses and the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. As required by the Hyogo Framework of Action on the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in disaster and recovery responses, vulnerability reduction and disaster management should be integrated into existing national and local development and poverty reduction plans.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the idea of putting poverty alleviation at the centre of the recovery process acknowledges that the poor are the most vulnerable to major disasters, and also more exposed to small recurrent disasters like floods, landslides, the collapsing of badly maintained buildings etc. Before the Tsunami in Aceh, both poor and rich lived in risk locations.

However, the average poor family in the city of Banda Aceh lived in an area which was already below sea level and sank even more after the earthquake and Tsunami. In the near future small disasters like periodically occurring floods will deteriorate houses and settlements with an insufficient drainage system and the poorer inhabitants of these areas will have few savings to maintain their houses.

For UN-HABITAT, the mapping of human settlements issues is a core mandate in the pursuit of the agency to support communities and institutions in improving housing environments and settlement management practices. Urban Sector Profiling, identifying Best Practices and allowing benchmarking through the establishment of standardised databases, as is the objective of the Global Urban Observatory initiative, are but a few ways of establishing such support. Specifically for disaster and recovery responses, the SRR guidelines are accompanied by an indicator tool set. The latter was used to reframe the reporting format of the Aceh monitoring framework, moving from performance benchmarking to a SRR picture of shelter and settlement recovery.

## THE DESIGN OF THE MONITORING PROGRAMME

### The Sample Unit and its Selection

The monitoring programme randomly sampled hamlets, neighbourhoods or parts of them where a specific humanitarian organisation or a specific government programme was providing new houses. A valid standard sample was a project location of a single organisation where surveyors could get in touch with the beneficiaries of at least five houses of which the construction was progressing. The definition of the sample unit took into account that houses were mostly built in batches of more than five houses but that only a small group of beneficiaries would be around at the time of monitoring the finished or unfinished houses.

The selected five houses were assumed to be a representative sample of the on-going construction work facilitated by the implementing organisation in a particular location. Typically, a programme would provide between 25 to 100 houses at a time. The selected five houses were expected to be a random sample providing information on the construction quality of all housing provided by the housing implementation organisation in that location. But by selecting only five houses, the programme did not in no way engage in 'building inspection'. Rather, it simply provided an indication of probable quality being delivered by the implementing organisation. In the same way, the beneficiaries of those five houses represented a focus group which could inform the monitors about various issues in relation to shelter and settlement recovery in their neighbourhood and testify about issues of satisfaction and transparency.

Once the sample location was considered valid and five respondents had been selected, the monitors proceeded with the entire query, encompassing issues of both housing and settlement recovery. It was clear that the challenges of implementation would cause the quality and the problems to vary from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, even for the same implementing organisation. Therefore, it was attempted to select more samples for a particular organisation commensurate for the scale of programme. This was not always possible, however, for practical reasons. For instance, the survey rounds of the monitoring programme targeted one particular district at a time, to which the Unsyiah teams then travelled. It occurred that a larger implementation programme had not yet started up its projects in that particular district at the time of the survey.

With respect to the sampling of locations, a simple methodology was followed. Information from the Garansi surveys, the RAN database and data collection in the ShelterWorkgroup was collated to make a long list of ongoing implementation activities. Districts were selected based on the availability of



sufficient number of locations where housing construction was physically progressing, even if that was only in small numbers. In early 2006, accessibility was also an issue to be considered. Already after the publication of round 2, it became clear that the information and the selection process provided a reasonable overall picture. Most organisations gave the feedback that they were by and large agreeable to the information. Even those who saw embarrassingly poor results accepted their assessment begrudgingly. Organisations like Terre des Hommes Netherlands and Habitat for Humanity Indonesia initiated programme corrections and reviews.

A more serious issue was of course that the monitoring programme was skewed towards areas where reconstruction had achieved or was in the process of effectively overcoming the initial hurdles of debris clearance, land mapping, possibly resettlement and beneficiary selection. Otherwise, building would not have started, even not of a first batch of houses. As a result, areas of non-activity for a long period in Aceh Jaya, along the Southwest coast and on Simeulue were blind gaps in respect to the needs. Even ongoing minimal preparations in these areas, such as land mapping and beneficiary listing, were not tracked by the monitoring programme as the programme could only start efficiently surveying progress in those areas where a degree of housing building had taken off. Fortunately, the experience of the student monitors built up through 2006 was such that a special monitoring mission on request of BRR could be undertaken to Aceh Jaya to look into the delay problems of programmes of the Canadian Red Cross, and to map the settlement issues of the villages where so far only transitional shelters had been put up.

## The Questionnaire

In order to capture the progress and issues of both shelter and settlement recovery, a lengthy questionnaire was designed with the contribution of stakeholders. The process started with workshop sessions with Unsyiah lecturers and students. When they tested the questionnaire, additional inputs were included from community members.<sup>12</sup> The active participation in the design of the questionnaire resulted in a feeling of ownership of the process among the monitors.

The result was a questionnaire consisting of 5 key sections: the scoping of the needs and the ongoing shelter response in a village; the progress on the preparatory work of land mapping and village planning; the needs and responses in relation to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of neighbourhood and village infrastructure and amenities; details about the housing programme itself; and feedback on the quality of the construction work in progress. Additional forms provided information on the location, the five responding beneficiaries and the organisation providing housing assistance.

The questionnaire was accordingly lengthy. It in relation to the rebuilding of the immediate





neighbourhood by the housing implementing organisation providing assistance there, about 250 questions needed to be answered by a focus group of five beneficiaries. For questions about the shelter and settlement recovery in the village as a whole, the village head was sought. Another 70 questions were used to guide the student-monitors through a session of visible observation of the features and the quality of the construction of each of the five houses. In total, the questionnaire contained over 1,000 reply boxes to be considered. The vast majority of questions required a simple multiple choice response. Most questions listed the most likely responses and allowed that additional information could be added, such as for instance the name of the organisation assisting the land mapping, providing drinking water, education assistance, or livelihoods support. Responses in relation to the construction of the houses were structured around the standards set out in the Building Code. One of the answers would correspond with the standard set in the code, while others would be either above-standard or below-standard.

In addition, the student monitors were asked to draw up out the floor plan and elevations of the new houses and to make a sketch of the hamlet layout, so that the targeted houses could be identified. No GPS identification or satellite maps were used.

TABLE 2.2 : PARTICIPATORY QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

QUESTIONNAIRE SECTIONS	Respondents	Scope
<b>IDENTIFICATION of 5 SAMPLE RESPONDENTS</b> [24 questions]	<b>Focus Group and Village Leader</b>	<b>Within the Housing Programme Area</b>
<b>1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE HOUSING PROGRAMME</b> [9 questions]	<b>Focus Group</b>	<b>Housing Programme</b>
<b>2. NEEDS IN THE VILLAGE FOR SETTLEMENT &amp; HOUSING RECOVERY, INCLUDING FOR SHORT - TERM HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</b> [58 questions]	<b>Focus Group and Village Leader</b>	<b>Village</b>
<b>3. PREPARTORY WORKS FOR LAND MAPPING, VILLAGE PLANNING AND RELOCATION</b> [34 questions]	<b>Focus Group and Village Leader</b>	<b>Housing Programme Area</b>
<b>4. INFRASTRUCTURE &amp; AMENITIES ISSUES</b> [94 questions]	<b>Focus Group and Village Leader</b>	<b>Village</b>
<b>5. DETAILS ABOUT THE HOUSING PROGRAMME</b> [34 questions]	<b>Focus Group and Village Leader</b>	<b>Housing Programme Area</b>
<b>6. CONSTRUCTION QUALITY</b> [71 questions]	<b>Visual Observation</b>	<b>Housing Programme</b>

The complete questionnaire has been published in 'Let People Speak: Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation', in the series 'Community-based programming for shelter and community infrastructure', published by UN-HABITAT ANSSP (2008). See: [www.unhabitat-indonesia.org](http://www.unhabitat-indonesia.org).

A typical field monitoring team consisted of one teacher and three to four students. Throughout the programme, experienced monitors were retained and new students added to the team. The training of the monitors coincided with the field testing of the questionnaire.<sup>13</sup> A typical work division developed. Two members of the team would do the focus group discussion, while another would interview the village leader. An engineering student by preference would do the visual observation of the construction. Architecture students would do the sketching. On a typical day, one team could examine two sample locations, either two different housing implementation programmes ongoing in the same village or two programmes ongoing in adjacent villages. In the late afternoon, the team would sit together and check the responses of the long questionnaires. A late afternoon job may have been required to overcome the problem of a focus group discussion where the five beneficiaries had not been available all together. This happened regularly for a variety of reasons, such as in the case that the available responding men and women were not willing to sit in one focus group together. Monitors would resort to filling out five questionnaires with each respondent separately. Later in the day, they would then collate one final



response for the 'cluster', based on the most prevalent answer for each question.

Upon return to Banda Aceh, the answers were finally transferred to a database. In addition, the teams provided a complete photo archive of the surveyed houses and their surroundings. After multiple rounds of quality checks, a 'cleaned' database which had checked and re-checked on typo-errors and data inconsistencies, was released.

## The Indicators

The initial data stream produced as a result of the 2nd monitoring round was already comprehensive, but for several reasons, it was obvious that the evaluation was tedious. The broad scope of the questionnaire was a challenge. But also the different levels of progress made comparisons difficult. As a result, a number of indicators were developed, which allowed expressing the intermediate outcomes in the sampled location as a set of three numerical scores: construction quality, satisfaction and transparency.

### a. The Construction Quality score

The construction quality was measured against the official Building Code. The scoring methodology was done in a number of steps:

- During the survey, the monitor was not allowed to consider the scoring. Being a student, he or she was only asked to do visual observation, ticking boxes which indicated whether a construction item was below standard, compliant or exceeding it.
- After tabulation, the results were subjected to an algorithm that automatically calculated the score. For example, the evaluator had only to specify the type of construction (full brick, half brick/half timber, or 'other') and the earthquake zone in which the sample was located. (Reconstruction in Aceh and Nias was spread out over three different earthquake zones, with differing construction standards set out for each.)
- The algorithm was based on attributed scores to each of the questions, ranging from 1 to 4; the score 3 was 'in compliance', 4 stood for exceeding the standard, while 2 for being sub-standard and 1 or less being outright dangerously sub-standard. The questions were grouped into a number of issues to calculate preliminary and separate scores in relation to the quality of the foundation, the structure, the choice of materials (either structural or for finishing) and the application of bracings and anchoring (the latter two being vital attributes to make structures more earthquake safe). Then a final score was being derived from the sub-scores, with 'downgrades' being applied if one of the sub-scores was particularly bad.

The scoring was often a controversial application. First, as most organisations opted to build a concrete-and-brick structure but very few organisations managed to build in compliance with the Building Code, it exposed a situation of virtually systematic non-compliance. Of course, as discussed at length in chapter 1, the building standard itself was demanding while the know-how among construction workers in Aceh was very limited. Either the design of the construction had to significantly exceed the Building Code so as to assure that expected implementation errors did not drag the score below the standard, or supervision had to be extremely tight. Neither was possible in 2006 for most organisations. It was achieved by some in 2007 and beyond, but only after allowing the average budgets to increase twofold or more.

The monitoring programme therefore applied a pragmatic stand: 'near-compliance' to the Building Code was presented as a reasonable outcome. In the visual presentations, near-compliance was depicted as 'green'; exceeding the standard as 'silver blue'; under-achievement 'yellow'; and blatantly dangerous work was coded 'red'. There was indeed a logic for this decision. The Building Code was, as any safety code would be, typically over-engineered to a certain degree in anticipation of bad practice. For instance, the required steel sizes in the standard were typically one size larger than what engineering calculations would dictate, so that bad steel binding by workers could be tolerated to a limited extent. The scoring was thus accompanied by an evaluation (the colour green in the scoring tables) signalling that the surveyed structures were approaching the expectations of the Building Code. The policy followed was that if near-

compliance was achieved, then the risk to large-scale loss of life and wholesale destruction in the event of a new heavy earthquake was reduced. This was even more so a reasonable consideration as most construction was taking place in low density areas. In other words, near-compliance in low-density areas would only bring a risk for a large loss of assets and loss of life in the case of a heavy earthquake with the epicentre in those areas. This risk had to be weighed against halting the housing reconstruction programmes till workers and supervisors had been trained so that full compliance could be achieved.

The approach, however, failed for urban Banda Aceh, where construction standards should have been higher in order to offer more protection, because of the higher population density. Surprisingly, the

## SCORING CONSTRUCTION QUALITY

The construction quality indicator put an average score between 0 and 4 to every cluster of 5 houses which was sampled. The first table shows the meaning adhered to each score.

TABLE 2.3 : SCORING MATRIX FOR CONSTRUCTION QUALITY

Scoring Matrix for Construction Quality		
BUILDING TYPE		
score	brick, concrete, metal	half-brick, soft-infill, timber
4	BETTER THAN BUILDING CODE	BUILDING CODE, AND VERY DURABLE
better than required		
3	BUILDING CODE TRESHOLD	BUILDING CODE ,AND MORE DURABLE
>2.5 broadly acceptable		
<2.5 many acceptable; may require inspection for retrofitting		
2	BELOW BUILDING CODE	BUILDING CODE TRESHOLD
poor; to be replaced or retrofitted		
1	CRITICALLY BELOW BUILDING CODE	BELOW BUILDING CODE
dangerous; to be replaced immediately		
0	INACCEPTABLE	CRITICALLY BELOW BUILDING CODE

A distinction had to be made between timber and brick houses. The Building Code specified that timber had to have a certain class and strength. In the case for the structure of timber houses, 2nd class timber was sufficient. The Building Code was not necessarily logical on this point. 2nd class timber affects the lifetime of the construction. Simply put: a brick construction in accordance with the Building Code would easily survive more than 20 years, while a timber construction in compliance would probably not exceed 10 years, or 15 at best. The Building Code did not target to standardise traditional Acehnese timber houses, which used very good hardwood and would have lifetimes of more than 100 years. The Code simply showed a conventional engineering bias, declaring a house built with 2nd class timber still earthquake safe. Durability was not an immediate engineering concern.

The algorithm therefore gave only a score of '3' to timber constructions with the best wood (class 1, thus exceeding the standard), which would have a lifetime comparable to or longer than brick constructions. If class 2 was used, then the compliant score was '2'.



construction quality was often particularly problematic in the city, either because questionable local contractors were at work for a quick profit but also because community oversight was more difficult to organise in heterogeneous urban neighbourhoods. This complex situation was not well understood in 2006. Urban recovery has indeed different dynamics. A simple change to the scoring could have given a better indication, by making the thresholds for 'broadly acceptable quality' more sensitive to population density. It would have been an objective measure focused at risk reduction, without requiring the need to define first the difference between rural and urban areas.

The table shows the compliance scores for brick and timber constructions.

The second table shows the list of indicators, which the scoring was based on. Critical issues were those with which every construction had to comply. They impacted the score. Conditional issues could lead to different requirements of the critical issues. For instance, not all soil types would justify a strip foundation, and different types of timber would lead to different expectations of durability, which impacted the scoring algorithm. Obviously, the main conditional issue was the earthquake zone. Rebuilding in Aceh was on-going in areas with three different levels of earthquake risk.

TABLE 2.4 : SCORING PARAMETERS

	Indicators	
	Critical issues	Conditional issues
<b>Foundation</b>	foundation material, foundation base width, material of the foundation strip and plinth tie beam, dimension of the foundation strip, concrete composition, diameter of structural reinforcement, stirrup distance	soil type, type of foundation, class of structural timber, type of reinforcement, distance between two columns, earthquake zone
<b>Structure</b>	plinth tie beam material and dimensions, type and materials of the columns, tie beam material, wall in-fill material, diameters of the structural reinforcement, diameter of non-structural reinforcement, stirrup distance, concrete composition, water source and quality for concrete	type of house, type of foundation, class of structural timber, type of reinforcement, sand quality, utilisation of continuous lintel beams over doors or windows, earthquake zone
<b>Material Choice</b>	cement type, type of aggregates, class of structural timber, class of non-structural timber, diameter of structural reinforcement, diameter of non-structural reinforcement, water source and quality for concrete, wall material, floor material, roof structure material	main door material, bathroom door material, window material, sand, quality, type of reinforcement, earthquake zone
<b>Bracing/ Anchoring</b>	application of anchors tying walls and columns to the roof structure, type of bracings including wind bracing, anchoring of door and windows to the wall frames	earthquake zone
<b>Finishing Quality</b>	floor material, cement composition for finishing plaster work, cement type	



## b. The Satisfaction Score

As mentioned throughout this publication, an important issue of the Aceh Nias reconstruction has been the community oriented approach and community participation. Common construction monitoring systems usually revolve around hard facts like cost, quality and timely delivery. For shelter and settlement recovery, an indication of community involvement was, however, important.

The questionnaire sought both subjective feedback from beneficiaries and factual information. Community participation could be queried directly and indirectly. Simple questions included the frequency of community meetings and the participation rate of women. Indirect indications could be derived from questions asking for factual information: when monitors asked the focus group whether the land maps had been concluded and signed off, the answer 'I don't know' would point to a lack of community involvement, especially if this answer was returned in response to many questions.

Yet the most difficult point to gauge in the quality of community involvement was the discontinuity and complexity of the interactions of communities with housing implementation organisations. People were often intensively involved in the initial communications on land mapping and beneficiary selection. Thereafter, organisations often went back to prepare for design and engineering, budgeting and contracting. It was a well known and lamented issue that many communities were not contacted for months, especially in 2005 and the first half of 2006. Communities became disappointed as a result. Moreover, it was frequently reported that organisations, because of internal bureaucracy, funding or competency problems, did not follow up with actual housing construction, reduced their commitments or returned with additional queries.

As a result, many communities were dealing with more than one organisation at a time, be it for shelter or in relation to other needs. Pinpointing community involvement and satisfaction in relation to a single housing programme was therefore not easy and a single indicator would be at most indicative. An aggregate indicator based on more than one question was a better option. A simple and pragmatic selection of nine questions was made. The reply to each of the questions was valued as 1, 0 or -1. A cumulative score between 3 and 9 was labelled green / satisfied. A score below -3 was considered red / dissatisfied. In-between was yellow.

The following questions were used:

- Is the new house (likely to be) comfortable?
- Did the housing organisations a good job, overall speaking?
- Would you recommend that the organisation implement its programme in other villages?  
Has the organisation built good infrastructure and facilities?



- Is the organisation (or any organisation) providing a place of worship or promising to do so?
- Is the organisation (or any organisation) providing a school or promising to do so?
- Has the organisation kept the community informed?
- Has the organisation kept its promises in this village?
- Has the organisation followed the wishes of communities?

These simple questions address a number of issues: the first three query the general appreciation of the programme, in the sense whether people like the house and commend the work of the organisation; the next three questions ask whether it provided more than shelter assistance; and the last three questions query the overall responsiveness of the organisation to the community. Feedback throughout the monitoring programme has validated the choice of these questions as being reasonable but not perfect indicators of satisfaction. Obtaining a good house was important for people, irrespective of the way it had been provided. But people also expected that amenities and infrastructure were provided and saw the housing organisation as the provider of the last resort. If settlement recovery failed but houses were built, the housing implementation organisation was often blamed for it, often with further recriminations made such as its lack of willingness to follow the wishes of the community. Housing organisations often found the score therefore unfair, as they claimed to have taken on no responsibility for the provision of amenities and infrastructure. From a monitoring perspective, however, the indicator still signalled valid sentiments: people had more appreciation for organisations which provided houses and amenities in a holistic programme, while they found it difficult to understand why organisations often wanted to limit spending on houses only. That faraway donors and headquarters had decided to do so was of course a matter neither easily registered nor appreciated by people in a destroyed space.

In short, the satisfaction score required organisations to deliver good houses, but also to take up the initiative for assisting a process of holistic and sustainable recovery of the settlement as a whole. The low levels of satisfaction did therefore not necessarily show the simple lack of competency of several organisations, but also the problematic formulation of their shelter-only programmes and thus the problematic narrow sectoral response policy upheld by BRR, the major humanitarian organisations and many donors.

### c. The Quality – Satisfaction Matrix

The development of two indices allowed a performance benchmarking matrix to be put together. This became the Quality – Satisfaction Matrix. The matrix simply listed all sample results, providing a scorecard showing organisations which did well on both scores in a certain location, or those which scored poorly on either or both indices. The performance matrix was useful as it gave quick feedback,



without making allusions that there was a causal relationship between satisfaction and quality. Early quick statistical analysis had indicated that it was futile to look for simple cause and effect relationships on many issues in the shelter and settlement recovery process. This had been supported by subsequent analysis which maintained that it was not possible to identify simple explanations or easy fixes. The first complete matrix was made on the basis of round 2 results. It was presented with a strategic purpose in mind: green was chosen for programmes producing shelter which was broadly in line with the Building Code standard – even if not fully compliant. The very few organisations which were fully compliant to or exceeding the Building Code were shown as 'silver' blue. Those which scored close to the 2 were given a yellow status. Few organisations received a red label.

The guiding criterion for the colour coding was thus construction quality. Furthermore, the organisations were evenly distributed over the four quadrants of the matrix. The position of the organisations in the matrix therefore only indicated their relative performance in relation to other organisations. Hence the matrix only 'named and shamed' organisations with systematically poor scores. At the same time, it brought out a statement that there were 'neither saints nor sinners' in the Aceh and Nias reconstruction. Many of the larger programmes indeed had more than one sample in the matrix and scored well at times but poorly in other locations. Organisations could have a decent programme, but still get into problems in certain districts or locations or with certain communities.

TABLE 2.5 : BENCHMARKING RESULTS OF THE 2<sup>nd</sup> MONITORING ROUND (JAN-FEB 2006)

		QUALITY SATISFACTION SCORING							
		lower		higher					
QUALITY	Satisfaction	Q		S					
		Q	S	Q	S				
higher	higher	ABE_018	UP-LINK	3.00	3	ABE_019	UPLINK	3.00	8
	higher	ABE_021	UP LINK	3.00	3	ABE_007	TURKEY	2.83	8
	higher	ABA_007	WORLD VISION	2.85	3	ABE_011	UPLINK	3.00	7
	higher	PID_009	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	3.07	2	ABE_016	UP-LINK	3.00	7
	higher	ABA_019	WORLD VISION	2.83	2	PID_011	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT	2.89	7
	higher	ABA_011	CRS	2.78	2	ABA_022	SOS	2.83	7
	higher	BNA_004	PKPU	2.71	2	ABA_021	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.82	7
	higher	ABE_012	UP-LINK	3.00	1	ABA_002	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.73	7
	higher	ABA_017	ISLAMIC RELIEF	2.97	1	PID_016	UN-HABITAT	2.70	7
	higher	ABA_001	CRS	2.85	0	PID_019	ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	3.05	6
	higher	PID_004	GTZ/KfW	2.74	0	ABE_020	UPLINK	3.00	6
	higher	ABE_014	UP-LINK	3.00	-1	BNA_006	BUDHA TZU-CHI	2.95	6
	higher	BNA_008	MDTFANS	2.80	-1	ABA_015	SOS	2.83	6
	higher	ABA_012	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.70	-1	BNA_001	UP-LINK	3.00	5
	higher	BNA_005	BRR	2.81	-2	ABE_017	UP-LINK	3.00	5
	higher	PID_013	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	3.07	-3	ABE_003	SAMARITAN'S PURSE	2.80	5
	higher	ABE_013	AL- IMDAAD FOUNDATION	2.74	-4	BNA_003	CARE INTERNATIONAL	3.04	4
	higher	PID_020	BRR	3.03	-5	PID_017	UN-HABITAT	2.80	4
higher	PID_003	SERASIH INDONESIA	2.70	-7					
lower	higher	ABE_005	OXFAM	2.35	1	ABA_005	BALA KESELAMATAN, SALVATION ARMY	2.53	7
	higher	ABA_013	CRS	2.19	1	ABE_004	YAYASAN SOSIAL KREASI	2.48	7
	higher	PID_015	SAVE THE CHILDREN	2.18	1	ABE_022	CARITAS-MAMAMIA CARITAS-MAMAMIA	2.30	7
	higher	PID_002	SERASIH INDONESIA	2.55	-1	PID_018	ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	2.67	6
	higher	ABE_015	IOM	2.24	-1	ABA_009	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.52	6
	higher	ABA_018	CRS *	2.17	-1	PID_012	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	2.46	6
	higher	PID_008	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.70	-2	ABE_024	NORLINK	2.21	6
	higher	PID_014	UN-HABITAT	2.61	-2	BNA_002	UN-HABITAT	2.61	5
	higher	ABA_003	WORLD RELIEF	2.55	-2	BNA_007	WORLD BANK/MDTF-P2KP	2.57	5
	higher	ABE_023	YEU	2.18	-3	ABE_001	ISLAMIC RELIEF	2.62	4
	higher	ABA_008	KJRG	2.66	-4	PID_010	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.43	3
	higher	ABA_004	TERRE DE HOMMES GERMANY & KKSP	2.33	-4	PID_007	IOM	2.39	3
	higher	PID_005	TERREE DES HOMMES NETHERLANDS	2.54	-5	ABE_008	OXFAM	2.11	3
	higher	ABA_014	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.48	-5	ABE_006	LAFARGE	2.00	3
	higher	PID_001	SERASIH INDONESIA	2.55	-6	ABE_002	PEMERINTAH SULAWESI TENGAH	1.78	3
	higher	BNA_009	YBI	2.35	-6	PID_006	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	2.69	2
	higher	BNA_010	OXFAM	2.29	-6	ABA_010	KKSP	2.67	2
	higher	ABA_011	IOM	2.25	-7	ABA_006	SALVATION ARMY	2.00	2
higher					ABE_009	SERASIH INDONESIA	2.60	1	
lower	higher								
lower	lower								

Q = Construction Quality (0 to 4)  
S = Satisfaction (-9 to 9)

UN-Habitat case

half-brick & soft-infill  
timber structures

average satisfaction 1.8  
average construction quality 2.65



### d. The Transparency or Accountability Score

When in February 2005, rumours came up that the programmes of Save the Children and Oxfam were being investigated by their headquarters because of malfeasance and corruption problems, the monitoring team analysed the 2nd round database, which had just been compiled, and distilled an Accountability Index. It was a timely input for policy: the monitored programmes of Save the Children and Oxfam showed very poor results on the questions in relation to the transparency of the process. As a result, randomly selected beneficiaries had come to the same conclusion as auditors in headquarters. However, the problems of these two organisations were not the tip of the iceberg, but simply symptomatic of two failing programmes. This was a reassuring feedback about the ongoing reconstruction process.

The transparency score was calculated mainly based on two questions: did beneficiaries think that the process of obtaining new houses, including the selection of beneficiaries, was done open and honestly and were labour and materials being bought in fairness and without corruption? Eighty percent of the score was linked to the replies on these questions, while the rest was based on a couple of secondary calibrating questions querying the general satisfaction of beneficiaries with the housing organisation. A score from 8 to 10 was classified as green / transparent. Below 5 was red, pointing to considerable or even grave problems. Between 5 and 8 indicated the possibility of problems (yellow).

TABLE 2.6 : THE TRANSPARENCY OR ACCOUNTABILITY SCORE

score (aggregated, normalised)	Organisation (giving house assistance)	District	Sub District	Village	score (aggregated, normalised)	Organisation (giving house assistance)	District	Sub District	Village
10.0	CARE INTERNATIONAL	BANDA ACEH	KUTA ALAM	LAMBARO SKEP	6.7	OXFAM	ACEH BESAR	BAJUSSLAM	KAJHU
10.0	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	PASI PEUKAN BARO	6.7	BALA KESELAMATAN, SALVATION ARMY	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK RIBEK
10.0	SERASH INDONESIA	ACEH BESAR	MESJID RAYA	LAMINGA	6.7	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	KUALA PIDIE
10.0	SO3	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK RAYA	6.4	ISLAMIC RELIEF	ACEH BESAR	BAJUSSLAM	BLANG KRJENG
10.0	TURKEY	ACEH BESAR	LHOONGA	MEUNASAH MESJID LA	6.1	PEMERINTAH BULANEN TENGAH	ACEH BESAR	BAJUSSLAM	CADEK
10.0	UN-HABITAT	PIDIE	PIDIE	RAWA	5.8	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	PANTE TEUNGOH
10.0	UPLINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAMBARO	5.8	ICM	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	KRAMAT LUAR
10.0	UPLINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM RUKAM	5.8	ISLAMIC RELIEF	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	SUAK PANDAN
10.0	UP-LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM ISEK	5.8	KKSP	ACEH BARAT	MEUREUBO	GUNONG KLENG
10.0	WORLD BANK/MOTF-P2KP	BANDA ACEH	MEURAKSA	GAMPONG BARO	5.8	SALVATION ARMY	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK SIGADENG
10.0	WORLD VISION	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	UJONG BAROH	5.8	UP LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAMTEH
10.0	YAYASAN SOSIAL KREASI	ACEH BESAR	BAJUSSLAM	LAM UJONG	5.8	UP-LINK	BANDA ACEH	MEURAKSA	ASOI NANGGRO
9.4	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	KUTA PADANG	5.0	GTZ/IKW	PIDIE	KEMBANG TANJUNG	LANCANG
9.4	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	GAMPONG TEUNGOH	5.0	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	LAMPOIH KRUENG
9.2	ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	PIDIE	SIMPANG TIGA (PIDIE)	COT JAJA	5.0	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	MEUREUBO	MEUREUBO
9.2	ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	PIDIE	SIMPANG TIGA (PIDIE)	KUPULA	5.0	SAVE THE CHILDREN	PIDIE	PANTE RAJA	MESJID PANTE RAJA
9.2	CRS	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	PANGGONG	5.0	UN-HABITAT	PIDIE	PIDIE	PIDIE
9.2	NDRLINK	ACEH BESAR	MESJID RAYA	DURUNG	4.4	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	KRAMAT LUAR
9.2	PKPU	BANDA ACEH	KUTA ALAM	LAMDINGIN	4.4	BRR	PIDIE	SIMPANG TIGA (PIDIE)	PEUKAN TUHA
9.2	SAMARITAN'S PURSE	ACEH BESAR	BAJUSSLAM	KLENG COT ARON	3.9	AL-IMDAAD FOUNDATION	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM GEU EU
9.2	SO3	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	GAMPONG COT	3.6	ICM	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM ASAN
9.2	UN-HABITAT	BANDA ACEH	KUTA ALAM	KEURAWAT	3.6	TERRE DE HOMMES GERMANY & KKSP	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SUAK NIE
9.2	UP-LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM MANYANG	3.6	WORLD RELIEF	ACEH BARAT	JOHAN PAHLAWAN	SEJNEUBOK
9.2	UP-LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAMKELUMOK	3.6	YEU	ACEH BESAR	MESJID RAYA	LAM REH
9.2	WORLD VISION	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	SUAK TIMAH	3.3	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	COT DARAT
8.3	BIUDHA TZU-CHI	BANDA ACEH	LUENG BATA	PANTERIEK	3.3	ICM	BANDA ACEH	KUTA RAJA	LAMPASEH KOTA
8.3	CARITAS-MAMAMIA/CARITAS-MAMAMIA	ACEH BESAR	LHOONG	BAROH KRUENGKALA	3.3	KIRG	NAGAN RAYA	KUALA (NAGAN RAYA)	SUAK PUNTING
8.3	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	PASI RAWA	3.3	BRR	BANDA ACEH	KUTA RAJA	GAMPONG JAWA
8.3	UPLINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	GAMPONG BARO	3.3	UP-LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM ASAN
8.1	LAFARGE	ACEH BESAR	LHOONGA	LAMKRJET	2.8	SERASH INDONESIA	PIDIE	BATEE	KULAM
8.1	UN-HABITAT	PIDIE	PANTE RAJA	PEURADE	2.2	OXFAM	ACEH BESAR	DARUSSALAM	LAM PEUDAYA
7.8	CRS	ACEH BARAT	MEUREUBO	LANGUNG	1.1	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY	ACEH BARAT	MEUREUBO	LANGUNG
7.8	UP-LINK	ACEH BESAR	PEUKAN BADA	LAM GEU EU	0.3	SERASH INDONESIA	PIDIE	BATEE	KULEE
7.5	CRS	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	SUAK SEUMASEH	0.3	TERREE DES HOMMES NETHERLANDS	PIDIE	KEMBANG TANJUNG	JEMEURANG
7.2	EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE	PIDIE	KOTA SIGLI	KRAMAT LUAR	0.0	OXFAM	BANDA ACEH	MEURAKSA	DEAH BARO
6.7	CRS	ACEH BARAT	SAMA TIGA	PUOCK LUENG	0.0	SERASH INDONESIA	PIDIE	BATEE	PASI BEJRANDEH
6.7	MOTIFANS	BANDA ACEH	MEURAKSA	BLANG OI	0.0	YBI	BANDA ACEH	MEURAKSA	DEAH BARO

An area of concern has always been that the accountability problems were not caused by or related to the implementation programme and its implementing organisation. For instance, various forms of malfeasance (bending rules, collusion, etc.) could have been caused within communities or by community leaders. This area of concern was of course valid. As a result, the index showed not necessarily a lack of accountability of the implementing organisation, but a lack of the accountability of the recovery process in a specific location and community. In other words, it indicated the robustness of the process in which the organisation was involved. The tightly organised contractor-led programmes of several Red Cross



organisations, which as of 2007 started to deliver houses of high cost and quality by qualified contractors and with strict oversight, were generally judged by beneficiaries as transparent and accountable. However, well organised community-driven programmes reached the same results, although under duress, much earlier and at a much lower cost in early 2006.

## Limitations of The Programme

A number of concerns have already been listed in the above discussion: the balance sought between monitoring compliance-against-standards and the fostering of a compliance culture; the use of student monitors; the selection of samples based on progress; and the over-simplified interpretation that problems were caused by under-performing housing implementing organisations. Another area of concern has been to present the questioning of five individual respondents with a multiple-choice list as a 'focus group discussion'. The design of the survey aggregation meant that outlier opinions skewed the satisfaction and accountability score considerably, leading to concerns about how representative five randomly selected households were for the community. Student-monitors would report such problems during their debriefings. Straight forward problems such as beneficiaries overstating their needs and frustrations were of course also common.

Another area of concern has been that institutionalising information feedback has proven difficult over the past years. There were several valid reasons. Like so much post-Tsunami work, the approach fostered an exclusive micro-view. The provision of encompassing flood protection, water resource management, the delivery of urban services and other matters are indeed often not organised at a settlement level, but by the administrations of 'mukim', sub-districts and districts.<sup>14</sup> Another reason for the lack of institutionalisation was that Syiah Kuala University has not succeeded in setting up a settlements based research programme, mainly as it has neither a spatial planning nor an urban management faculty.

Of course, once it became clear that the housing reconstruction programme as a whole was succeeding, the monitoring programme in its then present format – tracking early progress, stressing performance, providing early warning and recording the learning curve – started to lose its strategic value. Its design was too broad to allow detailed compliance monitoring. The indicators were also too coarse to record the decreasing performance differences between various implementation organisations. Moreover, the strategic needs started to change. By 2007, BRR was already considering its upcoming closure in 2009. By then, it would require asset audit initiatives, listing all work done rather than evaluating on-going dynamics. The monitoring programme was never designed to do a full census of 'assets', or all houses built. For that purpose, BRR developed its own database system. This is why the monitoring programme exited by early 2008.

## REPORTING TOOLS

### Reporting Quality, Satisfaction and Transparency Issues

For the reporting of the monitoring results, UN-HABITAT used various outlets: the Shelter Work Group, the distribution of CDroms, briefing sessions with authorities, a website, a newsletter, policy documents, national and international seminars and workshops.

The dissemination would typically start with a debriefing and discussion session with the Unsyiah monitors after the completion of the database. Next, the results were presented and discussed in the Shelter Work Group. CDroms were distributed to all interested organisations. In the months up to September 2006, 40 CDroms were distributed through government presentations, 9 were given to donors and close to 60 were collected by humanitarian organisations. All recipients had to sign a declaration that they could not approach individual respondents-beneficiaries in case of poor results.



A critical application was the UN-HABITAT electronic newsletter for Aceh and Nias shelter reconstruction. The newsletter was sent to 800 email addresses, including to the United Nations Special Envoy for the Tsunami Reconstruction. The newsletter provided a short review on critical issues, in relation to quality, accountability or land issues. In addition, policy briefings for Aceh and Nias were widely published, especially in the critical months of the first half of 2006.

The website [www.unhabitat-Indonesia.org](http://www.unhabitat-Indonesia.org) always provided access to the full database and is still the complete archive of all the reporting tools.

English Bahasa



## ACEH-NIAS HOUSING & SETTLEMENTS

### Reconstruction Newsletter

Compiled by UN-Habitat for the Shelter Work Groups in Aceh and Nias

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06 Apr 2006 (No. 04 06)

## Sector Facts

### Meetings

Next Meetings:

**Monday, April 17th, at 15.00**  
**Joint Shelter and Watsan meeting** –  
 at Dinas PU.  
 Jl Pemancar no 5, Banda Aceh.  
 The meeting is fully bilingual

For any update, please contact **Deepti Tiwari at UN-Habitat**

For Regular schedules, please [click](#)

### Last workgroup meeting reports

[Meeting Notes 03-04-2006](#)

[Village Planning Workgroup Meeting I](#)

[More meeting minutes](#)

### Other Reports

[IDP's Within Host Communities \(UNORC\)](#)

[Progress MDF Housing and Infrastructure Programmes \(MDFANS Newsflash 9\)](#)

### Monitoring

#### Milestones

A rapid poll on 13 Feb indicates that the housing starts are still running at 5,000 per month.

#### New Houses:

Pledged: 134,000  
 Under construction: 21,000  
 Finished March: 16,000  
 Finished April: 37,000  
 Finished June: 58,000

The full list: [ML04Apr06](#)

Please send your updates to BRR or UN-Habitat [tito@unhabitat-indonesia.org](mailto:tito@unhabitat-indonesia.org)

## Unsyiah-UN-Habitat Accountability Index

The Architecture Department of Universitas Syiah Kuala (Banda Aceh) and UN-Habitat have been doing 3<sup>rd</sup> party quality monitoring on housing reconstruction since October 2005. The programme monitors the quality of the provision process and of the outcomes of the permanent housing programmes of local and international NGOs and multilateral organizations. The respondents are beneficiaries who have received finished houses or for whom houses are near finishing. The purpose of the monitoring programme is to provide feedback on quality and to put judgment with local institutions.



So far, 74 locations representing the activities of about 35 different housing organizations in 4 districts in Aceh have been covered during the months January to March 2006. The questionnaire contains more than 1000 data items and reflects the complexity of settlement reconstruction. The survey measures needs, inputs, outcomes and satisfaction. Also pictures, as-built floor plans and village plans are being collected. Earlier results made available in the newsletter dealt with construction quality and water and sanitation issues. CD-roms with complete data sets are available.

This newsletter provides an accountability index. It is a simple index based on two questions : **did beneficiaries state that the process of obtaining new houses was without malfeasance, in terms of the provision process (selection etc.) and with regard to supply processes of labour and materials ?** Three secondary indicators on the perceived quality of the preparatory process and on satisfaction with the outcomes are added.

The outcomes in brief :

- Green (score between 8.0 and 10): 42% of locations show no or virtually no problems; processes are perceived to be clean and honest;
- Yellow (score between 5.0 and 7.9) : 31% of locations may show problems; respondents are not sure;
- Red (score between 0 to 4.9) : 27% of locations show considerable or even grave problems

This index relates to "robust processes" and not necessarily to corruption. For instance, various forms of malfeasance (bending rules, collusion, etc.) could have been caused within communities. Not surprisingly, good organizations with multiple sample locations tend to show a problem location as well. Really strong organizations should have more "green locations" than other.

Interestingly, **Save the Children** (1x yellow) and **Oxfam** (1x yellow, 2x red) are in the bottom range. To their credit, these organizations have already intervened and temporarily halted their programmes. However, it also means that they are not the tip of the iceberg. Save the Children and Oxfam appear to have failed on the "robustness test" for their housing programmes – not only in the eyes of their auditors but also of the recipient communities within the survey locations.

## Beyond Quality, Satisfaction And Accountability : The SRR Scorecards.

As earlier indicated, the need arose to report beyond the immediate issues of performance and to use the monitoring system in order to indicate the outcomes rather than the outputs of all activities. This has proven to be still a work in progress. A scorecard was developed bringing together various categories of information in relation to shelter and settlement recovery, including the categories of (1) critical infrastructure and amenities, (2) critical land use, planning and rights issues, (3) environmental remediation, and (4) livelihoods restoration.

FIGURE 2.2 : SCORECARD



A set of scorecards are included in this publication, with selected samples brought together thematically :

- Realisations of large programmes, in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Realisations of small INGO programmes, in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Realisations of community driven programmes, in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Contractor-built realisations;
- Realisations of programmes of the Indonesian Government (BRR), as well as of Indonesian NGOs (2006-2007) and of Indonesian philanthropic initiatives funded by Indonesian companies;
- Red Cross Society programmes;
- UN-HABITAT realisations; and
- Results of the government reconstruction programme in Central Java (Klaten district) and Yogyakarta (Bantul district).

These scorecards allow a realistic and sobering review of the achievements of the post-Tsunami assistance in Aceh and Nias. They should enable future evaluation work. Monitoring and evaluation should indeed continue in Aceh and Nias. For the amount of humanitarian funds invested in the settlement recovery, repeated evaluation and learning over time is no luxury. Monitoring and evaluation also provide a chance to look back when providing future assistance for development and further peace building. Indeed, rebuilding Aceh is still ongoing, especially with regard to infrastructure and the economy. The sustainability of the rebuilt settlements is not yet certain.




This chapter derived sections of an earlier report: "Post-Tsunami Settlement Recovery Monitoring in Aceh by UN-HABITAT and Syiah Kuala University", by Francesca Campagnoli, Bruno Dercon, Tito Syahjanuar and Daniel Timme, Preliminary Report presented at the TRIAMS 2 Conference, Bangkok, and March 22, 2007.

- 1 'The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan for the Region and People of the Province NAD and Nias Islands, North Sumatra Province'. See chapter I.
- 2 On the status of UNHCR: see previous chapter.
- 3 The surveys, conducted in September and November 2005, were published as the 'Garansi Surveys'. The initiative had teething problems and was, probably prematurely, aborted. BRR decided to invest more into the RAN tracking system, while the National Statistics Bureau, BPS, would do more comprehensive census-like data gathering. However, the need remained for data gathering to bridge the gap between the broad statistical data collection of BPS and the narrow 'production data' supplied by implementing organisations. In 2006, the Housing and Settlements Department of BRR did additional data gathering by itself, such as the listing of all beneficiaries. It took almost 2 years, till late 2007, until these stand-alone data gathering produced verified results.
- 4 The Garansi survey was actually of very good quality, in retrospect. It was very detailed and covered all almost all villages, at a time when many were difficult to access. UN-HABITAT used the survey results to make extrapolations on the pace of housing recovery and these extrapolations proved to be reasonably correct. The post-conflict context fostered a general lack of trust between stakeholders, including Indonesian institutions and organisations. The matter was never that the Garansi survey had no level of error. The problem was simply that it was hard to reach a consensual agreement on the likely errors and the acceptability of them for policy steering between Jakarta and Aceh stakeholders.
- 5 The various rounds of the monitoring programme were done for specific purposes. Round 1 to 4 was done for the Shelter Work Group. The Red Cross work in Aceh Jaya was monitored on the request of BRR. The UN-HABITAT work was evaluated as part of the project cycle of the Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programmes.
- 6 See for instance 'The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003'. <http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS.2003.0.pdf>.
- 7 'SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response', the Sphere Project, 2004. SPHERE defines an absolute minimum of 3.5 sqm per person. The Building Code set out the minimum of 9 sqm per person.
- 8 The Millennium Development Goals are 18 internationally agreed targets in 8 development areas. They are to be achieved by 2015 with the exception of target 11, which shall be achieved by 2020. Goal 1: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 7, target 10 and 11 are shelter specific, 10: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. MDG are part of the Millennium Declaration, UN-GA 2000, for more information see: [www.unhabitat.org](http://www.unhabitat.org)
- 9 'The Pinheiro Principles: United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons', edited by COHRE on the basis of the final report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 2005.
- 10 ISDR, Living with Risk, A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, Geneva July 2002
- 11 MDG 1 also relates to shelter in disaster situation. Disasters reduce directly livelihood sustainability, because of damage to housing, service infrastructure, savings, productive assets and human losses. Disasters have also an indirect impact on livelihood sustainability because they force vulnerable households to sell productive assets, and thus they increase inequality by pushing many into long-term poverty. In Aceh, Indonesia, the 2004 Tsunami is estimated to have increased the proportion of people living below the poverty line from 30% to 50% (DfID, 2006)
- 12 As a result, there are some additional questions in the questionnaire used in round 3 to survey 97 cases compared to the questionnaire used to survey 74 clusters in round 2. Round 3 complete database of 171 clusters circulated in late September 2006 is based on the wider questionnaire; therefore clusters surveyed in round 2 happen to have the newly introduced questions blank.
- 13 Training series: two day on the field led by Robin Willison in October 2005; one evening seminar led by Elisabeth Hausler at UN-Habitat's ANSSP in May 2006
- 14 Mukim are geographical areas in which a number of villages and neighbourhoods are organised. They are a traditional administrative entity in much of Sumatra.



# SCORECARD LEGEND



# Scorecards on Settlement Recovery

## Collaborators ACEH SETTLEMENT MONITORING PROGRAMME :



Ade Farisa, Afwan, Akmal Fata, Amelia Ria Aksyarida, Asmaul Husna, Ata Isnaini, Cici, Cut M. Amin, Dewi, Eva, Fachrizal, Farah Diba, Fauzan Rizal, Fauzul, Firman, Fitri, Gunawan, Hervia Yudistira, Iin Rima Zahara, Irawan Fuadi, Irma, Laina Hilmasari, M. Qurani, Masrizal, Mawaddah, Meutia Sari Dewi, Nanda, Nina Arisanti, Nina Fahriana, Novan Nosra, Novia Sari, Nurul Izzati, Putra Sukmana, Resa Yuliza, Reza Udin, Rina Wiranda, Rizki Munanda, Roni, Yulianto, Santi, Suzaldi, Syafrizal, T. Yudi Fajri, Teja, Ulil Amri, Widya Afdal, Zainul Furqan.



A. Rizaldi Lubis, Amin Afifuddin, Bruno Dercon, Dendi Juandi, Daniel Thieme, Diella Dahlan, Farid Wadjidi, Francesca Campagnoli, Isma Arsyani, Mahdalena Almaddany, Muamar Vebry, Nancy Rosma Rini, Rissalwan H. Lubis, Sayed Mukhayar Syauki, Syardan Djalil, Tito E. Syafjanuar, Yayan Mardianah.




# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## LARGE PROGRAMMES 2006 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	457	109	213	170	117	182
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	10	0	288	20	0	13
Number of houses before tsunami	350	76	400	150	120	182
Number New houses required after tsunami	419	102	400	170	117	195
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	50	0	6	0	0	0
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	30 %	100 %	0 %	2 %	10 %	60 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	0 %	0 %	10 %	22 %	0 %	40 %
New House (plan)	308	95	110	170	117	107
New House (built)	120	95	0	30	27	107
Who is building	c. other organisations :HFHI	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : BRR	b. program organisation	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : BRR, Islamic Relief, and Save the Children



### LEGEND

- 1 : CRS : Langung - Meureubo - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : CARITAS - MAMAMIA : Baroh Kruengkala - Lhoong - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : TURKISH RED CRESENT : Bitai - Jaya Baru - BANDA ACEH
- 4 : GERMANY RED CROSS : Kampung Blang - Krueng Sabee - ACEH JAYA
- 5 : EMERGENCY ARCHITECT : Pasi Peukan Baro - Kota Sigi - PIDIE
- 6 : BRR : Kruede Trienggadeng - Trieng Gadeng - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)

B. Quality  
House of houses is (will be) good enough  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episodes happened during house provision process

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in survey and mapping  
% of women who involved in village meeting  
Is it common if women involved in a meeting?  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	A. Key Performance Indicators	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	ABA_011 CRS ACEH BARAT	0	2.78	2	7.8	b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree b. disagree d. agree b. disagree d. agree	d. agree d. agree	f. 81-100% d. agree d. agree
2	ABE_039 CARITAS - MAMAMIA ACEH BESAR	5	2.34	1	8.3	c. doubt d. agree b. disagree b. disagree d. agree	c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	b. no, worse than enough for building d. agree d. agree	d. housing organisation d. community group
3	BNA_016 TURKISH RED CRESENT BANDA ACEH	0	3.04	7	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	b. no, worse than enough for building d. agree d. agree	f. 81-100% b. 0-20% b. yes d. housing organisation d. community group
4	CLG_002 GERMANY RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	5	3.14	5	6.1	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree a. not relevant d. agree	b. no, worse than enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	d. 41-60% a. don't know a. don't know a. housing organisation d. housing organisation d. community group
5	PID_011 EMERGENCY ARCHITECT PIDIE	3	2.60	7	10.0	b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	c. 1 million IDR d. agree d. agree	a. don't know d. don't know d. housing organisation d. housing organisation d. community group
6	PID_030 BRR PIDIE	4	2.45	-3	5.0	c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree	b. no, worse than enough for building d. agree c. doubt	d. 41-60% c. 21-40% b. yes d. housing organisation d. housing organisation d. community group

# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS

SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

MONITORING



CRS



CARITAS - MAMAMIA



TURKISH RED CRESENT



GERMANY RED CROSS



EMERGENCY ARCHITECTS



BRR

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health support
  - Social support
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights
  - Right advocacy for house provision
  - Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims
  - LAND MAPPING needed?
  - Is land mapping provided?
  - Is land mapping finished?
  - VILLAGE PLANNING needed?
  - Is village planning provided?
  - Is village planning finished?
  - LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?
  - Is land consolidation provided?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste of water system provision
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods (restoration)
  - Livelihood assistance
  - Current employment status, before tsunami
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to extend core house
  - How long to reach market
- Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

f. provided by Government a. don't know b. not provided c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by	a. don't know b. not c. provide by d. agree e. provided by f. provided by
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ABA_011 CRS ACEH BARAT	<b>1</b>
ABE_039 CARITAS - MAMAMIA ACEH BESAR	<b>2</b>
BNA_016 TURKISH RED CRESENT BANDA ACEH	<b>3</b>
CLG_002 GERMANY RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	<b>4</b>
PID_011 EMERGENCY ARCHITECT PIDIE	<b>5</b>
PID_030 BRR PIDIE	<b>6</b>



# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007


## LARGE PROGRAMMES

2007 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	204	164	316	700	335	223
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	2	-	-	-	1	-
Number of houses before tsunami	136	-	216	-	350	212
Number New houses required after tsunami	212	-	338	850	336	145
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	-	-	40	-	-	56
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	-	-	-	-	21
% Living in permanent housing in the village	96 %	60 %	78 %	100 %	30 %	70 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	0 %	40 %	2 %	0 %	20 %	31 %
New House (plan)	204	72	252	850	315	145
New House (built)	175	72	252	850	296	95
Who is building	c. other organisations :HFHI and CRS	b. program organisation	c. other organisations :HKRC;IOM; BRR;STC	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : British Red Cross, IDES and IFRC	c. other organisations : IOM; STC; BRR; OXFAM



### LEGEND

- 1 : HABITAT FOR HUMANITY : Gampong Teungoh - Sama Tiga - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : IOM : Gampong Blang - Ingin Jaya - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : HONGKONG RED CROSS : Blang Nibon - Samudar - ACEH UTARA
- 4 : BUDHATZU CHI : Pante Riek - Lueng Bata - BANDA ACEH
- 5 : BRITISH RED CROSS : Alue Ambang - Teunom - ACEH JAYA
- 6 : OXFAM : Kuala Meuraxa - Blang Mangat - LHOUKSEUMAWE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 4)  
B. Quality  
House of house is (will be) good enough  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now  
C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built community  
Kept infrastructure and facility  
Followed wishes of this village  
Does good help in preparation  
D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episode occurred in material and labour management  
E. Community Participation Level  
% of women who involved in village meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Average number of households member(s) per house	Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)	Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)	Accountability Score (0 - 4)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	ABA_029 HABITAT FOR HUMANITY ACEH BARAT	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.65	3	5.8	c. doubt d. agree	c. doubt d. agree	a. not relevant d. agree	c. 21-40%
2	ABE_042 IOM ACEH BESAR	5	c. resettlement	2.84	0	9.2	c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree	b. not relevant d. agree	c. 21-40%
3	AUT_008 HONGKONG RED CROSS ACEH UTARA	3	a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.30	6	6.1	d. agree b. disagree	d. agree d. agree	b. not relevant d. agree	c. 21-40%
4	BNA_051 BUDHA TZU CHI BANDA ACEH	3	c. resettlement	2.60	9	10.0	c. doubt b. disagree	d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40%	
5	CLG_008 BRITISH RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	6	a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.24	6	6.7	d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree	b. not relevant d. agree	e. 61-80%
6	LSM_009 OXFAM ACEH UTARA	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.64	7	10.0	d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree	b. not relevant d. agree	d. 41-60%

# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



HABITAT FOR HUMANITY



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION for MIGRATION



HONGKONG RED CROSS



BUDHA TZU CHI



BRITISH RED CROSS



OXFAM

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health support
  - Social or education assistance
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights
  - Right advocacy for drinking water is good
  - Assistance through land provision is good enough
  - LAND MAPPING needed?
  - Is land mapping finished?
  - VILLAGE PLANNING needed?
  - Is village planning finished?
  - Is village planning needed?
  - LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?
  - Is land consolidation finished?
  - House consolidation provided?
  - Village plan is more safe now from flood
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste water system provision
  - Garbage disposal system
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - Source of timbers
  - New house more safe now from flood?
- D. Livelihoods restoration
  - Employment assistance
  - Current employment status
  - Individual bank accounts
  - How long to extent core house
- Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

b. not provided
f. provided by UNICEF
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
c. doubt

f. provided by BRK
b. not provided
a. yes
f. provided by AFPD
d. finished
a. yes
f. provided by AFPD
d. finished
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by UNICEF
c. provided by UNICEF
b. no
b. no
b. low change
c. 30-60 minutes
3
d. agree
d. agree

ABA_029
HABITAT FOR HUMANITY
ACEH BARAT
1

b. not provided
b. not provided
b. disagree
b. disagree
d. agree
b. disagree

b. not provided
b. not provided
b. no
b. no
b. no
d. agree
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

b. not provided
Private sector
Private sector
b. no
b. low change
b. 15-30 minutes
1
b. disagree
b. disagree

ABE_042
IOM
ACEH BESAR
2

b. not provided
f. provided by UNICEF
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree

b. not provided
b. not provided
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
b. no
d. agree
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by UNICEF
c. provided by UNICEF
b. no
b. no
b. low change
b. 15-30 minutes
3
c. doubt
c. doubt

AUT_008
HONGKONG RED CROSS
ACEH UTARA
3

c. provided by the housing programme
c. provided by the housing programme
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
c. provided by the housing programme
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
b. no
d. agree
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

b. not provided
Private sector
Private sector
b. no
b. low change
a. 15 minutes
0
b. disagree
b. disagree

f. provided by UNICEF
c. provided by UNICEF
b. no
b. no
b. low change
a. 5-15 minutes
1
d. agree
d. agree

BNA_051
BUDHA TZU CHI
BANDA ACEH
4

f. provided by BRK
f. provided by UNICEF
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
b. not provided
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
b. no
b. no
b. disagree
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by UNICEF
c. provided by UNICEF
b. no
b. no
b. low change
a. 5-15 minutes
1
d. agree
d. agree

CLG_008
BRITISH RED CROSS
ACEH JAYA
5

f. provided by PHN
f. provided by PHN
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
b. not provided
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
a. yes
f. provided by BRK
d. finished
b. no
b. no
d. agree
d. agree

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
b. disagree
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
b. disagree
c. doubt

c. provided by housing
e. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing
a. other (TO THE BACKYARD)
c. provided by community
b. burned
d. no to have one
g. local
b. no
b. disagree
c. doubt

f. provided by UNICEF
c. provided by UNICEF
b. no
b. no
a. cannot afford it
b. 15-30 minutes
4
c. doubt
c. doubt

LSM_009
OXFAM
ACEH UTARA
6

# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007


## SMALL PROGRAMMES

### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

2006 survey



Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	194	364	201	180	175	120
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	0	0	0	0	34	20
Number of houses before tsunami	194	500	170	0	135	93
Number New houses required after tsunami	194	362	201	180	209	125
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	0	2	101	0	7	40
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	0 %	8 %	100 %	97 %	100 %	75 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	29 %	12 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	
New House (plan)	194	274	206	130	244	125
New House (built)	50	64	191	107	209	73
Who is building	b. program organisation	b. program organisation	c. other organisations :YEU, INDOSIAR, Almarhamah	c. other organisations : YBI & OXFAM	c. other organisations : BRR	c. other organisations : program organisation & SHEEP



### LEGEND

- 1 : ISLAMIC RELIEF : Suak Pandan - Sama Tiga - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : LA FARGE - ATLAS LOGISTIQUE : Lamkruet - Lho'nga - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : SAVE THE CHILDREN : Tanoh Anoue - Muara BAu - ACEH UTARA
- 4 : YBI : Deah Baro - Meuraxa - Banda Aceh
- 5 : MALESTER INTERNATIONAL : Jambo Timu - Blang Mangat - LHOKESEMAWE
- 6 : PREMIERE URGENCE : Kuala Baro - Kuala (Nagan Raya) - NAGAN RAYA

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house

Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators

Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)

Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)

Accountability Score (0 - 4)

B. Quality

Quality of house is (will be) good enough

House smaller than before Tsunami

New house more safe from earthquake

New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction

Did good work

Built good infrastructure

Kept community informed

Followed wishes of communities

Does good help in this village

Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency

No corruption episode happened during house provision process

No corruption episodes occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level

% of women who involved in a meeting

Decision making in village meeting

House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Average number of households member(s) per house	Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)	Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)	Accountability Score (0 - 4)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
1	ISLAMIC RELIEF ACEH BARAT	3	2.97	1	5.8	b. disagree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	b. no assistance fund enough for finishing c. doubt c. doubt	d. 41-60%
2	LA FARGE - ATLAS LOGISTIQUE ACEH BESAR	3	3.20	3	5.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree b. disagree d. agree	c. doubt b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree	b. no assistance fund enough for finishing b. disagree d. agree	d. 41-60% e. 61-80% b. yes d. by women d. housing operation d. community decision d. monitoring of houses construction
3	SAVE THE CHILDREN ACEH UTARA	6	2.25	4	5.0	c. doubt d. agree b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt	c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. no assistance fund enough for finishing c. doubt c. doubt	
4	YBI BANDA ACEH	2	2.35	-6	0.0	b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt	b. no assistance fund enough for finishing b. disagree b. disagree	
5	MALESTER INTERNATIONAL LHOKESEMAWE	5	2.96	6	5.8	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. no assistance fund enough for finishing c. doubt c. doubt	f. 81-100% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by women d. housing operation c. community decision d. monitoring of houses construction
6	PREMIERE URGENCE NAGAN RAYA	5	2.35	4	5.8	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	e. < 4 million IDR c. doubt c. doubt	d. 41-60% d. 41-60% b. yes d. by women d. housing operation b. group decision e. no aid



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

Indicator	Response	Score	Organization	Location	
A. Critical infrastructure and amenities Health support Social or education assistance The social facilities available is (will be) good enough Power provision is (will be) good enough Provision of water supply for drinking water is good	b. not provided b. not provided f. provided by the state d. agree d. agree d. agree				
	b. not provided b. not provided f. provided by the state d. agree d. agree d. agree				
	f. provided by the housing programme f. provided by YPP d. agree c. doubt d. agree b. disagree				
	b. not provided b. not provided d. provided by the government a. yes d. completed d. provided by the government a. yes				
	b. not provided b. not provided d. provided by the government a. yes d. completed b. no a. yes d. completed c. doubt				
	b. not provided b. not provided f. provided by the government a. yes d. completed b. no a. yes d. completed c. doubt				
B. Critical land use, planning and rights Right advocacy is (will be) good enough Assistance through land provision is (will be) good enough LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished? Is village planning needed? Is village planning finished? Is land consolidation needed? Is land consolidation finished? Village plan is more safe now	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
C. Environmental remediation Septic tank provision Type of septic tank Waste water system provision Type of waste water system Garbage disposal provision Who takes care of the public toilets / baths? Flood risk New house more safe now from flood	b. not provided b. not provided f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	b. not provided b. not provided f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	c. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
D. Livelihoods restoration Employment assistance Current employment status Individual bank accounts How long to reach core house Local construction capacity (material & labour) Job availability is (will be) good enough Village site plan more support the livelihoods now	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				
	f. provided by the housing programme d. concrete well f. provided by the state (reference) a. new (TO THE BACK - VAD)				

ABA_017	ISLAMIC RELIEF	ACEH BARAT	1
ABE_037	LA FARGE - ATLAS LOGISTIQUE	ACEH BESAR	2
AUT_001	SAVE THE CHILDREN	ACEH UTARA	3
BNA_009	YBI	BANDA ACEH	4
LSM_003	MALTESER INTERNATIONAL	LHOKSEUMAWA	5
NRY_002	PREMIERE URGENCE	NAGAN RAYA	6




# UN-HABITAT - UNSYAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## SMALL PROGRAMMES 2007 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	118	163	225	572	117	520
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	1	-	-	70	-	4
Number of houses before tsunami	110	150	185	800	95	512
Number New houses required after tsunami	45	163	242	500	111	419
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	38	-	5	-	15	60
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	-	0	-	10	-
% Living in permanent housing in the village	94 %	92 %	80 %	18 %	50 %	93 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	0 %	8 %	10 %	18 %	50 %	5 %
New House (plan)	17	165	275	204	46	349
New House (built)	17	152	221	50	46	181
Who is building	c. other organisations : Spain Red Cross and JARKAS	c. other organisations : GENASSIST; BRR	c. other organisations : TDH; DIAKONIE; REKOMPAK	c. other organisations : Caritas Austria & German, BRR, CRS, MUSLIM AID, Australian RC	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : HIVOS; MUSLIM AID; GAA; BRR; IFRC



### LEGEND

- 1** : SPANISH RED CROSS : Beurawang - Bubon - ACEH BARAT
- 2** : GENASSIST : Lamkuta Blang Mee - Lhoong - ACEH BESAR
- 3** : TERRE DE HOLMES NETHERLANDS : Pante Rheeng - Samalanga - BIREUEN
- 4** : CORDIA MEDAN/CARITAS GERMANY & AUSTRIA : Alu Naga - Syiah Kuala - BANDA ACEH
- 5** : CHF INTERNATIONAL : Lambaroh - Jaya - ACEH JAYA
- 6** : GAA : Keudee Panteraja - Panteraja - PIDIE JAYA

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house

Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators

Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)

Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)

Accountability Score (0 - 4)

B. Quality

House of houses is (will be) good enough

House is better than before Tsunami

New house more safe from earthquake

C. Satisfaction

Did good work

Built good infrastructure

Kept community informed

Followed wishes of communities

Does good help in this village

Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency

Cost added by the owner to get house finished

No corruption episode happened during house provision process

E. Community Participation Level

% of women who involved in village meeting

Decision making in village meeting

House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-4)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	ABA_025 SPANISH RED CROSS ACEH BARAT	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.28	-2	6.1	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by program d. housing organization e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization
2	ABE_048 GENASSIST ACEH BESAR	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.85	5	9.2	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by program d. housing organization c. community decision e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization
3	BIR_009 TERRE DE HOLMES NETHERLANDS BIREUEN	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.48	2	4.7	d. agree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree	b. more housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	d. housing organization e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization
4	CLG_002 CORDIA MEDAN/CARITAS GERMANY & AUSTRIA BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.77	4	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree b. disagree	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. housing organization e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization
5	LAM_007 CHF INTERNATIONAL ACEH JAYA	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.81	-2	7.8	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree	a. don't know b. 0-20% c. no d. by program d. housing organization e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization
6	PID_047 GAA PIDIE JAYA	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.57	0	8.1	d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% c. 21-40% d. by program d. housing organization c. community decision e. facilitator/ supervisor from housing organization




# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## COMMUNITY DRIVEN PROGRAMMES 2006 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	177	201	267	1218	141	95
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	0	0	0	47	0	0
Number of houses before tsunami	115	170	262	1527	141	67
Number New houses required after tsunami	177	201	267	602	90	95
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	0	101	9	41	0	4
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	0	0	0	0	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	0 %	100 %	50 %	30 %	1 %	0 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	27 %	0 %	25 %	25 %	80 %	0 %
New House (plan)	177	206	273	895	141	70
New House (built)	30	191	211	446	50	40
Who is building	b. program organisation	c. other organisations .STC, INDOSIAR & Almaharmah	b. program organisation	c. other organisations .BRR	b. program organisation	b. program organisation



### LEGEND

- 1 : HABITAT FOR HUMANITY : Gampong Teungoh - Sama Tiga - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : YEU : Tanah Anoue - Muara Batu - ACEH UTARA
- 3 : WORLD BANK : Gampong Baro - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 4 : UN-HABITAT : Merduati - Kuta Raja - BANDA ACEH
- 5 : WORLD VISSION : Lamtui - Jaya - ACEH JAYA
- 6 : ATLAS LOGISTUQUE : Kupula - Simpang Tiga (Pidie) - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households (number) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 4)  
B. Quality  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort, now  
C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good infrastructure and facility  
D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
E. Community Participation Level  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Is it common if women involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on  
Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-4)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
1	ABA_021 HABITAT FOR HUMANITY ACEH BARAT	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.82	7	9.4	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60%
2	YEU_002 YEU ACEH UTARA	2 b. relocation within the village	2.42	5	5.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme
3	BNA_007 WORLD BANK/ MDTF - P2KP BANDA ACEH	0 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.57	5	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	f. 81-100%
4	BNA_012 UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.69	2	9.2	c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 61-80% c. 21-40%
5	LAM_004 WORLD VISSION ACEH JAYA	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.94	3	5.3	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	c. doubt a. not relevant c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% c. no d. by program e. housing operation f. follow-up service from housing programme
6	BNA_007 ATLAS LOGISTUQUE BANDA ACEH	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.05	6	9.2	b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 61-80% d. by program e. housing operation f. follow-up service from housing programme



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS

**HABITAT FOR HUMANITY**



**YAKKUM EMERGENCY UNIT**



**WORLD BANK/MDTF - P2KP**



**UN-HABITAT**

**WORLD VISSION**

**ATLAS LOGISTIQUE**

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities**
  - Health support
  - Social or education assistance
  - The social facilities available (will be) good enough
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights**
  - Right advocacy or issue provision
  - Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims
  - Is LAND MAPPING needed?
  - Is land mapping finished?
  - Is VILLAGE PLANNING needed?
  - Is village planning finished?
  - Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?
  - Is land consolidation provided?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation**
  - Septic tank provision
  - Waste water system provision
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - New protection (in village level) is (will be) good
- D. Livelihoods restoration**
  - Employment assistance
  - Current employment status
  - Individual bank status
  - Affordability to extent
  - How long to reach core house
  - Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

f. provided by WORLD VISION
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by MERCY
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by MERCY
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by PPA
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by WFP
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by YBI
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by ZKP
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by OAH
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

f. provided by the government
a. yes
b. no
c. doubt
d. agree

ABA_021 HABITAT FOR HUMANITY ACEH BARAT	1
YEU_002 YEU ACEH UTARA	2
BNA_007 WORLD BANK/ MDTF - P2KP BANDA ACEH	3
BNA_012 UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH	4
LAM_004 WORLD VISSION ACEH JAYA	5
BNA_007 ATLAS LOGISTIQUE BANDA ACEH	6




# UN-HABITAT - UNSYAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## COMMUNITY DRIVEN PROGRAMMES 2007 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	118	163	225	572	117	520
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	1	-	-	70	-	4
Number of houses before tsunami	110	150	185	800	95	512
Number New houses required after tsunami	45	163	242	500	111	419
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	38	-	5	-	15	60
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	-	0	-	10	-
% Living in permanent housing in the village	94 %	92 %	80 %	18 %	50 %	93 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	0 %	8 %	10 %	18 %	50 %	5 %
New House (plan)	17	165	275	204	46	349
New House (built)	17	152	221	50	46	181
Who is building	c. other organisations : Spain Red Cross and JARKAS	c. other organisations : GENASSIST; BRR	c. other organisations : TDH; DIAKONIE; REKOMPAK	c. other organisations : Caritas Austria & German, BRR, CRS, Muslim Aid, Australian RC	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : HIVOS; MUSLIM AID; GAA; BRR;IFRC



### LEGEND

- 1 : WORLD VISSION INDONESIA : Lhok Bubon - Sama Tiga - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : CARITAS AUSTRIA & GERMANI - MAMAMIA : Glee Bruek - Lhoeng - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : SAMARITANS PURSE : Blang Kubu - Peudada - BIREUEN
- 4 : UPLINK : Cot Lamkewueh - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 5 : HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INDONESIA : Blang Monlung - Sampoiniet - ACEH JAYA
- 6 : REKOMPAK : Baloy - Blang Mangat - LHOKESEUMAWE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Average number of households member(s) Per house	Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)	Satisfaction Score (0 - 10)	Accountability Score (0 - 4)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level	F. Monitoring of houses construction
1	ABA_030 WORLD VISSION INDONESIA ACEH BARAT	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.28	-2	6.1	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt	b. no. housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by program d. housing organisation a. full-time supervisor from housing organisation	
2	ABE_046 CARITAS AUSTRIA & GERMANY - MAMAMIA ACEH BESAR	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.85	5	9.2	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	b. no. housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by program c. community decision a. staff	
3	BIR_009 SAMARITANS PURSE BIREUEN	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.48	2	4.7	d. agree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree	b. no. housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt		d. housing organisation a. full-time supervisor from housing organisation
4	PID_047 UPLINK BANDA ACEH	3	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.77	4	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt b. disagree	b. no. housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt		d. housing organisation a. full-time supervisor from housing organisation
5	LAM_007 HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INDONESIA ACEH JAYA	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.81	-2	7.8	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. no. housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree	a. don't know b. 0-20% c. no d. by program d. housing organisation c. community decision a. full-time supervisor from housing organisation	
6	LSM_007 REKOMPAK LHOKESEUMAWE	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.57	0	8.1	d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	b. no. housing budget enough for building d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by program c. community decision a. full-time supervisor from housing organisation	



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS

**WORLD VISSION INDONESIA**



**CARTAS AUSTRIA & GERMANY MAMAMIA**



**SAMARITANS PURSE**



**UPLINK**

**HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INDONESIA**

**REKOMPAK**

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health support
  - Social or other
  - The social education assistance facilities are (will be) good enough
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights
  - Right advocacy or voice provision is (will be) good enough
  - Assistance through land acquisition is (will be) good enough
  - LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping provided?
  - Is LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping provided?
  - Is VILLAGE PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?
  - Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed? Is land consolidation finished?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste of water system provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Source of timber
  - Flood risk
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods restoration
  - Employment status, before tsunami
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to extent con house
  - How long to reach con house
  - Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

d. provided by government	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
d. provided by UNICEF	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
d. provided by government	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
d. provided by UNICEF	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
d. provided by government	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
d. provided by UNICEF	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree
b. not provided	c. doubt	d. agree	b. disagree

c. provided by government	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
c. provided by UNICEF	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
c. provided by government	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
c. provided by UNICEF	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
c. provided by government	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
c. provided by UNICEF	a. yes	d. finished	b. no
b. not provided	a. yes	d. finished	b. no

c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
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b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt

c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
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b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
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c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt

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c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt

c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
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c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt

c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
c. provided by housing	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt
b. not provided	a. linked well	c. provided by housing	a. not provided	a. burned	b. not safe	a. yes	b. disagree	c. doubt

ABA_030	WORLD VISSION INDONESIA	1
ACEH BARAT		
ABE_046	CARTAS AUSTRIA & GERMANY - MAMAMIA	2
ACEH BESAR		
BIR_009	SAMARITANS PURSE	3
BIREUEN		
PID_047	UPLINK	4
BANDA ACEH		
LAM_007	HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INDONESIA	5
ACEH JAYA		
LSM_007	REKOMPAK	6
LHOKSEUMAWE		


# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## CONTRACTOR-BUILT REALIZATIONS



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	470	747	1753	169	219	110
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	0	-	0	70	0	0
Number of houses before tsunami	216	-	1000	85	182	128
Number New houses required after tsunami	305	1247	700	80	106	110
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	7	-	300	1	36	5
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	-	0	-	0	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	0 %	65 %	40 %	60 %	60 %	10 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	1 %	35 %	30 %	10 %	15 %	35 %
New House (plan)	305	1201	1171	58	87	110
New House (built)	50	701	520	44	95	14
Who is building	c. other organisations : self built without assistant & CRS	c. other organisations : TURKISH RC: Emergency BRR	c. other organisations : diakonie TURKISH RC: Aid, Aceh Relief BRR	c. other organisations : BRR ; Jawa Pos ; IFRC	c. other organisations : OXFAM, SAVE THE CHILDREN, BRR	b. program organisation



### LEGEND

- 1 : CRS : Panggong - Johan Pahlawan - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : TURKISH RED CRESENT : Meunasah Mesjid (Lampuuk) - Lho'nga - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : CARE INTERNATIONAL INDONESIA : Lampulo - Kuta Alam - BANDA ACEH
- 4 : BRR : Bahagia - Krueng Sabee - ACEH JAYA
- 5 : IOM : Kuala Meuraxa - Blang Mangat - LHOEKSEUMAWE
- 6 : EMERGENCY ARCHITECTS FRANCE : Kuala Meuraksa - Kota Sigli - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 4)

B. Quality  
House of house is (will be) good enough  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept promised in formed  
Kept good infrastructure and facility  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in preparation process  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episodes occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-4)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
1	ABA_002 CRS ACEH BARAT	0 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.85	0	9.2	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	b. no assistance fast enough for building d. agree d. agree	b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision
2	ABE_044 TURKISH RED CRESENT ACEH UTARA	2 a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.09	7	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. some housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision b. no assistance
3	BNA_022 CARE INTERNATIONAL INDONESIA BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.86	-5	3.6	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt b. disagree	b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt a. not relevant	b. no assistance fast enough for building b. disagree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision a. no assistance for housing programme
4	CLG_006 BRR ACEH JAYA	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.61	-1	5.0	c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt	b. some housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	c. 21-40% d. 41-60% d. by program d. housing organisation decision b. no assistance
5	LSM_004 IOM LHOEKSEUMAWE	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.56	3	5.3	c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree a. not relevant c. doubt	b. no assistance fast enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% d. by program d. housing organisation decision a. not relevant
6	PID_009 EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE PIDIE	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.74	2	6.7	b. disagree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	d. agree c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt d. agree d. agree	b. no assistance fast enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	c. 21-40% d. by program d. housing organisation decision a. not relevant



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

A. Critical infrastructure and amenities  
 Health or education assistance  
 Social support  
 The social facilities available  
 The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough  
 Power provision is (will be) good enough  
 Provision of water supply for drinking water is good

B. Critical land use, planning and rights  
 Right advocacy or voice provision  
 Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims  
 Is LAND MAPPING needed?  
 Is land mapping finished?  
 Is village planning needed?  
 Is village planning finished?  
 Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?  
 Is land consolidation finished?  
 House accessibility is (will be) good enough  
 Village plan is more safe now

C. Environmental remediation  
 Septic tank provision  
 Type of septic tank  
 Waste water system provision  
 Type of waste water system  
 Garbage disposal provision  
 Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?  
 Flood risk  
 New house more safe now from flood

D. Livelihoods (restoration)  
 Employment assistance  
 Current employment status  
 Individual bank accounts  
 Affordable to extent core house  
 How long to reach market  
 Local construction capacity (material & labour)  
 Job availability is (will be) good enough  
 Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

Indicator	Response	Score	Weight	Weighted Score
A. Critical infrastructure and amenities	1. don't know	0	1	0
	2. provided by the housing programme	1	1	1
	3. provided by PTSA	2	1	2
	4. provided by BRRNTS (BRRNTS/PTM/PTD)	3	1	3
	5. provided by BRR	4	1	4
	6. provided by Caritas Red Cross	5	1	5
B. Critical land use, planning and rights	1. don't know	0	1	0
	2. provided by the government	1	1	1
	3. provided by PTSA	2	1	2
	4. provided by BRRNTS (BRRNTS/PTM/PTD)	3	1	3
	5. provided by BRR	4	1	4
	6. provided by Caritas Red Cross	5	1	5
C. Environmental remediation	1. don't know	0	1	0
	2. provided by the housing programme	1	1	1
	3. provided by PTSA	2	1	2
	4. provided by BRRNTS (BRRNTS/PTM/PTD)	3	1	3
	5. provided by BRR	4	1	4
	6. provided by Caritas Red Cross	5	1	5
D. Livelihoods (restoration)	1. don't know	0	1	0
	2. provided by the housing programme	1	1	1
	3. provided by PTSA	2	1	2
	4. provided by BRRNTS (BRRNTS/PTM/PTD)	3	1	3
	5. provided by BRR	4	1	4
	6. provided by Caritas Red Cross	5	1	5

ABA_002 CRS ACEH BARAT	1
ABE_044 TURKISH RED CRESCENT ACEH UTARA	2
BNA_022 CARE INTERNATIONAL INDONESIA BANDA ACEH	3
CLG_006 BRR ACEH JAYA	4
LSM_004 IOM LHOKSEUMAWE	5
PID_009 EMERGENCY ARCHITECT FRANCE PIDIE	6




# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	320	1073	137	154	147	131
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	0	30	0	-	13	4
Number of houses before tsunami	0	918		450	120	105
Number New houses required after tsunami	320	988	137	154	129	119
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	0	115		-	39	9
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	0		-	20	-
% Living in permanent housing in the village	9 %	70 %		60 %	79 %	100 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	25 %	20 %	10 %	40 %	7 %	0 %
New House (plan)	300	342	60	154	79	89
New House (built)	30	286	60	99	79	89
Who is building	c. other organisations : MDTF, MEDCO & OXFAM	c. other organisations : UN-HABITAT, IOM	b. program organisation	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : BRR; REKOMPAK	c. other organisations : REKOMPAK; ATLAS LOGISTIQUE



### LEGEND

- 1 : MDTFANS : Blang Oi - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 2 : BRR : Punge Jurong - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 3 : BRR : Bahagia - Krueng Sabee - ACEH JAYA
- 4 : BRR : Nusa - Jaya - ACEH JAYA
- 5 : REKOMPAK : Baloy - Blang Mangat - LHOKEUMAWE
- 6 : REKOMPAK : Pulo Gajah Matee - Simpang Tiga (Pidie) - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households (members) per house

Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators

Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)

Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)

Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality

Quality of house is (will be) good enough

House smaller than before Tsunami

House is better than before Tsunami

New house more safe from earthquake

C. Satisfaction

Did good work

Built good work

Kept community informed

Followed wishes of the village

Does good help in material and facility

D. Transparency

Cost added by the owner to get house finished

No corruption episodes happened during house provision process

No corruption episodes for diminish bad impact

E. Community Participation Level

% of women who involved in village meeting

Is it common if women involved in a meeting?

Decision making in village meeting

House construction based on monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-10)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	BNA_008 MDTFANS BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.80	-1	6.7	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree b. disagree	c. doubt d. agree	c. 21-40 % d. by group d. housing organisation d. community group
2	BNA_044 BRR BANDA ACEH	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.44	-5	3.3	b. disagree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt	d. 0-4 value OK c. doubt c. doubt	d. housing organisation d. community group b. private contractor
3	CLG_001 BRR ACEH JAYA	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.61	3	6.4	c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt	e. no, unmet need enough for housing c. doubt d. agree	d. housing organisation d. community group d. 0-4 value
4	LAM_009 BRR ACEH JAYA	5 b. relocation within the village	2.77	-5	3.3	c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt	e. 0-4 value OK c. doubt c. doubt	e. 61-80 % d. 41-60 % b. yes d. by group d. housing organisation d. community group b. private contractor
5	LSM_007 REKOMPAK LHOKEUMAWE	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.97	3	6.1	c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	d. agree a. not relevant c. doubt d. agree c. doubt a. not relevant c. doubt	b. some housing budget was not used for housing c. doubt c. doubt	e. 61-80 % d. 41-60 % b. yes d. by group d. housing organisation d. community group b. private contractor
6	PID_042 REKOMPAK PIDIE	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.94	7	6.7	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	a. most shelter remain longer than housing budget c. doubt c. doubt	d. 41-60 % b. 0-20 % b. yes d. by group d. housing organisation d. community group

# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities**
  - Health or education assistance
  - Social or technical support
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
  - Provision of water supply for domestic use is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights**
  - Right advocacy or issue provision is good enough
  - Assistance through land acquisition is good
  - LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished?
  - LAND ACQUISITION needed? Is land acquisition finished?
  - VILLAGE PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?
  - LAND CONSOLIDATION needed? Is land consolidation finished?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation**
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste of water system provision
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods restoration**
  - Employment status, before tsunami
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to enter core house
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

Indicator	Response	Score	Organization
A. Critical infrastructure and amenities	Health or education assistance	b. not provided	MDTFANS BANDA ACEH
	Social or technical support	b. not provided	
	The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough	b. disagree	
	Provision of water supply for drinking water is good	b. disagree	
	Provision of water supply for domestic use is good	b. disagree	
	Overall score	1	
B. Critical land use, planning and rights	Right advocacy or issue provision is good enough	b. not provided	BRR BANDA ACEH
	Assistance through land acquisition is good	b. not provided	
	LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished?	d. agree	
	LAND ACQUISITION needed? Is land acquisition finished?	d. agree	
	VILLAGE PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?	d. agree	
	Overall score	2	
C. Environmental remediation	Septic tank provision	b. not provided	BRR ACEH JAYA
	Type of septic tank	b. not provided	
	Waste of water system provision	b. not provided	
	Garbage disposal provision	b. not provided	
	Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?	b. not provided	
	Overall score	3	
D. Livelihoods restoration	Employment status, before tsunami	b. not provided	BRR ACEH JAYA
	Individual bank accounts	b. not provided	
	Affordability to enter core house	b. not provided	
	Job availability is (will be) good enough	b. not provided	
	Village site plan more support the livelihoods now	b. not provided	
	Overall score	4	
A. Critical infrastructure and amenities	Health or education assistance	b. not provided	REKOMPAK LHOKSEUMAWE
	Social or technical support	b. not provided	
	The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough	b. disagree	
	Provision of water supply for drinking water is good	b. disagree	
	Provision of water supply for domestic use is good	b. disagree	
	Overall score	5	
B. Critical land use, planning and rights	Right advocacy or issue provision is good enough	b. not provided	REKOMPAK PIDIE
	Assistance through land acquisition is good	b. not provided	
	LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished?	d. agree	
	LAND ACQUISITION needed? Is land acquisition finished?	d. agree	
	VILLAGE PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?	d. agree	
	Overall score	6	

# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007


## INDONESIAN NGOs 2006 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	328	160	146	1250	128	110
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	80	2	0	70	3	0
Number of houses before tsunami	340	135	300	1020	115	110
Number New houses required after tsunami	347	90	240	750	128	110
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	87	25	0	600	0	0
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	20	0	0	0	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	73 %	100 %	30 %	50 %	95 %	0 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	1 %	0 %	70 %	10 %		0 %
New House (plan)	287	101	88	593	126	110
New House (built)	100	97	52	35	126	60
Who is building	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : TDH Netherlands, YEU	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : PKS, BRR, IOM, CRS, GTZ	b. program organisation	b. program organisation

SABANG (KOTA)



### LEGEND

- 1 : KKSP : Gunong Kleng - Meureubo - ACEH BARAT
- 2 : INDOSIAR & UNIMAL : Meunasah Lhok - Muara Batu - ACEH UTARA
- 3 : UPLINK : Aso Nangro - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 4 : YAYASAN ISLAH BINA UMAT : Punge Blang Cut - Jaya Baru - BANDA ACEH
- 5 : JARINGAN RELAWAN KEMANUSIAAN (JRK) : Kuala Tuha - Kuala (Nagan Raya) - NAGAN RAYA
- 6 : SERASIH INDONESIA : Pasi Beurandeh - Batee - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 4)

B. Quality  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept promised in this need  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in this village  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost agreed by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episode occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Average number of households member(s) per house	Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)	Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)	Accountability Score (0 - 4)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	ABA_010 KKSP ACEH BARAT	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.67	2	5.8	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision	
2	AUT_004 INDOSIAR & UNIMAL ACEH UTARA	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.43	-2	5.8	c. doubt d. agree b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt	b. disagree a. not relevant c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt a. not relevant b. disagree	c. 0-10% d. agree c. doubt	d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme
3	BNA_001 UPLINK BANDA ACEH	2	a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.02	4	10.0	d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by program d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme	
4	BNA_039 YAYASAN ISLAH BINA UMAT BANDA ACEH	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.67	5	8.6	d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant d. agree d. agree d. agree a. not relevant c. doubt	c. 0-10% d. agree d. agree	d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme
5	NRY_003 JARINGAN RELAWAN KEMANUSIAAN (JRK) BANDA ACEH	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.45	-5	0.3	b. disagree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree	b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	b. 0-20% d. by program d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme	
6	PID_003 SERASIH INDONESIA PIDIE	0	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.70	-7	0.0	c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree d. agree	c. 0-10% b. disagree b. disagree	b. by village leader d. housing operation e. follow-up service from housing programme







# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007


## INDONESIAN NGOs 2007 survey



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	-	324	235	1279	502	545
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	362	30	2	30	103	-
Number of houses before tsunami	-	-	220	918	403	-
Number New houses required after tsunami	1100	253	224	923	477	-
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	-	21	20	-	10	-
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	-	-	-	-	-
% Living in permanent housing in the village	30 %	695 %	94 %	75 %	95 %	60 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	45 %	25 %	4 %	20 %	5 %	24 %
New House (plan)	1100	233	264	923	477	267
New House (built)	852	233	194	882	361	213
Who is building	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : UPLINK; BRR, MUSLIM AID, IFRIC	c. other organisations : MAMAMIA GITEC; IOM; BRR	c. other organisations : PMI; UNH; BRR; PB	c. other organisations : UPLINK AND BRR	c. other organisations : UPLINK AND BRR

SABANG (KOTA)



### LEGEND

- 1** : BUDHA TZU CHI : Paya Peunaga - Meureubo - ACEH BARAT
- 2** : UPLINK : Paya Tieng - Peukan Bada - ACEH BESAR
- 3** : MAMAMIA GITEC : Seuneubok Seumawe - Plimbang - BIREUEN
- 4** : RC INDONESIA/PMI : Punge Jurong - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 5** : UPLINK : Surien - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 6** : UPLINK : Ulee Lheue - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episode occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster ID	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-10)	B. Quality	C. Satisfaction	D. Transparency	E. Community Participation Level
1	ABA_027 BUDHA TZU CHI ACEH BARAT	4 c. resettlement	2.74	9	10.0	d. agree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	b. more housing budget enough for building d. 2.4 million IDR d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% c. no d. by question d. housing organisation e. follow-up/monitor from housing organisation
2	ABE_054 UPLINK ACEH BESAR	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.00	5	9.2	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. 2.4 million IDR d. agree d. agree	
3	BIR_008 MAMAMIA GITEC BIREUEN	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.81	1	5.3	c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt	d. agree a. not relevant c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt a. not relevant c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	b. 0-20% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by question d. housing organisation e. follow-up/monitor from housing organisation
4	BNA_057 RC INDONESIA/PMI BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.89	4	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. 2.4 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by question d. housing organisation e. follow-up/monitor from housing organisation
5	ABE_058 UPLINK BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.02	4	9.2	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. 2.4 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by question d. housing organisation e. follow-up/monitor from housing organisation
6	ABE_059 UPLINK BANDA ACEH	1 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.79	3	9.2	d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	e. 5.4 million IDR d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by question d. housing organisation e. follow-up/monitor from housing organisation

# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



**BUDHA TZU CHI**




**RC INDONESIA / PMI**



**UPLINK**




**UPLINK**



**MAMAMIA GITEC**




**UPLINK**

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health or education assistance
  - Social or other support
  - The social facilities available in (will be) good enough
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning, and rights
  - Right advocacy for house provision
  - Assistance through land provision
  - Is LAND MAPPING needed?
  - Is land mapping finished?
  - Is village planning finished?
  - Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?
  - Is land consolidation provided?
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste of water system provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Garbage disposal system
  - Flood risk
  - Flood protection
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods restoration
  - Employment assistance
  - Current employment status
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to extent core house
  - How long to reach market

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>b. disagree</li> <li>b. disagree</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by the government</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>c. provided by the housing programme</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>c. provided by the housing programme</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. yes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>d. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>g. local supplier</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>Housewife</li> <li>Housewife</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>a. I cannot afford it</li> <li>a. 5-15</li> <li>3</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<p>ABA_027 <b>BUDHA TZU CHI</b> ACEH BARAT</p>	<b>1</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>d. provided by government</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>b. disagree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by the government</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. provided by the housing programme</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>f. provided by the housing programme</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>d. not done one</li> <li>c. legal source</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>f. provided by the government</li> <li>Farmer</li> <li>Farmer</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>a. I cannot afford it</li> <li>a. 5-15</li> <li>2</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<p>ABE_054 <b>UPLINK</b> ACEH BESAR</p>	<b>2</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. don't know</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>f. provided by the government AND BNA</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>d. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>d. not done one</li> <li>c. legal source</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>a. I cannot afford it</li> <li>a. 5-15</li> <li>4</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<p>BIR_008 <b>MAMAMIA GITEC</b> BIREUEN</p>	<b>3</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>b. disagree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by the government</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>f. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>d. not done one</li> <li>c. legal source</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. don't know</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>a. I cannot afford it</li> <li>a. 5-15</li> <li>2</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<p>BNA_057 <b>RC INDONESIA/ PMI</b> BANDA ACEH</p>	<b>4</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>b. disagree</li> <li>b. disagree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by the government</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>a. yes</li> <li>f. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>d. not done one</li> <li>c. legal source</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>f. provided by the government</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>c. 1 room</li> <li>b. 15-30</li> <li>1</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<p>ABE_058 <b>UPLINK</b> BANDA ACEH</p>	<b>5</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. don't know</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>b. disagree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. provided by the government</li> <li>d. finished</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. provided by housing</li> <li>a. concrete wall not reinforced</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. selected TO THE BACKWARD</li> <li>b. not provided</li> <li>a. burned</li> <li>d. not done one</li> <li>c. legal source</li> <li>a. YES</li> <li>d. agree</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>f. provided by the government</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>b. no</li> <li>c. 1 room</li> <li>a. 5-15</li> <li>1</li> <li>c. doubt</li> <li>d. agree</li> </ul>	<p>ABE_059 <b>UPLINK</b> BANDA ACEH</p>	<b>6</b>


# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## PHILANTROPIC PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	-	360	160	750	290	285
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	362	0	2	20	-	49
Number of houses before tsunami	-	400	135	750	625	215
Number New houses required after tsunami	1100	400	90	800	290	277
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	-	10	25	1	-	-
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	0	20	0	-	-
% Living in permanent housing in the village	30 %	1 %	100 %	28 %	15 %	95 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	45 %	0 %	0 %	70 %	5 %	1 %
New House (plan)	1100	297	101	415	290	267
New House (built)	852	60	97	350	272	157
Who is building	b. program organisation	c. other organisations : LAFARGE & BRR	c. other organisations : TDH Netherlands, YEU	c. other organisations : P2KPKYKPI	c. other organisations : Bakrie Group, BRR & Rekompak	c. other organisations : RCTI, FRANCE RED CROSS, REKOMPAK



### LEGEND

- 1** : BUDHA TZU CHI : Paya Peunaga - Meureubo - ACEH BARAT
- 2** : LAFARGE : Lamkruet - Lho'nga - ACEH BESAR
- 3** : INDOSIAR & UNIMAL : Meunash Lhok - Muara Batu - ACEH UTARA
- 4** : MEDCO-JENGGALA : Blang Oi - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 5** : BAKRIE GROUP : Deah Raya - Syiah Kuala - BANDA ACEH
- 6** : RCTI : Benteng - Kota Sigli - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member (h) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (- 9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 4)

B. Quality  
Houses smaller than before Tsunami  
Houses is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in preparation  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episodes happened during house provision process  
No corruption episodes occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
Is it common if women involved in a meeting?  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-4)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
<b>1</b> ABA_027 BUDHA TZU CHI ACEH BARAT	4 c. resettlement	2.74	9	10.0	d. disagree b. disagree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	b. no insurance fund enough a. no insurance fund enough c. 1 million DA d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% c. no d. by program d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough
<b>2</b> ABE_006 LAFARGE ACEH BESAR	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.92	3	8.1	d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree	b. no insurance fund enough a. no insurance fund enough c. 1 million DA d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% d. by program d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough
<b>3</b> AUT_004 INDOSIAR & UNIMAL ACEH UTARA	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.43	-2	5.8	c. doubt d. agree b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt	b. disagree a. not relevant c. doubt b. disagree a. not relevant b. disagree	c. 1 million DA d. agree c. doubt	d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough c. no insurance fund enough
<b>4</b> BNA_041 MEDCO & JENGGALA BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.39	-3	3.6	b. disagree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree b. disagree	c. 1 million DA d. agree b. disagree	d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough c. no insurance fund enough
<b>5</b> BNA_061 BAKRIE GROUP BANDA ACEH	3 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.69	-2	4.4	b. disagree d. agree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree b. disagree	b. no insurance fund enough a. no insurance fund enough c. 1 million DA d. agree c. doubt	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% c. yes d. by program d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough
<b>6</b> PID_038 RCTI PIDIE	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.71	7	10.0	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. no insurance fund enough a. no insurance fund enough c. 1 million DA d. agree d. agree	d. housing organisation a. no insurance fund enough c. no insurance fund enough



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



**BUDHA TZU CHI**



**LAFARGE**



**INDOSIAR & UNIMAL**



**MEDCO & JENGGALA**



**BAKRIE GROUP**



**RCTI**

- 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY**
- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities**
    - Health support
    - Social or education assistance
    - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
    - Power provision is (will be) good enough
    - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
  - B. Critical land use, planning and rights**
    - Right advocacy or issue provision is (will be) good enough
    - Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims is (will be) good enough
    - LAND MAPPING needed?
      - Is land mapping finished?
      - Is village planning finished?
      - Is land consolidation needed?
      - Is land consolidation finished?
      - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
      - Village plan is more safe now
  - C. Environmental remediation**
    - Septic tank provision
    - Type of septic tank
    - Waste water system provision
    - Garbage disposal provision
    - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
    - Flood risk
    - Flood protection (in village level) is (will be) good
    - New house more safe now from flood
  - D. Livelihoods restoration**
    - Livelihood assistance
    - Employment status, before tsunami
    - Individual bank accounts
    - Affordability to extent core house
    - How long to reach core house
  - Local construction capacity (material & labour)**
    - Job availability is (will be) good enough
    - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

b. not provided
b. not provided
d. agree
b. disagree
b. disagree
d. agree

c. provided by the housing programme
c. provided by the housing programme
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. finished
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. finished
d. agree
d. agree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. completed
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. completed
b. no
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (not reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (not reinforced)
d. concrete wall (not reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. agree
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
b. not provided
b. no
c. legal source
c. doubt

b. not provided
Housewife
Housewife
b. no
a. I can't afford it
a. 5-15 minutes
3
c. doubt
c. doubt

ABA_027
BUDHA TZU CHI
ACEH BARAT
1

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
c. started
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
c. started
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
c. started
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. disagree
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
b. not provided
b. no
c. legal source
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
Private sector
Private sector
b. no
a. I can't afford it
a. 15-30 minutes
1
c. doubt
c. doubt

ABE_006
LAFARGE
ACEH BESAR
2

b. not provided
c. provided by the housing programme
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
c. doubt

d. provided by the housing programme
a. don't know
a. yes
c. started
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
c. started
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. disagree
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
Farmer
Farmer
b. no
a. I can't afford it
a. 15-30 minutes
3
c. doubt
c. doubt

ABA_004
INDOSIAR & UNIMAL
ACEH UTARA
3

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree

d. provided by the housing programme
a. don't know
a. yes
d. completed
a. yes
a. don't know
b. no
c. doubt
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
d. completed
a. yes
a. don't know
b. no
c. doubt
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. disagree
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
Private sector
Private sector
b. no
a. I can't afford it
a. 15-30 minutes
0
b. disagree
b. disagree

BNA_041
MEDCO & JENGGALA
BANDA ACEH
4

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
c. doubt
b. disagree
c. doubt
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
d. finished
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. finished
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
a. yes
d. finished
a. yes
c. provided by the housing programme
d. finished
b. no
c. doubt
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
a. yes
b. disagree
b. disagree

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
Private sector
Private sector
b. no
a. I can't afford it
a. 15-30 minutes
0
b. disagree
b. disagree

BNA_061
BAKRIE GROUP
BANDA ACEH
5

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
d. agree
d. agree
d. agree
b. disagree

g. not relevant
b. not provided
b. no
b. no
b. no
d. agree
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. disagree
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
c. provided by housing programme
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
d. concrete wall (reinforced)
a. banned
d. not taken care
a. don't know
b. no
d. disagree
c. doubt

c. provided by the housing programme
b. not provided
Housewife
Housewife
b. no
b. few change
a. 5-15 minutes
3
c. doubt
d. agree

PID_038
RCTI
PIDIE
6



# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007


## RED CROSS/CRESCENT PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	747	1279	400	335	635	830
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	-	30	200	1	6	40
Number of houses before tsunami	-	918	600	350	553	700
Number New houses required after tsunami	1247	923	215	336	675	272
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	-	-	-	-	-	470
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	-	-	-	-	-	0
% Living in permanent housing in the village	65 %	75 %	40 %	30 %	-	40 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	35 %	20 %	20 %	20 %	30 %	19 %
New House (plan)	1201	923	311	315	507	180
New House (built)	701	882	83	296	230	25
Who is building	c. other organisations : TURKISH RC, BRR	c. other organisations : PMI, UNH,BRR; PB	c. other organisations : German Red Cross and BRR	c. other organisations : British Red Cross, IDES and IFRC	c. other organisations : HKRC, IOM, BRR; RCTI Peduli	b. program organisation

SABANG (KOTA)



### LEGEND

- 1 : TURKISH RED CRESENT : Meunasah Mesjid (Lampuuk) - Lho'nga - ACEH BESAR
- 2 : RC INDONESIA/PMI : Punge Jurong - Meuraxa - BANDA ACEH
- 3 : GERMANY RED CROSS : Dayah Baro - Krueng Sabee - ACEH JAYA
- 4 : BRITISH RED CROSS : Alue Ambang - Teunom - ACEH JAYA
- 5 : HONG KONG RED CROSS : Kuala Cangko - Lapang - ACEH UTARA
- 6 : FRENCH RED CROSS : Blang Paseh - Kota Sigli - PIDIE

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member (n) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept promised in this village  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in preparation  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episode occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Programme	Cluster	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-10)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
1. ABE_044 TURKISH RED CRESCENT ACEH BESAR	2. a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.09	7	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision b. women involved
2. BNA_057 RC INDONESIA / PMI BANDA ACEH	3. a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.89	4	8.3	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% d. by program a. housing operation b. facilitator/supervisor from housing organisation
3. CLG_007 GERMANY RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	4. a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.14	1	7.5	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant b. disagree c. doubt c. doubt d. agree d. agree	b. more housing budget enough for building d. agree c. doubt	c. 21-40% b. 0-20% d. by program a. housing operation b. facilitator/supervisor from housing organisation
4. CLG_008 BRITISH RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	6. a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.24	6	6.7	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree a. not relevant d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	e. 61-80% e. 61-80% d. by program a. housing operation b. facilitator/supervisor from housing organisation
5. AUT_006 HONGKONG RED CROSS ACEH UTARA	4. a. house reconstruction on the same location	3.30	2	5.8	d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	b. more housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	e. 61-80% e. 61-80% d. by program a. housing operation b. facilitator/supervisor from housing organisation
6. PID_023 FRENCH RED CROSS PIDIE	6. a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.96	4	5.6	d. agree c. doubt c. doubt c. doubt d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree d. agree	b. more housing budget enough for building c. doubt c. doubt	b. 0-20% b. 0-20% d. by program c. community decision a. facilitator/supervisor from housing organisation

# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



**TURKISH RED CRESCENT**



**RC INDONESIA / PMI**



**GERMANY RED CROSS**



**BRITISH RED CROSS**



**HONGKONG RED CROSS**



**FRENCH RED CROSS**

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health support
  - Social or education assistance
  - The social facilities available is (will be) good enough
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Power provision is (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights
  - Right advocacy or voice provision is (will be) good enough
  - Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims is (will be) good enough
  - LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished?
  - LAND PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?
  - LAND CONSOLIDATION needed? Is land consolidation finished?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste water system provision
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods restoration
  - Employment status, before tsunami
  - Current employment status
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to extent
  - How long to reach market
  - Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

Indicator	Response	Score
A. Critical infrastructure and amenities	Health support	1
	Social or education assistance	1
	The social facilities available is (will be) good enough	1
	The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough	1
	Power provision is (will be) good enough	1
	Provision of water supply for drinking water is good	1
B. Critical land use, planning and rights	Right advocacy or voice provision is (will be) good enough	1
	Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims is (will be) good enough	1
	LAND MAPPING needed? Is land mapping finished?	1
	LAND PLANNING needed? Is village planning finished?	1
	LAND CONSOLIDATION needed? Is land consolidation finished?	1
	House accessibility is (will be) good enough	1
C. Environmental remediation	Septic tank provision	1
	Type of septic tank	1
	Waste water system provision	1
	Garbage disposal provision	1
	Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?	1
	Flood risk	1
D. Livelihoods restoration	Employment status, before tsunami	1
	Current employment status	1
	Individual bank accounts	1
	Affordability to extent	1
	How long to reach market	1
	Local construction capacity (material & labour)	1

ABE_044 TURKISH RED CRESCENT ACEH BESAR	1
BNA_057 RC INDONESIA / PMI BANDA ACEH	2
CLG_007 GERMANY RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	3
CLG_008 BRITISH RED CROSS ACEH JAYA	4
AUT_006 HONGKONG RED CROSS ACEH UTARA	5
PID_023 FRENCH RED CROSS PIDIE	6

# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## UN-HABITAT PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after tsunami (pre-tsunami residents)	181	219	528	554	226	298
Number of family head after tsunami (new comers)	0	0	0	7	3	73
Number of houses before tsunami	0	160	400	420	228	631
Number New houses required after tsunami	181	219	85	339	252	340
Number of houses need repairs after tsunami	0	0	158	4	26	70
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	0	73	0	0	3
% Living in permanent housing in the village	0 %	45 %	76 %	85 %	97 %	80 %
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	0 %	1 %	0 %	15 %	3 %	5 %
New House (plan)	166	161	85	265	221	148
New House (built)	106	106	85	265	221	87
Who is building	c. other organisations CHF, IFRC	Programme Organisation, CHF	b. program organisation	Programme Organisation	Programme Organisation	Programme Organisation and BRR, Palang Merah Spanyol, Yayasan HOWU-HOWU



### LEGEND

- 1 : UN-HABITAT : Pulot - Leupunga - ACEH BESAR
- 2 : UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH/ACEH BESAR : Pulot - Leupunga - ACEH BESAR
- 3 : UN-HABITAT : Rawa - Pidie - PIDIE
- 4 : UN-HABITAT PIDIE : Rawa - Pidie - PIDIE
- 5 : UN-HABITAT SIMEULUE : Kuala Makmur - Simeulue Timur - SIMEULUE
- 6 : UN-HABITAT NIAS/NIAS SELATAN : Kelurahan Pasar Teluk Dalam - Teluk Dalam - NIAS SELATAN

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households/cluster (n) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept community informed  
Kept good infrastructure and facility  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in this village  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episode happened during house provision process  
No corruption episodes occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
% of women who involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Programme	Cluster	Relocation/Type	Construction Quality Score	Satisfaction Score	Accountability Score	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level
1 UN-HABITAT ACEH BESAR	3	b. relocation within the village	2.43	3	8.3	d. agree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree a. not relevant c. doubt	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by system d. housing operation e. not relevant d. community group
2 UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH/ACEH BESAR	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.83	-7	0.0	b. disagree d. agree b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree	b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree b. disagree	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing b. disagree d. disagree	d. 41-60% d. 41-60% d. by system d. by system c. community decision e. not relevant
3 UN-HABITAT PIDIE	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.48	4	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. disagree d. agree a. not relevant	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing d. agree d. agree	e. 61-80% d. by system c. community decision
4 UN-HABITAT PIDIE	9	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.89	-2	5.0	c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt c. doubt	c. doubt c. doubt b. disagree c. doubt b. disagree d. agree a. not relevant	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing c. doubt c. doubt	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% c. no d. by system d. housing operation e. not relevant d. community group
5 UN-HABITAT SIMEULUE	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.67	3	10.0	d. agree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree d. agree c. doubt	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by system c. community decision e. not relevant d. community group
6 UN-HABITAT NIAS/NIAS SELATAN	8	a. house reconstruction on the same location	2.75	7	10.0	c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	b. no infrastructure built enough for housing e. <4 - below CH d. agree d. agree	f. 81-100% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by system d. housing operation e. not relevant d. community group



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS

UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH  
ACEH BESAR



UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH  
ACEH BESAR



UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT  
PIDIE



UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT  
PIDIE

UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT  
SIMEULUE

UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT  
NIASNIAS SELATAN

## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

- A. Critical infrastructure and amenities
  - Health support
  - Social or education assistance
  - The social facilities available (will be) good enough
  - The school and health facilities are (will be) good enough
  - Provision of water supply for drinking water is good
- B. Critical land use, planning and rights
  - Right advocacy or house provision is (will be) good enough
  - Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims is (will be) good enough
  - LAND MAPPING needed?
  - Is land mapping provided?
  - Is VILLAGE PLANNING needed?
  - Is village planning finished?
  - Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?
  - Is land consolidation provided?
  - House accessibility is (will be) good enough
  - Village plan is more safe now
- C. Environmental remediation
  - Septic tank provision
  - Type of septic tank
  - Waste of water system provision
  - Garbage disposal provision
  - Who takes care of the public toilets / baths?
  - Flood risk
  - New house more safe now from flood
- D. Livelihoods restoration
  - Livelihood assistance
  - Employment status, before tsunami
  - Current employment status
  - Individual bank accounts
  - Affordability to extent
  - How long to reach core house
- Local construction capacity (material & labour)
  - Job availability is (will be) good enough
  - Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

f. provided by Government b. not provided e. provided by PLAN d. agree g. disagree b. disagree c. doubt
f. provided by CARE d. agree b. disagree b. disagree
f. provided by BAKHIN INDONESIA e. provided by UNICEF
b. not provided d. agree b. disagree b. disagree
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by PT MASCON d. finished a. yes b. not provided
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. completed b. no
b. not provided d. agree b. disagree b. disagree
a. don't know b. not provided a. yes e. provided by APMD d. finished b. no
a. yes f. provided by BIR c. doubt c. doubt
e. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by housing programme d. finished b. no
b. no b. no c. doubt c. doubt
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. not started b. no
b. no b. no c. doubt a. not relevant

c. provided by the local government d. concrete well e. provided by the reinforced a. other no the back of house b. not provided a. burned e. water tank is used by community c. legal source a. yes b. disagree b. disagree
e. provided by housing programme d. concrete well b. not provided a. other no the back of house b. not provided a. burned e. water tank is used by community c. legal source a. yes b. disagree b. disagree
e. provided by housing programme d. concrete well b. not provided a. other no the back of house b. not provided a. burned e. water tank is used by community c. legal source a. yes b. disagree b. disagree
e. provided by housing programme d. concrete well b. not provided a. other no the back of house b. not provided a. burned e. water tank is used by community c. legal source a. yes b. disagree b. disagree

f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no

f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no

f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no

f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no

f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no
f. provided by the local government b. not provided a. yes e. provided by the housing programme d. finished b. no

ABE_026 UN-HABITAT ACEH BESAR	1
KPR III/1 LAPOH RAYA UN-HABITAT BANDA ACEH / ACEH BESAR ACEH BESAR	2
PID_017 UN-HABITAT PIDIE	3
KPR 2 UN-HABITAT PIDIE PIDIE	4
KPR Blang Makmur 02 UN-HABITAT SIMEULUE SIMEULUE TIMUR	5
KPR Murai UN-HABITAT NIAS/ NIAS SELATAN NIAS SELATAN	6

# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## YOGYAKARTA (BANTUL) GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after earthquake (pre-earthquake residents)	3560	3243	4164	2355	2904	8200
Number of family head after earthquake (new comers)	no data	0	680	0	581	50
Number of houses before earthquake	3524	3293	3548	no data	2791	7960
Number New houses required after earthquake	2615	3265	400	2479	2182	1728
Number of houses need repairs after earthquake	1409	400	276	419	609	4714
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	0	28	710	0	0	3000
% Living in permanent housing in the village	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%	100%
% of total households now living in PERMANENTCONDITION elsewhere	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
New House (plan)	2615	3603	4000	3188	2362	1861
New House (built)	2345	3435	3680	3121	2362	1855
Who is building	RR, TURKEY, JRF, IOM	RR, JRF, CORDAID, IOM	RR, JRF, German, WALUBI	RR, P2KP, JRF	RR, JRF, World Bank, IOM	RR, P2KP, JRF

### LEGEND

- 1 : RR : Mulyodadi - Bambang Lipuro - BANTUL
- 2 : RR : Sidomulyo - Bambang Lipuro - BANTUL
- 3 : RR : Sumbermulyo - Bambang Lipuro - BANTUL
- 4 : RR : Winokerten - Banguntapan - BANTUL
- 5 : RR : Potorono - Banguntapan - BANTUL
- 6 : RR : Banguntapan - Banguntapan - BANTUL

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (- 9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality  
Quality of house is (will be) good enough  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good work  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in this village  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact

D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episodes happened during house provision process

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
Is it common if women involved in a meeting  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Type of Programme	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-10)	Quality	Satisfaction	Transparency	Community Participation Level	
1	YOGYA_001 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.72	5	8.9	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree b. disagree d. agree b. disagree d. agree	f. 0.20 million IDR d. agree d. agree	b. 0-20% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by forum a. own decision f. community group
2	YOGYA_002 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	3	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.57	5	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree c. doubt	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 5.8 million IDR d. agree d. agree	- - - - b. group decision f. community group
3	YOGYA_003 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.39	2	6.7	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree b. disagree d. agree c. doubt b. disagree d. agree d. agree	f. 0.9 million IDR b. disagree d. agree	- - - - a. own decision d. all
4	YOGYA_004 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	4	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.70	7	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 5.8 million IDR d. agree d. agree	e. 61-80% d. 41-60% b. yes d. by forum a. own decision f. community group
5	YOGYA_005 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	5	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.72	7	6.7	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	f. 0.9 million IDR d. agree b. disagree	e. 61-80% e. 61-80% b. yes d. by forum a. own decision f. community group
6	YOGYA_006 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA BANTUL	6	a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.51	6	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 5.8 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by forum a. own decision f. community group





# UN-HABITAT - UNSYIAH POST TSUNAMI SETTLEMENT RECOVERY MONITORING 2005-2007

## CENTRAL JAVA (KLATEN) GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES



### 1. VILLAGE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of family head after earthquake (pre-earthquake residents)	2890	758	1174	586	1392	397
Number of family head after earthquake (new comers)	0	0	2	5	5	0
Number of houses before earthquake	2890	558	1130	500	1294	397
Number New houses required after earthquake	1378	558	603	206	678	397
Number of houses need repairs after earthquake	no data	218	791	244	16	0
Number of families do not need reconstruction or repairs	no data	0	283	50	606	no data
% Living in permanent housing in the village	90%	95%	100%	100%	100%	100%
% of total households now living in PERMANENT CONDITION elsewhere	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
New House (plan)	1390	558	700	212	664	403
New House (built)	1378	558	700	206	664	397
Who is building	RR; JRF	RR	RR, IOM, CRS, JRF	RR, CRF, IOM	RR, JRF, IOM	RR, JRF

### LEGEND

- 1 : RR : Kerakitan - Bayat - KLATEN
- 2 : RR : Tirtomarto - Cawas - KLATEN
- 3 : RR : Bawak - Cawas - KLATEN
- 4 : RR : Plosowangi - Cawas - KLATEN
- 5 : RR : Cawas - Cawas - KLATEN
- 6 : RR : Kerten - Gantiwarno - KLATEN

### 2. CLUSTERS STATISTICS

Average number of households member(s) per house  
Type of Programme

### 3. SHELTER RECONSTRUCTION INDICATORS

A. Key Performance Indicators  
Construction Quality Score (0 - 4)  
Satisfaction Score (-9 - 9)  
Accountability Score (0 - 10)

B. Quality  
Quality of house is (will be) good enough  
House smaller than before Tsunami  
House is better than before Tsunami  
New house more safe from earthquake  
New house more comfort now

C. Satisfaction  
Did good work  
Built good infrastructure and facility  
Kept community informed  
Followed wishes of communities  
Does good help in this village  
Does good attention for diminish bad impact


D. Transparency  
Cost added by the owner to get house finished  
No corruption episodes happened during house provision process  
No corruption episodes occurred in material and labour management

E. Community Participation Level  
Participants who involved in village meeting  
Is it common if women involved in a meeting?  
Decision making in village meeting  
House construction based on Monitoring of houses construction

Cluster	Programme	Programme Description	Construction Quality Score (0-4)	Satisfaction Score (-9-9)	Accountability Score (0-10)	Quality Indicators	Satisfaction Indicators	Transparency Indicators	Community Participation Indicators
1	KLA_001 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	3.14	7	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	f. > 2 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by spiritum a. own decision b. 0-10% (household/communities) c. 0-10% (household/communities)
2	KLA_002 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	3.05	7	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	f. > 2 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by spiritum a. own decision b. 0-10% (household/communities) c. 0-10% (household/communities)
3	KLA_003 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.83	5	6.7	d. agree a. not relevant d. agree c. doubt d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. 2-4 million IDR d. agree a. not relevant	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by spiritum c. community decision d. not independent
4	KLA_004 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	4 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.57	7	9.4	d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	f. > 2 million IDR d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by spiritum a. own decision c. community decision d. not independent
5	KLA_005 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	8 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	2.57	3	10.0	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree b. disagree c. doubt d. agree c. doubt d. agree d. agree	e. 5-8 million IDR d. agree d. agree	d. 41-60% b. 0-20% b. yes d. by spiritum a. own decision c. community decision d. community group
6	KLA_006 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	5 a. house reconstruction on the same location than before earthquake	3.02	7	10.0	d. agree b. disagree d. agree d. agree d. agree	d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree d. agree	e. 5-8 million IDR d. agree d. agree	c. 21-40% c. 21-40% b. yes d. by spiritum a. own decision b. 0-10% (household/communities) c. 0-10% (household/communities)



# HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION AND VILLAGE RECOVERY INDICATORS



## 4. SETTLEMENT RECOVERY

**A. Critical infrastructure and amenities**  
 Health support  
 Social or education assistance  
 The social facilities available is (will be) good enough  
 Power provision is (will be) good enough  
 Provision of water supply for drinking water is good enough  
**B. Critical land use, planning and rights**  
 Right advocacy for house provision  
 Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims  
 Is LAND MAPPING needed?  
 Is land mapping finished?  
 Is village planning needed?  
 Is village planning finished?  
 Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?  
 Is land consolidation provided?  
 House accessibility is (will be) good enough  
**C. Environmental remediation**  
 Septic tank provision  
 Type of septic tank  
 Waste water system provision  
 Type of waste water system  
 Garbage disposal provision  
 Source of garbage disposal  
 Flood risk  
 Flood protection  
**D. Livelihoods restoration**  
 Livelihood assistance  
 Employment status, before tsunami  
 Individual bank accounts  
 How long to enter core house  
**Local constructor capacity (material & labour)**  
 Job availability is (will be) good enough  
 Village site plan more support the livelihoods now

Indicator	1	2	3	4	5	6
Health support	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government
Social or education assistance	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government
The social facilities available is (will be) good enough	d. agree	c. doubt	b. disagree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Power provision is (will be) good enough	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Provision of water supply for drinking water is good enough	d. agree	d. agree	a. not relevant	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Right advocacy for house provision	b. not provided	b. not provided	c. provided by the government	b. not provided	b. not provided	b. not provided
Assistance through land acquisition for landless victims	a. don't know	a. don't know	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes
Is LAND MAPPING needed?	a. yes	a. yes	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government
Is land mapping finished?	d. finished	d. finished	d. finished	d. finished	d. finished	d. finished
Is village planning needed?	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes	a. yes
Is village planning finished?	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government	d. provided by government
Is LAND CONSOLIDATION needed?	d. finished	d. finished	b. no	b. no	b. no	b. no
Is land consolidation provided?	b. no	b. no	b. no	b. no	b. no	b. no
House accessibility is (will be) good enough	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Environmental remediation	d. agree	c. doubt	c. doubt	c. doubt	c. doubt	c. doubt
Septic tank provision	f. provided by person	f. provided by person	f. provided by person	f. provided by person	f. provided by person	f. provided by person
Type of septic tank	e. concrete wall (not reinforced)	e. concrete wall (not reinforced)	b. not agree	c. provided by housing community	b. not agree	b. not agree
Waste water system provision	e. provided by person	e. provided by person	e. provided by person	e. provided by person	e. provided by person	e. provided by person
Type of waste water system	d. provided by person	d. provided by person	d. provided by person	d. provided by person	d. provided by person	d. provided by person
Garbage disposal provision	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned
Source of garbage disposal	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned	a. banned
Flood risk	b. local supplier	b. local supplier	b. local supplier	b. local supplier	b. local supplier	b. local supplier
Flood protection	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	a. not relevant
Livelihoods restoration	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Livelihood assistance	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree
Employment status, before tsunami	1	0	2	1	3	2
Individual bank accounts	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. disagree	d. agree
How long to enter core house	d. agree	d. agree	c. doubt	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	d. agree
Local constructor capacity (material & labour)	d. agree	d. agree	c. doubt	a. not relevant	a. not relevant	d. agree
Job availability is (will be) good enough	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. disagree	d. agree
Village site plan more support the livelihoods now	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. agree	d. disagree	d. agree

KLA_001 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	1
KLA_002 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	2
KLA_003 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	3
KLA_004 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	4
KLA_005 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	5
KLA_006 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA KLATEN	6




# Shouting from House to House in Nias

by : Diella Dachlan







It was morning in Ladara Village, North Nias. “Ya’ahowu” (a greeting in the Nias language) was heard from a man with a wide smile. He was passing by on a motorcycle, a live hog, trussed up with his feet in the air, tied securely on the back of the bike. This brief exchange took place on our way to the office on a temporary bridge over the river made of coconut palm trunks bound tightly in wire. “When a pig is trussed up, feet up like that, it is on its way to slaughter,” explained Ika, our facilitator colleague from Aceh.

Not long after that, another man on a motorcycle passed by us, a great deal of noise issuing from the bags hanging at each side of the bike. Not able to restrain my curiosity, I asked: “What is that noise, Sir?” “Oh, those are some dogs I’m taking over to Mount Sitoli”, He answered in a friendly manner. While I was still wondering at his response, a dog’s head emerged from one of the bags on the right side of the motorcycle, which was facing me. “Woof, woof, woof,” the dog barked as if to ensure me that it really was dogs the man was carrying. My companions laughed at the look on my face during this interchange.

To them, this kind of sight was nothing at all out of the ordinary. Since the end of 2006, when the construction of the donated housing had first begun in four villages in two districts in Tuhemberua and Sawo in North Nias, these colleagues of mine and many others from various places, such as Nias, Aceh, Padang, Medan, Sibolga, Jakarta and Surabaya, had been living in villages in the area surrounding our office in Banuagea village.



The houses were constructed by the local people themselves. They had formed small groups and managed the assistance funds transferred in to the accounts belonging to their groups. "The local people are responsible for managing the construction of their own homes, starting from procurement of materials, then on through the actual construction work, and the compiling of final reports. Our function is that of advisors, both in terms of the technical and social aspects," explained the UN-HABITAT Project Manager Bima Indra.

The 36-square-meter houses are constructed of steel frames and roofed with ceramic tiles at a cost Rp 50 million per unit. The most important thing was that all of the houses constructed had to be earthquake proof. For that reason, technical assistance was required.

We had to inspect 486 houses along with the inspection team from ADB. Because this particular inspection was not for the purpose of sampling for monitoring purposes, each house would have to be checked none by one. The houses being inspected in the four villages were at such a distance from one another as to make the inspectors' legs ache. Although the houses were structurally complete and almost ready to be occupied, there were still minor things pending completion like the placement of siding planks, the installation of water taps, the painting of the back walls, and the finishing touches on the septic tanks and water reservoirs.

We certainly found some interesting things during our inspection trips. "Mam, this is a bathroom, so why it is being used as a chicken coop?" asked Leli, one of the facilitators who originates from Padang, while pointing at a hen sitting on eggs in a nest in the toilet. "Well, there was no place to keep the chickens, so I have them here temporarily," answered Mrs. Fatiria Gea of Banuagea village. Fatiria Gea and her family were still going down to the well near the river when they needed to use the bathroom even though they now had a functioning toilet in their home.





There was also a case in which the septic tank was being used as a well. "I don't need a septic tank; I need a well, so I have converted it into a well," explained one of the assistance recipients in Sawo village. There were still others who used the siding planks to build chicken coops. "I plan to expand the size of the house later anyway, so why should I side the house now?" they would offer as a reason. Others also stubbornly refused to paint the backs of their houses. "This is my house. I don't want any more painting done at my house," said Mr. Bedali Gea, a resident of Banuagea village. "That man really does not want his house painted. When they came by to repaint it, he threatened to hit the workman and caused him to run away," said Zendrate, a facilitator from Nias. The only reason for this was that he simply didn't want it painted. Period!

What was particularly humorous was the reaction of Mr. Gabuyu of Mede. When we showed him the inspection sheet, he was more interested in discussing the photo of his house than he was in commenting on the work on the house that was almost completed. "Oh, this is my house, and that is the right pillar, and that is the roof, and that is me," he said in delight as he admired his image.

Despite some resistance to change, most of the villagers receiving assistance were open to new things. Quite a few of the new home owners took the initiative to decorate their homes by tiling the bathroom and the floors of their houses. Mr. Sekifaho of Silimabanua village is one example. He creatively pieced broken tiles together like a puzzle to tile his bathroom floor. Besides costing less, his bathroom looked unique. There were others who even understood enough to place their septic tanks at a distance of 20 meters from their houses.

"Wow, the paint on this house looks really nice and neat," commented Donal from ADB. The owner of the house receiving such praise just smiled. "I work in construction," he said. Oh, so that explained it.





## Capital is a Sensitive Matter

From the point of view of technical matters, constructing a house is not that difficult. However, from the social point of view, there are bound to be differing perceptions. This is especially so because a home is a private matter. "We have to be very culturally sensitive. We have to approach things slowly and can't force anything," said Yeka Kusumawijaya of Surabaya. He gave the example of people who are not used to having bathrooms as an example, emphasizing that patience was the best method in initiating change. "We have to understand their culture. In a number of places, people do not perceive putting the bathroom in the house as a good thing," he explained. For that reason, besides constructing houses and basic infrastructure, UN-HABITAT also promotes hygiene. The goal is to bridge the gap in relation to these kinds of issues.

There is also the perception that Nias is a hard culture, and that the least mistake will result in the drawing of machetes. Not to mention that drinking alcoholic beverages is an ingrained tradition on Nias. The local beverages Tonifare and Ashoka are the two most popular drinks. Both are alcoholic beverages that can be made at home and are sold in roadside stalls. Brenkol, a mixed drink made with Brandy, is also popular.

While in North Nias, I frequently observed people passed out drunk sleeping on bridges. But the drinking habit didn't always seem to be a negative. When building houses, there were a few people who worked more industriously with a couple of drinks in them; they worked really fast. "They would even sing, which somehow energized the others," said one facilitator.

In Nias, Sunday is a special day, when the people of Nias, the majority of whom are Christian, go to church. And, in line with tradition, no one is allowed to work on Sunday. It is against all custom and local law. For that reason, we had to respect this element of the culture.

Yeka emphasized that being aware of cultural sensitivity is one of the most important elements in working with the local people. "And this is the case not only in Nias, but wherever we may be," said Yeka, who before coming to Nias, had also worked in Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Papua.



## Difficult Acces

One of the challenges of working in Nias is that access can be difficult. Most materials for construction of houses have to be brought in over a distance of 125 kilometers from the western coast of Sumatra Island. Generally, shipments of material are brought in by ocean from Sibolga. When the weather is bad, the ships can't sail and the materials do not reach Nias, resulting in delays in the construction.

The main roads are also not easily traversed, although the current road conditions are also much better than before 2005. The government has built many roads and bridges since then. Even so, there remain many areas that are difficult to reach.

To travel from Gunung Sitoli to Ladara village, we had to cross a number of temporary emergency bridges. Sedans of any kind clearly could not traverse this route, while other vehicles with higher wheel bases, such as the Kijang and Carry would even end up getting stuck.

Because some of the roads were so bad, turning into rivers of mud when it rained, trips from the village where the UN-HABITAT office is to the house construction sites in other villages were often done along an alternative coastal route that required the crossing of several small rivers that feed into the sea.

One time, the driver of a passenger vehicle thought it might be easier to drive into the shallow waters at the edge of the ocean for a short distance to avoid the difficult crossing of a river that, over time, had become deeper and more problematic to navigate. As it turned out, the engine became flooded with sea water, then the tide began rising and the vehicle got stuck and had to be abandoned. "It was pretty funny to watch," said one of the teenagers in the crowd that had gathered to see what was happening.

The most difficult of the UN-HABITAT village working locations to reach is Mede village. This is partially due to the fact that the only access is a dirt road that transforms into a huge mud puddle when it rains. And even in good weather, the trip requires a 2 kilometer hike but wherever we may be," said Yeka, who before coming to Nias, had also worked in hike at the end of the trip to get to the village itself.





“Sometimes we had to arrange to borrow a BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body) truck and carry in the materials ourselves because the suppliers gave up trying to get in,” said Ajo. “It is a difficult situation and we would end up frustrated because the vehicles we used would get stuck over and over again.”

### **Squid Curry and Deer Meat**

Even though conditions are minimal, my colleagues generally enjoy the work they are doing. “Especially when the houses are successfully completed; it just feels so good to have accomplished it,” said Elvi, the facilitator for Silimabanua village.

For the facilitators, the biggest problem is homesickness for their place of origin and the foods they are accustomed to, such as bakso (meatballs) and fried rice, among other favorite dishes. When this feeling gets to be too much for them, they head over to Gunung Sitoli about an hour from the village they are staying in. Or they go down to South Nias to relax while surfing in Lagundri Bay, or visit traditional villages like Bawomataluo to watch the traditional stone jumping.





Even though such events may not be scheduled for when they arrive, the village youngsters are always willing to put on a show costing between Rp 75,000 and 100,000 for three people to watch. The cheapest way to relax is watching TV at one of the villagers' houses, or just sleeping all day to counter the exhaustion of their daily activities.

But at the end of that week, we couldn't go anywhere as there was still too much work left to do. But my colleagues didn't give entirely on having a little fun. Ladara village has a lovely beach that is great for both swimming and fishing. And this time, there was especially good news; someone from a neighboring village had bagged a deer. And some other villagers had been lucky enough to catch some squid.

In Nias, the squid are jumbo sized; we call them "pillow squid" because they are about the size of a baby's pillow. So, we were all delighted to be able to tuck into such a wonderful dinner of roasted and curried deer meat and squid curry. And, of course, all of this was accompanied by the strumming of guitars and happy, singing voices. Hmm.....this was probably much more fun after all.

*Sawooglee..... (Thank you).*



# Chapter 3



# Directory of Housing Implementation Organisations

The directory of all housing implementing organisations and their work in Aceh and Nias was compiled based on the September 2008 data in the RAN database of BRR. The selection of data and text from the database was made by UN-HABITAT's team in Banda Aceh in such a way in order to provide a representative picture of the work of each organisation. UN-HABITAT staff attempted to double-check information with a large number of them. Pictures were mainly collected from the monitoring database of UN-HABITAT – Unsyiah's monitoring and evaluation programme. In some instances, organisations provided pictures to UN-HABITAT for use in the directory. The UN-HABITAT team in Banda Aceh tried to provide data as correct as possible, but errors in the RAN database or in the compilation of the directory are possible. The directory therefore provides a fair but not necessarily complete nor fully correct picture of the work of individual organisations but is a tribute to the collective undertaking in housing reconstruction in Aceh and Nias by the many governmental and non-governmental organisations.











# ACEH RELIEF

[www.acehrelief.org](http://www.acehrelief.org) / [info@acehrelief.org](mailto:info@acehrelief.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 146 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
11-May-06                                      9                                      2,100,000

Donor (s) : **Compassion International.**

Project Title : ACEH RELIEF I.

### Description :

1. Shelter project in Kecamatan Pulo Aceh (Desa Lhoh, Lemouyang and Lapeng).
2. Shelter project in Kecamatan Masjid Raya (Desa Durung).
3. Shelter project in Kecamatan Kuta Alam (Desa Lampulo).

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	160	160	100 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	91	91	100 %
<b>Households</b>				251

**Factors Causing Delays** : Lack of funding and Information Flow









## ALISEI

[www.alisei.org](http://www.alisei.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 102 Bilat  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 18-May-06 **Duration (Months)** 8 **Committed USD** 368,162

Donor(s) : **Italian Cooperation.**

Project Title : Support for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Social Sector (Housing) in Pidie District.

### Description :

Reconstruction of 33 permanent houses (45 m<sup>2</sup>).

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	33	33	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				165
<b>Households</b>				33



## ANANDA MARGA UNIVERSAL RELIEF TEAM AMURT

[www.amurt.net](http://www.amurt.net)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 6 Bilat  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 1-Apr-05 **Duration (Months)** 68 **Committed USD** 319,726.48

Donor (s) : **AMURT (Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team); GTZ (German Technical Cooperation).**

Project Title : GTZ/AMURT Neuheun House Reconstruction Project.

### Description :

Assisting Internal Displace People's to return to their origin village. Key main activities 1) cash for work program for land clearing on the origin housing site; 2) Assessment survey and costing; 3) Public consultation; 4) Recruitment of local skilled and unskilled labors; 5) Undertake the housing reconstruction activity and Undertake the housing repairs activity.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	30	30	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	16	16	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				240
<b>Households</b>				46

**Factor Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes.

**Notes/Comments** : Economic multiplier from cash for work scheme, the villagers who sourced as skilled and unskilled labor will be involved in the reconstruction work and will be compensated on daily wage basis. The community involves and consulted actively during early project commencement.







- Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes.
- Environmental Assessment** : Special care taken to source the timber legally from sustainable managed forest. The project will aim to improve pre-tsunami existing conditions by improving the drainage system, tree planting, waste management and improving the site planning of the settlement areas.
- Social Impact Assessment** : Holistic approach used to resolve the occurred problems, including the need of project approval by the whole community, which including any relocation, land acquisition and land swap arrangements. Nevertheless, the special care taken to ensure the female household headed family addressed and treated equally.
- Notes/Comment** : Economic multiplier effect: the local communities and other local residents will be involved on their own housing unit as well as other housing units, which also including the environment rehabilitation and improvement on the basis of cash for work.











# AUSTRALIA INDONESIA PARTNERSHIP for RECONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT

## AIPRD

[www.ausaid.gov.au](http://www.ausaid.gov.au)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 273 Bilat; INFRA 399 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On -budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Mon ths)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	16-Nov-05	12	82,261,068

**Donor** : **AIPRD (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)**

**Project Title** : AIPRD Temporary Shelter Housing Technical Assistance;The report of transitional shelters per implementing partners.

**Description :**

**INFRA 273 Bilat** : AIPRD is providing AUD 2.7 m to facilitate the housing reconstruction effort and the work of donors and NGO in the sector to maximize the number of houses built in Aceh.

**INFRA 399 IN** : The report of transitional shelter's per implementing partners -AIPRD.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	87,042	87,009	99.96 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	232	232	100 %
Household				232
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,259</b>

**Environmental Assessment** : Implementing housing partners are responsible to ensure that environment assessments are conducted.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Implementing housing partners are responsible to ensure that assessments are undertaken as required. Ongoing assessments will also be conducted.

**Notes/Comments** : The unallocated fund will be expensed and allocate in response to need identified trough key NGO's – this includes future work with Gen-Assit, CRS & ARC in Meulaboh, Calang and Pulo Aceh.



# AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS

www.redcross.org.au

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 197 IN; INFRA 212 IN; INFRA 213 IN; INFRA 409 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
(INFRA 197 IN)	01-Feb-05	12	1,500,000
(INFRA 212 IN)	26-Jan-06	23	5,343,511.45
(INFRA 213 IN)	01-May-07	20	2,556,096
(INFRA 409 IN)	01-Jan-06	12	2,788,000

Donor(s) : **Australian Red Cross; IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : 1. Australian Red Cross Sirombu Village community reconstruction project.  
 2. Simeulue Island Community Based Construction (CPR52).  
 3. Simeulue Island Reconstruction - Sinabang City Housing (CPR53).  
 4. The Report of Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

- INFRA 197 IN** : Sirombu, Lahewa and Apulu were severely damaged by the 26th December 2004 Tsunami and the 28th March 2005 Earthquake causing loss of life, and destruction of entire villages. The project has been designed to reconstruction homes, first aid centers, schools, water systems and bridges to rebuild the entire community and to assist the local residents in returning to their normal way of life.
- INFRA 212 IN** : This project aims to support local communities to rebuild 2000 unit plus houses in various areas of the island including remote communities in Simeulue Island using local labors.
- INFRA 213 IN** : This project aims to rebuild at least 250 houses in Sinabang City, Simeulue Island, for those families whose dwellings were destroyed by the earthquake of March 2005.
- INFRA 409 IN** : The Report of Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners - Australian Red Cross.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	637	637	100 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	1,182	455	38.49 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>3,497</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Human Resources; Land titling; other.

**Environmental Assessment** : 1. Reconstruction project has minimal effect on environment as environmentally friendly products are being used. The houses are being built, where possible, between the trees in order to preserve as much of the natural environment as possible.  
 2. Assessments are being conducted to ensure a minimal adverse impact on the environment. Communities are being consulted to take into account local conditions and design preferences.

**Social Impact Assessment** : 1. Community consultation was carried out prior to housing construction, to ensure they meet the beneficiaries' requirements. The houses that are being built represent their needs and wants of beneficiaries and local community members.  
 2. The incorporation of various aspects of the program seek enhance the positive impact of the project on communities.









# BANAU

**Reference Number** : INFRA 432 LN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01-Jan-06                              12                              756,000

Donor(s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners – BANAU.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab, SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	121	121	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				189
<b>Households</b>				121





# BRR SATKER Housing and Settlement Reconstruction Project Units

www.brr.g.o.id

**Reference Number** :  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** **Duration (Months)** **Committed USD**  
 26-Dec-05

Donor(s) : **BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD - Nias).**

Project Title : Housing Reconstruction.

**Description :**

: Reconstruction of 36 squares meter houses in NAD-Nias.

**Key Performance Indicators(August 2008)**

DISTRICT	PROVIDER	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
ACEH BARAT	SATKER ADB	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	500	450	90.00%
ACEH BESAR	SATKER ADB	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	969	604	62.33%
BANDA ACEH	SATKER ADB	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	943	893	94.70%
SABANG	SATKER ADB	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	108	108	100.00%
ACEH BARAT	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	440	432	98.18%
ACEH BARAT DAYA	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	119	119	100.00%
ACEH BESAR	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	332	289	87.05%
ACEH SELATAN	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	87	0	0.00%
ACEH TIMUR	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	304	214	70.39%
ACEH UTARA	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	357	291	81.51%
BANDA ACEH	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	2619	2147	81.98%
BIREUEN	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1700	1617	95.12%
LHOKSEUMAWE	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	203	185	91.13%
NAGAN RAYA	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	276	272	98.55%
PIDIE	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	667	510	76.46%
SABANG	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	49	0	0.00%
SIMEULUE	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	838	0	0.00%
SINGKIL	SATKER MDF	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	69	0	0.00%
ACEH JAYA	SATKER BPPK CALANG	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	4	4	100.00%
ACEH BARAT	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	460	387	84.13%
ACEH BARAT DAYA	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	489	489	100.00%
ACEH BESAR	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1553	1295	83.39%
ACEH JAYA	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	583	441	75.64%
ACEH SELATAN	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	838	640	76.37%
ACEH TAMIANG	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	200	200	100.00%
ACEH UTARA	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	46	46	100.00%
BANDA ACEH	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	3273	2605	79.59%
BIREUEN	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	298	298	100.00%
LHOKSEUMAWE	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	163	163	100.00%
NAGAN RAYA	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	149	149	100.00%
PIDIE	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	469	469	100.00%
SIMEULUE	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	765	727	95.03%
SINGKIL	SATKER BPPK NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1250	212	16.96%
ACEH SELATAN	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL II	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	5	0	0.00%
ACEH UTARA	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL II	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	150	0	0.00%
BIREUEN	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL II	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	176	0	0.00%

DISTRICT	PROVIDER	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
PIDIE	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL II	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	170	0	0.00%
ACEH BARAT	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL IV	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	448	0	0.00%
ACEH BARAT DAYA	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL IV	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	101	0	0.00%
NAGAN RAYA	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL IV	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	125	0	0.00%
BARAT DAYA	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL V	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	60	0	0.00%
ACEH SELATAN	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL V	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	833	0	0.00%
ACEH TENGGARA	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL V	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	0	0.00%
SINGKIL	SATKER BPPK REGIONAL V	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	500	0	0.00%
SIMEULUE	SATKER BPPK SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	465	0	0.00%
ACEH BESAR	SATKER BSBT (PP)	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	422	422	100.00%
BANDA ACEH	SATKER BSBT (PP)	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	41	41	100.00%
PIDIE	SATKER BSBT (PP)	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	60	60	100.00%
ACEH BARAT	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	150	150	100.00%
ACEH BESAR	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	879	879	100.00%
ACEH SELATAN	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	130	130	100.00%
ACEH UTARA	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	200	200	100.00%
BANDA ACEH	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1197	1147	95.82%
BIREUEN	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	260	260	100.00%
BIREUEN	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	250	250	100.00%
NAGAN RAYA	SATKER NAD	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	150	150	100.00%
Various Kabupaten	Variant Programmes	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	9,381	10,980	
<b>Households</b>					<b>37,773</b>





<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 313 IN; INFRA 408 IN; INFRA 314 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 313 IN)</b>	02-May-05	38	40,609,000
<b>INFRA 408 IN)</b>	02-May-05	44	11,479,312
<b>INFRA 314 IN)</b>	01-Jan-06	12	624,000

**Donor(s)** : Danish Red Cross; DEC-UK(UK Disaster Emergency Committee); British Red Cross; IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)

**Project Title** : 1. CPL 22 - Livelihoods Program in Aceh Jaya.  
2. PL15 - Livelihoods Initiative Pilot in Aceh (Pula Aceh, Lhoong and Peukan Bada).  
3. The Report of Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners.

**Description :**

- INFRA 313 IN** : Working with the PMI, the program aims at providing a holistic and people centered response to support the longer term recovery and rehabilitation of Tsunami affected communities in Aceh Jaya. Initial focus will be given to the sub-districts of Calang.
- INFRA 408 IN** : Working with local communities, PMI and other stakeholders to enable the re-establishment of livelihoods and to construct earthquake resistant houses for the families and communities affected by the Tsunami on Pulau Aceh.
- INFRA 314 IN** : The Report of Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners - British Red Cross.

**Key Performance Indicators (August-2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	1,912	1,912	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	300	300	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Physical progress for temporary houses built	200	200	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>8,902</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Land titling and Human Resources and other.

**Environmental Assessment** : Environmental assessments have been undertaken prior to intervention. Special emphasis is being given to ensuring that program activities, particularly in construction which causes the minimum damage toward the environment.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Social impact assessments have been carried out and the approach emphasis's that the involved communities will take full responsibility for their own development. The program will therefore not develop livelihoods on behalf of the Tsunami affected families.







# BUILDING BRIDGES TO THE FUTURE

[www.buildingbridgestothefuture.org](http://www.buildingbridgestothefuture.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>INFRA 334 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		5-Feb-05	18	406,000

Donor(s) : **Private Funds.**

Project Title : Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Rumpet Village, Sub - District of Jaya, District of Aceh Jaya of Rumpet Village, Sub-District of Jaya, District of Aceh Jaya.

### Description :

To reconstruct the village of Rumpet this had been totally destroyed due to the earthquake and tsunami. The beneficiary of this project is the remaining survivors of tsunami in the village. The main activities are the reconstruction of 52 units of houses, woman center, Meunasah (Small Mosque), septic system and water supply to each house, capacity building and community support activities, and livelihood programs. All project designs and monitoring is conducted by our internal staffs and all procurements and construction management projects are fully contracted through the local competitive bidding process.


### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	52	52	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>52</b>

**Environmental Assessment** : To create healthy environment.

**Social Impact Assessment** : To promote self esteem and self sufficient. It also generate income activities.









# C

## DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS

Canadian Red Cross

Cardi / NRC

CARE International Indonesia

Caritas Czech Republic

Caritas Czech Republic; Flora Fauna Indonesia

Caritas Sibolga

Caritas Switzerland

Catholic Organization For Relief & Development Aid (CORDAID)

Catholic Relief Services

China Charity Federation

Church World Services (CWS)

Community Habitat Finance

Concern Worldwide

Cordia Medan











# CARITAS CZECH REPUBLIC

[www.charita.cz](http://www.charita.cz)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 364 IN; INFRA 410 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 364 IN	01-May-06	8	510,961.73
INFRA 410 IN	01-Jan-06	12	120,000

Donor : Caritas Germany; Trocaire (Ireland); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

Project Title : 1. Reconstruction of 58 Houses for tsunami victims in Jambo Masi and Babah Nghom Aceh Jaya.  
2. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

**Description :**

**INFRA 364 IN** : Reconstruction of 58 Unit houses in Aceh Jaya; 32 houses in Sub - Village Babah Nghom and 26 units in Jambo Masi. Project is implemented in cooperation of Caritas Czech Republic and Caritas Germany. Caritas Czech Republic is funding and implementing agency and Caritas Germany is funding agency.

**INFRA 410 IN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners - Caritas Czech Republic .

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	58	58	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	30	30	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>88</b>







# CARITAS CZECH REPUBLIC; FLORA FAUNA INDONESIA FFI

[www.fauna-flora.org](http://www.fauna-flora.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 135 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01-Aug-05                              23                              379,746

Donor(s) : Hilfswerk Austria; Trocaire (Ireland).

Project Title : Rebuilding sustainable livelihoods based on small-scale enterprise and houses reconstruction support in Lamno Sub-district, Aceh Jaya.

### Description :

Establishment of small scale enterprises, which comprising building material production to support housing reconstruction; agricultural processing enterprises and other appropriate small scale enterprises. The project also assisting the post-tsunami reconstruction of Meudang Ghon Village by building 60 earthquake resistant permanent houses, using environmentally sustainable construction materials that provided by local micro-enterprises. In response to the environmentally-sound development, the reconstruction also integrated with waste water treatment.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	30	30	100%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				210
<b>Households</b>				30





# CARITAS SIBOLGA

[www.caritas-sibolga.blogspot.com](http://www.caritas-sibolga.blogspot.com)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 274 LN; INFRA 360 LN; INFRA 411 IN; INFRA 493 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 274 LN	01-Mar-05	19	370,370
INFRA 360 LN	01-Jul-06	18	1,061,728
INFRA 411 IN	29-Mar-06	7	171,721
INFRA 493 IN	01-Mar-07	10	406,517

Donor(s) : **Caritas Austria; Caritas Italy; IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : 1. Sirombu Housing Project.  
2. Earthquake Relief Housing Project Mandrehe.  
3. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.  
4. Housing Reconstruction for Earthquake Victims.

#### Description :

- 50 unit housing reconstruction for Tsunami Victims.
- Caritas Sibolga is building houses for earthquake victims in Sirombu and Mandrehe Sub-districts.
- The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners - Caritas Keuskupan Sibolga.
- Caritas Keuskupan Sibolga is reconstructing permanent houses for 37 families who became victims of March 2005 earthquake whom lost their previous houses.

#### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	256	172	67.19 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	126	126	100 %

**Factors Causing Delays** : Building Materials.

**Environmental Assessment** : Caritas Sibolga conducted environmental assessment. Based on the results, it should be okay to build in the areas.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Caritas Sibolga conducted social impact assessment and later will carry out social, livelihood projects in the future.

**Notes/Comments** : Caritas Sibolga finished the assessment and received approval letter from each Village leaders. Right now, no house has been built.



# CARITAS SWITZERLAND

[www.caritas.ch](http://www.caritas.ch)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 161 IN; INFRA 250 IN; INFRA 412 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 161 IN	30-Sep-05	34	14,500,000
INFRA 250 IN	30-Sep-05	34	7,500,000
INFRA 412 IN	01-Jan-06	10	405,000

Donor (s) : Caritas Network; CH Solidarity Chain; IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

Project Title : 1. Resettlement and House Reconstruction Project Aceh Barat.  
2. Resettlement and House Reconstruction Project Aceh Singkil.  
3. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

**INFRA 161 IN** : Resettlement and reconstruction of 1265 houses for 3 villages (Suak Indrapuri, Pasir and Padang Seurahet) in Meulaboh. The three villages and most of the houses were completely destroyed by the Tsunami. The local authorities decided that the houses cannot be reconstructed on the former site and will have to be relocated to other areas. Desired outcomes: 1,265 families have a home and live in a suitable location to their needs and according to their own will. Main activities: assessments with the families, development of a standard (development in communication with the people, with variations so as the families can choose, but within standards of 45 squares meter permanent shelter, subject to conditions and land suitability), participation by the villages in cooperation with the local authorities for village planning. Supervising contractor work to monitor the overall construction process.

**INFRA 250 IN** : Resettlement and reconstruction of 559 houses for 3 villages (Takai Pasir, Teluk Ambun, Siti Ambia) in Singkil on self helped basis (material and technical assistance provided by Caritas, and all technical works delivered by the communities) by working collaboratively with existing village structures. Integrated approach, including Water and sanitation and livelihood as well as disaster preparedness intervention. Why :With the aftershock on 28th March 2005, the (existing) problem of flooding increased dramatically. Desired Outcome : 600 families a home to live in a suitable and livable location to their needs and according to their own will. Main activities: assessments with the families, development of standard (development in communication with the people, with variation so as the families can choose, but within standard 45 squares meter wooden structure), participation by the villages in cooperation with the local authorities for the village planning to determine the new resettlement structure. Capacity building for carpenters in the village in order to improve their construction skill and techniques.

**INFRA 412 IN** : In cooperation with IFRC, Caritas Switzerland had the lead in the erection of 126 temporary shelters in Padang Seurahet and Suak Indrapuri. IFRC provides the materials and reimburse the whole amount expenses to Caritas Switzerland, including the labors cost and plywood and gables material expenditures. In delivering this activity, Caritas Switzerland has developed a close cooperation with several NGOs such as CRS, CWS, and Solidarites for the water and sanitation, and also a collaborative action with UNDP for the site preparation and waste management, and gain a support from BRR for the electricity connection. Camp management is made based on the community participatory approach to ensure that the camp is able run smoothly and become a decent temporary settlement for the beneficiaries.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	309	139	44.98 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of relocated houses built	1,041	703	67.53 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	126	126	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>11,236</b>
<b>Households</b>				<b>1,846</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Materials, Land titling; other.

**Environmental Assessment** : Caritas Switzerland is very much concerned about avoiding any negative environmental impacts and therefore closely works together with the national partner NGO YEL (Yayasan Ecosistem Lestari foundation for a sustainable ecosystem) to be advised on those EIA issues.

**Social Impact Assessment** : To avoid any negative social impacts, Caritas Switzerland applies a community- based and participatory approach (employ a social anthropologist). The people who will be relocated are very much involved in the planning and implementing process.





<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>EDUC 232 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		01-Apr-05	37	25,677,254

Donor (s) : **CORDAID the Netherland; Secours Catholique; SHO/HFH Netherlands; Trocaire; Asian Development Bank (ADB).**

Project Title : Community Development Program.

3,593,400

**Description :**

Community Development programme which is reconstruction of housing and school as a driven -force. Objectives of it programme are to strengthen the communities resilience capacity. The programme will achieve through livelihood intervention, health promotion, gender equity and other priorities issues raised, identified and prioritize by the community.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	1,050	648	61.71 %
Various Kabupaten in East Coast	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	377	377	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>1,427</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Human Resources; Materials; Other.

**Environmental Assessment** : Community behaviors.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Security situation in the area.





# CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

CRS

www.crs.org

**Reference Number : CROSS 3 IN; CROSS 5 IN; INFRA 195 IN; CROSS 2 IN; CROSS 4 IN; INFRA 226 IN; INFRA 227 IN; INFRA 228 IN; INFRA 193 IN; INFRA 230 IN**

Project Type	Start Date	Duration (Months)	Committed USD
Project Type	On-budget		
CROSS 3 IN	11-Jan-05	36	733,500
CROSS 5 IN	18-Mar-05	34	2,323,546
INFRA 195 IN	01-Jun-05	22	2,618,000
CROSS 2 IN	08-Nov-05	26	1,772,468
CROSS 4 IN	18-Mar-05	31	7,276,000
INFRA 226 IN	01-Jan-06	19	1,607,300
INFRA 227 IN	01-Sep-05	19	964,830
INFRA 228 IN	01-Nov-05	26	3,593,400
INFRA 193 IN	01-Nov-05	18	2,250,000
INFRA 230 IN	01-Jul-05	29	19,710,000
	01-Jan-06	12	3,060,000

Donor(s) : **CRS (Catholic Relief Service); Temporary Shelter Project – INFRA 230: (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

- Project Title :
1. Reconstruction of Gurah Village
  2. Reconstruction of the Village Lam Lumpu
  3. Provision of 272 units of Permanent House in Nagan Raya District
  4. Reconstruction of the Village of Mon Ikeun
  5. Reconstruction of the Villages of Lampuyang Palo and Blang Situngkoh on Pulo Aceh
  6. Reconstruction of Punge Blang Cut Village
  7. Reconstruction of Rima Jeuneu Village
  8. Reconstruction of Rukoh Village
  9. Provision of 1399 Units of Permanent House in Aceh Barat District
  10. Reconstruction and Road Repairs in Alue Naga Village
  11. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners

### Description :

- CROSS 3 IN** : In accordance with signed MOU with Village leader, Camat and Bupati CRS has constructed temporary shelters in the village of Gurah and provided sanitation facilities. The project is contracted to the 4 construction company.
- CROSS 5 IN** : In accordance with written request of the Village leader, CRS has signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Camat and the Bupati to completely reconstruct the village. CRS has started to reconstruct 272 permanent homes in Lam Lumpu Village.
- INFRA 195 IN** : CRS is complying government requests on earthquake proof house design consulting and communicating all activities with relevant government agencies including Village leaders, Camat, Bupati, Dinas Cipta Karya, Bappeda and Dinas Kehutanan (Forestry Department). The housing construction is delivered by the contractors and the monitoring and evaluation will be done by CRS Construction Supervision Officer, community liaison and by the communities.
- CROSS 2 IN** : In accordance with signed MOU with Village leaders CRS is soliciting bids for contractor for permanent house reconstruction in Mon Ikun village. CRS will also provide temporary shelters for the villagers who still living under tents.
- CROSS 4 IN** : In accordance with signed MOU with Village leaders Camat and Bupati, CRS has constructed temporary shelters on the island and provided boat transportation for the villagers and contracted with 5 local construction firms to immediately commence the construction activities.
- INFRA 226 IN** : CRS will rebuild 240 permanent houses 100 temporary shelter and other damaged infrastructure (i.e. clinics drainage system etc.) as well as support the economy through livelihoods programming and by employing local laborers.
- INFRA 227 IN** : CRS will rebuild 163 permanent houses and other damaged infrastructure (i.e. mosque water/sanitation system etc.) as well as support the economy through livelihoods programming and by employing local laborers
- INFRA 228 IN** : CRS will rebuild 287 permanent houses and other damaged infrastructure (i.e. mosque water/sanitation system etc.) as well as support the economy through livelihoods programming and by employing local laborers.
- INFRA 193 IN** : CRS is complying government requests on earthquake proof house design consulting and communicating all activities with relevant government agencies including Village leaders, Camat, Bupati, Dinas Cipta Karya, Bappeda and Dinas Kehutanan (Forestry Department). The housing construction is delivered by the contractors and the monitoring and evaluation will be done by CRS Construction Supervision Officer, community liaison and by the communities.
- INFRA 230 IN** : Alue Naga Village suffered significant damage after the earthquake and tsunami of 2004. In response to requests from local government officials CRS agreed to help rebuild the village. CRS is contracting with local construction firms to build 499 permanent homes in accordance with the Department of Public Works's design guidelines. Water and sanitation is also included in the construction contract; water supply and distribution systems have been budgeted for as needed if saline intrusion has significantly damaged the aquifer. Complete topographic and site survey plans will be completed and a full master plan with escape routes and improved roadway alignment will be prepared as needed and submitted for approval. The design and construction of a new mosque and a temporary multipurpose building as well as repairs/construction of other damaged infrastructure are also included in the project plan. In addition CRS will repair the main southerly road into Alue Naga which was heavily damaged in the disaster. In the short term CRS is supporting the local economy by employing residents to construct the multipurpose building through its cash-for-work program. Contractors are also required to employ village labor to the maximum extent possible. In the longer term the agency is developing Livelihoods programs to help the residents of Alue Naga Village regroup and move forward.
- INFRA 458 LN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners-CRS.



**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses repaired	7	7	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	5,313	5,149	96.78 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	3,092	3,092	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				24,831
<b>Households</b>				6,674

**Environmental Assessment** : New water supply development, new community sewer system treatment and discharge, and new alignment and widening of village roads should be carefully planned to minimize and avoid.

**Social Impact Assessment** : No social problems or issues of concern are anticipated unless project implementation is significantly delayed.







<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 114 IN; INFRA 256 IN; INFRA 381 IN; INFRA 393 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Mont hs)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 114 IN	01-Apr-05	33	7,928,906
INFRA 256 IN	01-Aug-05	22	701,000
INFRA 381 IN	01-Jan-06	12	1,065,918
INFRA 393 IN	01-Dec-06	8	344,785

Donor(s) : **ACT International (Action by Churches Together Alliances).**

- Project Title :
1. Village reconstruction in Nias Emergency And Recovery Program – CWS Indonesia.
  2. Village reconstruction in Meue and Cot Lheu Rheng Villages, Pidie Regency.
  3. Asia Earthquake and Tsunami (ASRE51).
  4. Housing Program for Reudeup Village, Pante Raja Sub District, Pidie Regency.

**Description :**

- INFRA 114 IN** : To Build and Rehabilitation community houses affected by earthquake. The purpose of this program is to help peoples who have lost their houses after quake in Nias Island. This program also underpin with other additional support activities such as access to safe water and sanitation, improved health sanitation education and livelihood activities is an integrated part of the housing reconstruction scheme.
- INFRA 256 IN** : To Build and Rehabilitation community houses affected by earthquake in Pidie Regency.
- INFRA 381 IN** : This program aimed to support the permanent houses rehabilitation for 138 tsunami affected households in Kuala Tadu Village, Nagan Raya Regency.
- INFRA 393 IN** : This program aimed to assist the group of the vulnerable community in shelter sector in Reudup Village, Pante Raja sub district of Pidie Regency.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	692	664	95.95 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				2,231
<b>Households</b>				1,676

**Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Land titling; Human Resources; Materials;

- Environmental Assessment** :
1. The main material i.e. timber is transported from Medan. This effort was undertaken in order to avoid any illegal logging activities in the surrounding vicinity. The location of houses is built in the existing areas where the location is relatively far from the sea.
  2. Close in coordination with of community level to create the much healthy human-settlement environment.

- Social Impact Assessment** :
1. The type of building was determined of the community through active participation during the community meetings.
  2. The housing program provided a basic needs for the tsunami affected community as they are living on the temporary shelter.
  3. The project implemented through Community Based Organization in order to raise the sense of belonging among the beneficiaries.





# COMMUNITY HABITAT FINANCE

## CHF INTERNATIONAL

[www.chfinternational.org](http://www.chfinternational.org)

**Reference Number :** INFRA 267 IN; INFRA 271 IN; INFRA 283 IN; INFRA 284 IN; INFRA 285 IN; INFRA 286 IN; INFRA 362 IN; INFRA 378 IN; INFRA 438 IN

Project Type	Start Date	Duration (Months)	Committed USD
Project Type			On-budget
INFRA 267 IN	25-Jan-06	9	459,019
INFRA 271 IN	19-Jan-06	9	461,781
INFRA 283 IN	15-Mar-06	7	704,935
INFRA 284 IN	15-Mar-06	7	745,414
INFRA 285 IN	15-Mar-06	7	724,428
INFRA 286 IN	15-Mar-06	7	382,174
INFRA 362 IN	15-Jul-06	4	830,000
INFRA 378 IN	05-Sep-06	3	430,000
INFRA 438 IN	15-Dec-06	7	900,000

Donor(s) : **DRI (Direct Relief International), USA; USAID (United States Agency for International Development).**

- Project Title :
1. Construction of permanent housing in Pulot Village, Leupung Sub-district, Aceh Besar as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  2. Construction of permanent housing in Geumbak Meualon Hamlet, Mon Ikeun Village, Lhoknga Sub-district, Aceh Besar as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh)
  3. Construction of permanent housing in Darat Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  4. Construction of permanent housing in Gle Jong Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  5. Construction of permanent housing in Meunasah Tutong Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  6. Construction of permanent housing in Lambaro Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  7. Construction of permanent housing in Teumareum Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  8. Construction of permanent housing in Babah le Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.
  9. Construction of permanent housing in Krueng Tunong Village, Jaya Sub-district, Aceh Jaya as part of the High Impact Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE-Aceh) program.

### Description :

Over a twenty-four month period, CHF International's HIRE-Aceh (which is funded in large part by USAID) will respond to the most urgent needs of earthquake-tsunami victims in Nanggroe Aceh-Darussalam (NAD) Province. HIRE-Aceh especially targets communities in the districts Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Banda Aceh who are in need of houses, basic infrastructure and livelihood assistance. CHF will provide full funding for and manage design and construction individual permanent housing units and will also provide electrical and plumbing subsystems within each house and external connections for utilities (water, sanitation, electricity), but not for electricity power supply. For community wide infrastructure CHF will assist the community in obtaining community mapping and planning services, and redevelopment of public facilities such as utilities, roads, drainage, footpaths, and street lights. CHF has assisted the community in forming a Community Resettlement Committee. CHF will identify and develop opportunities to assist village residents in obtaining technical and financial support for livelihoods activities.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	57	57	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	65	65	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	90	90	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	87	87	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	87	87	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	46	46	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	99	99	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	59	59	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	121	121	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	146	141	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>2,730</b>





**Factors Causing Delays** : Human Resources; Landtitling.

**Environmental Assessment** : I. During the entire process of preparation, as well as, during the implementation period, CHF is giving a high level of awareness to environment, in order not to violate or destruct the environmental conditions where the houses are located or the surrounding vicinity.





# CONCERN WORLDWIDE

[www.concern.net](http://www.concern.net)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 359 LN</b>			
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget			
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>	
<b>CROSS 6 IN</b>	01-Jan-05	31	9,072,575.31	
<b>INFRA 29 IN</b>	01-Apr-05	18	274,182.72	

Donor(s) : **Concern Worldwide; DEC -UK (UK Disaster Emergency Committee); Development Cooperation Ireland**

Project Title : 1. Concern Simeulue Shelter Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Programme.  
2. Pulau Nasi – Shelter Reconstruction.

### Description :

- CROSS 6 IN** : The project will provide semi-permanent housing and water and sanitation facilities for up to 1187 families living in 14 Tsunami affected villages in Simeulue Island. The house construction uses an alternative building materials such as coconut timber and cement fiber boards cladding.
- INFRA 29 IN** : The project will contribute to the reconstruction of infrastructure & shelter for tsunami affected household in Pulau Nasi Island.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	1,111	1,111	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	75	75	100 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	19	19	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	21	21	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				6,585
<b>Households</b>				1,226

**Factors Causing Delays** : Land titling; Materials; Other.

**Environmental Assessment** : In the Short run, the building work will have a negative impact on the environment during the course of construction. Nevertheless, the project should have the following positive impacts in improving the drainage of Rain & Waste Water and establishing a system and proper treatment facility for disposal of human waste.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Concern will Endeavour to minimize these problems through its Participative Rural Appraisal initiative (PRA). This program will identify and map community strengths and weaknesses prior to the construction implementation.

**Notes/Comments** : Economic multiplier : Communities will be re-established with their housing assets. Short term construction work expected to have knock-on effect on stimulating local enterprises & income generation sector.





# CORDIA MEDAN

www.cordia.or.id

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 351 LN; INFRA 352 LN; INFRA 353 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 351 LN	01-May-06	8	634,567.90
INFRA 353 LN	15-May-06	8	554,320.99
INFRA 352 LN	04-Dec-06	9	383,950.62

Donor(s) : **Caritas Germany; Caritas Austria.**

- Project Title :
1. Reconstruction of 52 houses for the lepers victims of the Tsunami - Gampong Kuala Keureu to Barat.
  2. Reconstruction of 59 houses for the lepers victims of the Tsunami - Meue Village in the district of Trieng Gadeng.
  3. Reconstruction of 35 houses for the lepers victims of the Tsunami - Dusun Po Diamat Alue Naga Village in the district of Syiah Kuala Banda Aceh.

### Description :

- INFRA 351 LN** : Housing reconstruction for 52 families for the leprosy community in the village of Kuala Keureuto Barat Sub-district of Tanah Pasir. Reconstruction process was made through village development where the leprosy community develops their own understanding and responsibility to develop peace and harmony environment and at the same time strengthen their creativity and sense of togetherness. Community Action Plan (CAP) performs in the village during the initial phase as a basis of village planning. Community participates through out the overall program cycle.
- INFRA 352 LN** : Housing reconstruction for 59 leprosy family in the relocation area of the village of Meue the Sub-district of Trieng Gadeng. The reconstructions aim is to develop the leprosy community in the area. Community involvement through out the process is strongly motivated. Project implemented by the local partner in order to develop local capacity, and construction will be undertaken by a small scale local contractor which encourage to use a local labor and local material to support the local economy recovery. Village committee is establishing as the representative of the community. Community is motivated to participate in decision making and designing process. Community Action Plan program is implemented in the early stage of the project and community is highly motivated to participate in disaster preparedness activities and village infrastructure design.
- INFRA 353 LN** : The third housing reconstruction project for the leper's community. Community development through housing reconstruction program for 34 family of the leprosy community in dusun Po Diamat located at Alue Naga Village district of Syiah Kuala in the city of Banda Aceh. Community is encouraged to participate through all decision making process. Village committee as the community representative is established during the program together with the community action plan by CAP – Cipta Aksi Partecipatif, a local NGO in community development sector. A workshop held for the community to gather their vision, initiative and inspiration in relation to their village development; resource management and disaster preparedness. Housing design and infrastructure planning adjusted according to the location suitability. With a complexity condition of the area proper coordination among other stakeholders is needed to prevent future possibility for any disaster - communities is informed with the real situation. The communities will involved in the process and as much as possible, local material and local labor will be used during the reconstruction in order to support local economy recovery. Funds are allocated for the housing reconstruction for the Dusun while water and sanitation and other infrastructures are coordinated with other organizations which working in those sectors particularly in village of Alue Naga.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	52	52	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	59	59	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	35	35	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	47	41	87.23 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>193</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Human Resources; Other.

**Environmental Assessment** : Community has been involved through out the process of program planning. Consequences of drainage waste resource and disaster management has also been discuss during the CAP (Community Action Planning) workshop in the village and has been included as part of the village planning.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Community participate approach for the reconstruction of their houses is considered to form the basis of re-establishing the social cohesiveness of the society.

**Notes/Comments** : Caritas is committed to develop the houses for the leprosy community with the coordination of BRR in relation to the water and sanitation and access of roads (infrastructure) trough CAP (community action plan) system.








**D**

**DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS**

**Deniz Feneri Dernegi**

**Dinas Perumahan dan Permukiman**





# DENİZ FENERİ DERNEĞİ

[www.denizfeneri.org.tr](http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 354 IN; INFRA 355 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	13-Apr-05	6	540,000
	22-Apr-05	15	36,000

Donor(s) : **Deniz Feneri Derneği.**

Project Title : 1. Building semi-permanent houses for tsunami victims in Lamno, Aceh Jaya Regency.  
2. Ulee Titi Teachers Housing Project.

### Description :

**INFRA 354 IN** : Semi-permanent housing reconstruction for tsunami victim in Lamno. 180 unit houses have been completed it will accommodate 680 people.

**INFRA 355 IN** : Housing reconstruction project for teachers in Ulee-titi, Aceh Utara Regency.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	180	180	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	10	10	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				717
<b>Households</b>				190

Factors Causing Delays : Government of Indonesia processes.







# DINAS PERUMAHAN DAN PERMUKIMAN

[www.kimpraswil.go.id](http://www.kimpraswil.go.id)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 361 GI; INFRA 369 GI</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 361 GI</b>	01-Jan-05	24	5,168,400
<b>INFRA 369 GI</b>	01-Jan-05	23	5,468,000

Donor(s) : **MDF (Multi Donor Fund).**

Project Title : 1. PILOT PROYEK CSRPP Tahun 2005.  
2. DIPA 2005 di Kota Banda Aceh.

### Description :

**INFRA 361 GI** : Pilot Project - Housing Reconstruction Project in Aceh for Post-Tsunami affected communities .  
**INFRA 369 GI** : Housing Reconstruction Project in 4 villages within 6 districts of Banda Aceh City.

### Key Performance Indicators (July 2007) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	839	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	87	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH SINGKIL	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	69	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	50	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH SELATAN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	87	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH TIMUR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	304	68	22.37 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	187	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	339	0	0 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	245	7	2.86 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	39	32	82.05 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	1,427	137	9.60 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	1,513	113	7.47 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	357	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	133	51	38.35 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT DAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	37	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	148	0	0 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	276	126	45.65 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	372	16	4.30 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	2,642	1,181	44.70 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	2,996	2,419	80.74 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	203	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	113	0	0 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	824	712	86.41 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of lightly damaged house(s)	810	810	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>14,097</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Land titling; Human Resources; Lack of Information; Other.











# EMERGENCY ARCHITECTS (ARCHITECTES DE L'URGENCE)

[www.emergencyarchitects.org.au](http://www.emergencyarchitects.org.au)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 31 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 03-Jan-05      **Duration (Months)** 14      **Committed USD** 2,943,948.89

**Donor(s)** : **Foundation de France; French Government / Embassy; Private Funds.**

**Project Title** : Housing – Reconstruction.

## Description :

Provide permanent shelter for Internal Displace Peoples in Kota Sigli. Key main activities: survey, Detail Engineering Design / master plan, Site preparation / structures, tender / direct labor (provide materials), supervision; and provide water supply, electrical supply and sanitary facilities.

## Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	543	543	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses repaired	22	0	0 %

**Environmental Assessment** : The building designed to minimize the timber usage, and every precaution step is taken to ensure that the timbers received are from a legal source.

**Social Impact Assessment** : There are no negative social impacts; only positive impact has shown significantly.

**Notes/Comments** : Builders and assistant builders, Tradesman and assistants, are employed in this project from the local labor market. All employees are source from the Internal Displace Peoples from the local areas as significant step to ensure local community support; As part of capacity building commitment, the unskilled workers are being trained by skilled workers as a knowledge transfer; it is expected that the unskilled labor will have skills in management and supervision at the end of the project implementation phase.



<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>HEAL 46 Bilat</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		12-Jan-05	57	31,693,827.16

Donor(s) : **German Development Cooperation through GTZ (German Technical Cooperation); German Development Cooperation through KfW Development Bank (German Financial Cooperation).**

Project Title : Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Zainoel Abidin Hospital Banda Aceh (Joint FC/TC).

**Description :**

FC/KfW measures : rehabilitation and reconstruction of hospital building supply of medical & other equipment - together with TC-support in optimizing organization and operation. TC/GTZ measures: focuses on strengthening hospital management efficiency and staff qualification.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	31	31	100%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				62
<b>Households</b>				31

**Notes/Comments** : Local community support: Planning was done involving the partners from MoH (Bureau of Planning and Aceh Health Coordinator, Dr. Muharso). Planning workshop at Zainoel Abidin hospital involved main stakeholders, including provincial level. The progress of this project might not be appear in exact number as GTZ are doing the management capacity building and KfW doing the design construction and project coordination with Zainoel Abidin Hospital. The progress of the work can be found in the comment of each KPIs.











# FOOD for the HUNGRY INTERNATIONAL FHI

[www.fhi.net](http://www.fhi.net)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: ECON 135 IN; INFRA 413 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Apr-05	33	795,000
	01-Jan-06	12	1,300,000

Donor(s) : **CIDA (Canadian International Development Agencies); FHI Canada (Food for the Hungry Canada); FHI US (Food for the Hungry US); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : 1. Aceh Jaya Agriculture Recovery Program.  
2. The Report of Transitional Shelters Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

**ECON 135 IN** : Aceh Jaya Agriculture Recovery Program (AJARP) is designed to help farmers resume agricultural activity and to improve agricultural practices and marketing and distribution. In addition AJARP is designed to empower the local community and leaders to take ownership of improving and restoring dignity and hope to their communities.

**INFRA 413 IN** : Food for the Hungry partnered with the IFRC to provide and construct temporary shelters for 325 household in Lhok Timon, Setia Bakti in conjunction with the agriculture recovery program being implemented. Incentive payments were also given to shelter owners for their effort on building the shelters.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	325	325	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	325	325	100 %
<b>Households</b>				325



# FORDER-UND INTERRESANT GEMEINSCHAFT INDONESIA FIG

[www.FIG-Indonesia.info](http://www.FIG-Indonesia.info)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 79 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	31-Oct-05	19	1,401,234.57

Donor(s) : **Ein Herz Fuer Kinder.**

Project Title : Houses Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.

### Description :

To provide permanent house for peoples whose house lost or damage by tsunami in Kota Sabang. The types are 36 plus and 45 and made from hollow block aluzinc (aluminum zinc) truss for roof construction and color aluzinc (aluminum zinc) as roof sheet.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota SABANG	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	11	11	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of relocated houses built	117	90	76.92 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	100	95	95 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,880
<b>Households</b>				111

Factors Causing Delays : Land titling.





# FRENCH RED CROSS

[www.croix-rouge.fr](http://www.croix-rouge.fr)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 448 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	30-Nov-05	29	3,831,700

Donor (s) : **French Red Cross.**

Project Title : Housing Assistance for 306 household in Pidie District (CPR 122 / C 42).

**Description :**

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses for 306 household of Tsunami victims in Benteng, Blang Paseh and Blok Bengkel in Pidie district.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	316	316	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				10,000
<b>Households</b>				316














# GENASSIST / CRWRC

www.crwrc.org

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 48 IN; INFRA 127 IN; INFRA 327 IN; INFRA 449 IN; INFRA 459 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 48 IN</b>	01-Sep-05	16	2,130,111
<b>INFRA 127 IN</b>	01-Nov-05	26	1,030,000
<b>INFRA 327 IN</b>	01-May-06	11	1,888,368
<b>INFRA 449 IN</b>	21-May-07	11	1,632,964
<b>INFRA 459 IN</b>	01-Jan-06	12	2,576,000

**Donor(s)** : **CIDA (Canadian International Development Agencies); CRWRC (Christian Reformed World Relief Committee); MCC (Mennonite Central Committee); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

**Project Title** :

1. Permanent Shelter in Lhoong Sub -District Aceh.
2. Permanent Shelter in Blang Mee Mukim, Lhoong Sub -District, Aceh.
3. Permanent Shelter in Meunasah Lhok and Pudeng.
4. Permanent Shelter in Paro, Seungkomulat, Baroh Kruengkala, Tunong Kruengkala, Meunasah Kruengkala, Jantang, Baroh Geunteut, Teungoh Geunteut, Sukaramai, Darusalam, Indrapuri, Loeng Bata, Bineh Blang, Peukan Bada, Kaye Lee, Jabo Tape and Ulee Tuy Villages.
5. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

**INFRA 48 IN** : Construction of 525 permanent houses in 6 villages as well as water and sanitation infrastructure.

**INFRA 127 IN** : Additional fund for INFRA 48 IN-Construction of permanent housing (525 houses) as well as water and sanitation infrastructure in Lhoong Sub-District.

**INFRA 327 IN** : The goal of the project is to open the windows of opportunity and enable the community in M. Lhok and Pudeng Villages in Lhoong Sub-District who have lost their land and houses due to the 2004 tsunami disaster event, to have a decent house to live in and to live in dignity by addressing their basic priority needs by reconstructing their human settlement elements through building settlement roads; provide access to safe water and sanitation facilities.

**INFRA 449 IN** : The goal of the project is to open the windows of opportunity and enable the community in Paro, Seungkomulat, Baroh Kruengkala, Tunong Kruengkala, Meunasah Kruengkala, Jantang, Baroh Geunteut, Teungoh Geunteut, Sukaramai, Darusalam, Indrapuri, Loeng Bata, Bineh Blang, Peukan Bada, Jabo Tape, Kaye Lee and Ulee Tuy Villages in Lhoong, Baiturrahman, Peukan Bada, Kuta Alam and Darul Imarah to have a decent house to live in and to live in dignity by addressing their basic priority needs by reconstructing their human settlement elements.

**INFRA 459 IN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners - Gen Assist.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	525	525	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	17	17	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	526	526	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	118	118	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	526	526	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	118	118	100 %
Various Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	470	470	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,797</b>

**Environmental Assessment** :

1. No negative impact on the environment.
2. Special step has been undertaken to ensure that the project procured and used the legal timber from sustainable managed forest; providing the settlement with waste water drainage and water and sanitation system.

**Social Impact Assessment** :

1. Improved physical security, health and well-being of tsunami-affected people through reconstruction of housing destroyed by the disaster.
2. Increased capacity of beneficiaries to achieve sustainable livelihoods.
3. Improved social cohesion.
4. People get house as well as available income resources from constructing the houses.

**Notes/Comments** : Local community support: Village communities requested housing. Local builders will be employed.





<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 100 IN; INFRA 134 IN; INFRA 204 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 100 IN</b>	10-May-05	13	1,708,860.76
<b>INFRA 134 IN</b>	01-Aug-05	38	2,679,012.35
<b>INFRA 204 IN</b>	27-Oct-05	35	2,800,000

Donor (s) : **ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office); GAA and Hivos funds; German Development Cooperation through GTZ, Asian Development Bank.**

Project Title : 1. Semi Permanent shelter construction and shelter assistance for the tsunami and earthquake victims of Simeulue Island, Aceh, Indonesia.  
2. Supporting the recovery of shelter and livelihoods in Tsunami affected villages in the districts of Pidie and Bireuen.  
3. Supporting the recovery of shelter and livelihoods in the village Keude Pantaraja in the district of Pidie.

#### Description :

**INFRA 100 IN** : The project aim to provide shelter assistance scheme to the tsunami and earthquake affected victims in Simeulue Island with sustainable building material and environment friendly approach.

**INFRA 134 IN** : The project supports the inhabitants of two heavily tsunami -affected villages in the Districts of Pidie and Bireuen of Aceh Province in the reconstruction houses and community infrastructure as well as in the rehabilitation of livelihoods by supporting income generating activities that enable the target groups to gain (additional) income. To assure ownership and sustainability the project approach implies that the communities themselves lead the development process.

**INFRA 204 IN** : The project supports the inhabitants of Keude Pante Raja a heavily tsunami -affected village in the Districts of Pidie of Aceh Province in the reconstruction houses and community infrastructure as well as in the rehabilitation of livelihoods by supporting income generating activities that enable the target groups to gain (additional) income. To assure ownership and sustainability the project approach implies that the community themselves lead the development process.

#### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	150	150	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	310	0	0 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	106	106	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses	13	13	100 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	76	76	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses	10	10	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	287	87	30.31 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses	30	1	3.33 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	192	192	30.31 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses	66	0	0 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>3,057</b>

Factors Causing Delays : Materials; Lack of Information.





# GERMAN RED CROSS

[www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de](http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 391 IN; INFRA 392 IN; INFRA 432 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 391 IN</b>	01-Oct-05	37	8,440,051.25
<b>INFRA 392 IN</b>	17-Oct-05	36	9,499,158.70
<b>INFRA 432 IN</b>	15-Mar-05	34	2,349,900

Donor(s) : **German Red Cross .**

Project Title :  
1. Construction of private houses in Aceh Jaya - Krueng Sabee.  
2. Reconstruction of private houses in Aceh Jaya - Teunom.  
3. Reconstruction of private houses on Pulau Weh.

## Description :

- INFRA 391 IN** : The District of Aceh Jaya especially Sub-District of Krueng Sabee was severely affected when a Tsunami devastated the coast line of northern Sumatra on 26 December 2004. Among the first organizations that arrived to assist the victims were the Indonesian Red Cross with its SATGANA teams and the German Red Cross with its Emergency Response Units (ERU's). After the phase of emergency assistance, both organizations wish to continue their commitment in the District of Aceh Jaya especially in Sub-District of Krueng Sabee in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. The living space in Sub-District of Krueng Sabee is completely destroyed by tsunami and earthquake. The aim is to reconstruct a number of approximately 600 private houses and to re-establish social and economic living conditions for the villagers. 633 families have lost their homes, belongings and livelihoods by the effects of Tsunami at their places of residence. Provision of permanent housing will contribute to a notion of stability and security as well as the source for family well being. Providing a house will also encourage the development and strengthening of livelihoods and of community involvement. Direct involvement of project beneficiaries and local communities in housing construction will facilitate the emergence of social networks as well as the development of sense of community. The vast degree of devastation and the huge need for external assistance in re-habilitation and recovery have both been assessed and confirmed during several field trips and meeting with local authorities.
- INFRA 392 IN** : The District of Aceh Jaya especially Sub-District of Teunom was severely affected when a Tsunami devastated the coast line of northern Sumatra on 26 December 2004. Among the first organizations that arrived to assist the victims were the Indonesian Red Cross with its SATGANA teams and the German Red Cross with its Emergency Response Units (ERU's). After the phase of emergency assistance, both organizations wish to continue their commitment in the District of Aceh Jaya especially in Sub-District of Teunom in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. The living space in Sub-District of Teunom is completely destroyed by tsunami and earthquake. The aim is to reconstruct a number of approximately 600 private houses and to reestablish social and economic living conditions for the villagers. More than 700 families have lost their homes, belongings and livelihoods by the effects of Tsunami at their places of residence. Provision of permanent housing will contribute to a notion of stability and security as well as the source for family well being. Providing a house will also encourage the development and strengthening of livelihoods and of community involvement. Direct involvement of project beneficiaries and local communities in housing construction will facilitate the emergence of social networks as well as the development of sense of community. The vast degree of devastation and the huge need for external assistance in re-habilitation and recovery have both been assessed and confirmed during several field trips and meeting with local authorities.
- INFRA 432 IN** : The principal aim of this project is the reconstruction of devastated private houses in relocation areas. As a private house is more than merely a building, one of the key elements of the project is to induce identification of the people with their new village, their new neighborhood and their new permanent home. GRC tends to ensure the participation and engagement of the village inhabitants, by applying a community-integrated approach. The cooperation of the villagers will be enhanced with the establishment of a village-committee (Board of Representatives). Families are integrated in the decision taking process of urban settlement and housing design (creating individuality of homes) and are encouraged to participate in the execution of construction works. GRC supplementary promotes the re-development of community-spirit by providing special public areas where people can officially and informally meet and a sense of community-responsibility by conducting special training programmes of risk reduction and environmental awareness. The construction of sample houses is a helpful tool to evoke the imagination and anticipation of the beneficiaries. Besides, the sample houses will function as offices to GRC and AmCross during the time of project-implementation and later on be handed over to PMI.



### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	633	229	36.18 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	698	215	30.80 %
Kota SABANG	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	173	98	56.65 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built		852	
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				3,480
<b>Households</b>				1,504

- Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Human Resources; Materials; Land titling.
- Environmental Assessment** :
1. It has become obvious that the local resources of legally approved timber are not sufficient to meet the needs in the reconstruction of devastated infrastructure.
  2. In direct relation to the tsunami -disaster, German Red Cross follows government policies and guidelines concerning the mitigation of ecological impacts.
- Social Impact Assessment** :
1. In the pre paratory phase German Red Cross has planned information exchange and consultations on sub-district and village level.
  2. Communities will participate in planning, mapping and allocation of housing plots as well as implementation and monitoring of the project. Future house -owners will participate in the project work as planned.
  3. The approach GRC pursues for this project is community-based and naturally implies the involvement and participation of the village-inhabitants.





<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 84 Bilat</b>			
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget			
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>	
	: 28-Aug-05	41	38,750,000	

Donor(s) : **German Development Cooperation through KfW Development Bank (German Financial Cooperation).**

Project Title : Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Housing And Settlement in Aceh (RRHS).

### Description :

The RRHS programme is based on a bilateral agreement between the Indonesian and German Government which committed by March 2007 EUR 31.0 million. The objective of the programme is to finance the rehabilitation and reconstruction of up to 10,000 houses in accordance with the needs of the tsunami affected communities. In addition the programme is to finance the repair or construction of basic infrastructure in the programme communities. RRHS is implemented by GITEC Consult GmbH (Germany), executed by BRR on behalf of the Indonesian Government and financed by KfW on behalf of the German Government.

### Key Performance Indicators (July 2007) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	6905	5525	80.01 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damaged houses	175	175	100%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				30,250
<b>Households</b>				7,080

**Environmental Assessment** : Use of certified timber and less use of timber through hollow block system.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Local community actively involved in preparation an actual implementation of housing construction.

**Notes/Comments** : Subdistric Plimbang, 4 village (Padang Kasab, Seun Seumawe, Kreung Baro, Seunabok Plimbang not yet include in key performance indicator. 4 village cancelled the Memorandum of Understanding in District Aceh Besar (Cadek, Baet, Lam Asan, Labuy).



## GONG PASEE

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 91 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	13-Jun-05	4	47,416

Donor(s) : **Caritas Germany.**

Project Title : Housing Development Project for Tsunami Victims in Meunasah Sagoe Village-1st Phase.

### Description :

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of 10 permanent houses which according to local minimum standards (extendable core house type 40+ square meter). Cost estimation for each unit is approximately 2.460 €. The aid recipients shall be classified as household of tsunami affected-victims.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	10	10	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				10
<b>Households</b>				10

## GREEN CORNER

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 428 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-06	12	312,000

Donor(s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

The report of Transitional shelter's per Implementing Partners - Green Corner.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	78	78	100 %



# GRÜNHELME GREEN HELMET

**Reference Number** : INFRA 258 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
15-Jan-05                                      17                                      500,000

Donor(s) : Private Funds .  
Project Title : Pulau Kayu Village Reconstruction and Lama Muda Village Reconstruction.

### Description :

Reconstruction for 175 houses for 200 household and house rehabilitation scheme for 25 household in Pulau Kayu Village and reconstruction of 70 houses in Lama Muda Village.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT DAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	209	209	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses	37	31	83.78 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of relocated houses built	24	24	100 %
<b>Households</b>				270

**Environmental Assessment** : No negative impact.  
**Social Impact Assessment** : Positive impact by sourcing the local labor from villages.  
**Notes/Comments** : Grunhelme Green Helmets able to commence the project after master plan presentation towards district head (Bupati) in Bilang Pidie, Subject to district head approval, both parties signed the master plan and subsequently commencing the ground breaking activities. The project was one of the quickest projects in the area.

















# HABITAT FOR HUMANITY INDONESIA

## HFHI

[www.habitatindonesia.org](http://www.habitatindonesia.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 101 IN; INFRA 217 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-05	36	36,217,004
	06-Feb-06	13	390,450

Donor(s) : **Baker Mc. Kenzie; Baptist World Aid; Bintang/Heineken; Bush Clinton Tsunami Funds; Caring House; Christian Aid; Cigna Insurance; Citibank Foundation Indonesia; Danamon Bank; Dave & Mary Salomon; Disciples Of Christ; Plan International.**

Project Title : 1. Tsunami Disaster Response Project.  
2. Housing Construction in Leupung, Aceh Besar.

### Description :

**INFRA 101 IN** : Providing Community development for the community; Housing design; Housing reconstruction; Technical training and Volunteer Management.

**INFRA 217 IN** : In collaboration with Plan International, Habitat for Humanity will build 61 houses in Meunasah Mesjid Village, Leupung Sub-district of Aceh Besar Regency.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	4865	4865	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>5,002</b>





# HELP e.V. HILFE zur SELBSTHILFE

www.helpev.de

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 156 IN; INFRA 348 IN; INFRA 430 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	04-May-06	15	1,582,278.48
	01-Mar-06	13	548,303.33
	01-Apr-06	8	638,338.27

Donor (s) : **ADH (Aktion Deutschland Hilft); ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) – Australia.**

Project Title : 1. Reconstruction And Rehabilitation Of The Village Kuala Keureutou Timur Sub-District Tanah Pasir Lhokseumawe Sumatra - Housing-Project.  
2. Housing Construction For Susoh Sub-District, Abdya Regency.  
3. Reconstruction Of Houses In Muzoi.

**Description :**

- INFRA 156 IN** : Reconstruction of 206 unit houses of Type 36 in Kuala Keureutou Timur.
- INFRA 348 IN** : The project is aimed to provide permanent shelter for tsunami affected people in Susoh Sub-District, which cover 4 villages of Padang Baru (Ujong Serangga and Samudera), Kedai Palak Kerambil, Kedai Susoh, Panjang Baru. List of beneficiaries were provided by Local Authorities. Subsequent to field cross-check, it is found that there are 98 families who need a shelter assistance as their former ones were destroyed by tsunami and earthquake 2004 and 2005. Help e.V. built new houses right on their originated site. However beneficiaries in Ujong Serangga need to be relocated as their old village land belongs to the Local Fishery Department and the location will be used for public purpose. New location, 11.248 m<sup>2</sup> width is already provided by Local Government in Ladang Village of Susoh Sub-District.
- INFRA 430 IN** : The project is aimed to reconstruct 70 houses and to rehabilitate 39 houses in Luaha Muzoi and its sub-villages Tourezouliko Wani and Sigete.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	829	332	40.04 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damage houses	249	0	0 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>610</b>

**Social Impact Assessment** : In the project, local human resources will be employed and beneficiaries will be actively involved in their house construction process. The beneficiaries working shift will be arranged in a schedule according to their availability.

## HELP ORGANIZATION

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 429 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-06	12	28,000

Donor (s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), Asian Development Bank (ADB).**

Project Title : Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners.

**Description :**

Report of Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners - HELP Organization.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	7	7	100 %
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	449	124	27,62%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>456</b>
<b>House holds</b>				<b>456</b>











# INTERNATIONAL BLUE CRESCENT RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

[www.ibc.org.tr](http://www.ibc.org.tr)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 264 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 01-May-05 **Duration (Months)** 15 **Committed USD** 2,100,000

Donor(s) : **UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief)**.

Project Title : Jaya Housing & Recovery Project.

## Description :

Three main interventions are planned within the scope of this project. Construction of core houses, construction of Meunasahs (small mosque) and implementation of small scale recovery projects which are decided and managed by the community themselves.

## Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	61	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	355	182	51.72 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				945
<b>Households</b>				416

**Environmental Assessment** : Within the scope of initial impact assessment activities the basic environmental and social and economic impact assessment was conducted.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Within the scope of initial impact assessment activities the basic environmental and social and economic impact assessment was conducted.

**Notes/Comments** : Within the scope of community - decided small -scale recovery projects;

1. Wide range of kitchen utensils was provided to Alue Mie, Mukhan, Mns. Rayeuk Villages to support culinary activities of village PKKs (Family Welfare Empowerment Institution) and to be used in large community gatherings.
2. In Alue Mie Village, a community center was built; a generator and street lighting were provided and Meunasah (small mosque) was designed with community participatory approach.
3. In Rayeuk Village, a Meunasah (small mosque) was designed with community participatory approach and rice peeling and polishing was planned to be provided.
4. In Mukhan Village, Women Musholla, Women & Children Activity Center including open sport fields and playground has been designed with the participation of the community.





# INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE of THE RED CROSS ICRC

[www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>INFRA 395 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		13-Jan-05	13	400,000

Donor (s) : **ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross).**

Project Title : Rehabilitation of Damaged Water and Sanitation installation in selected tsunami and conflict affected villages in Aceh Province.

### Description :

Emergency support to town PDAM (Water Supply Department) where appropriate. Providing emergency water provision to particular villages where the internal displaced people are returning to (tank storage with tap-stands, and filling by tinkering).

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	84	84	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				18,885
<b>Households</b>				3,977



# INTERNATIONAL DISASTER EMERGENCY SERVICES IDES

[www.ides.org](http://www.ides.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>INFRA 189 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		03-May-05	21	650,000

Donor (s) : **British Red Cross; IDES (International Disaster Emergency Service).**

Project Title : Shelter assistance for Teunom, Aceh Jaya.

### Description :

The temporary housing assistance scheme is a big need for homeless who lost their houses in the tsunami and earthquake disaster on Teunom Sub-District of Aceh Jaya Regency. Temporary wooden houses were being provided with 6 x 6 dimensions and with tin roofing material. Basic building materials such as bricks and concrete blocks are needed by agencies who will build permanent houses. This project provides temporary houses for homeless of tsunami affected-victims and also assists the community to be able to produce building material - such as concrete blocks and brick and subsequently to supply the building materials needs to the market for the upcoming permanent housing reconstruction activities.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	680	680	100 %





# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION for MIGRATION IOM

[www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)

**Reference Number :** INFRA 139 IG; INFRA 337 IN; INFRA 343 IN; INFRA 455 IN; INFRA 465 IN; INFRA 481 IN; INFRA 495 IN; INFRA 489 IN

**Project Type :** On-budget

Project Period	Start Date	Duration (Months)	Committed USD
INFRA 139 IG	01-Jun-05	27	2,279,635
INFRA 337 IN	01-Jul-05	28	20,537,986
INFRA 343 IN	15-Apr-06	17	9,877,154
INFRA 455 IN	01-Apr-05	19	1,419,295
INFRA 465 IN	15-Feb-05	11	3,242,542
INFRA 481 IN	01-Jan-05	12	1,709,015
INFRA 489 IN	26-Aug-06	9	706,073
INFRA 495 IN	21-Oct-05	10	799,806

**Donor(s) :** Queensland; American Red Cross; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; New Zealand Government; German Government; Netherlands Government; DOW Chemical; AusAid (Australian Agency for International Development)

**Project Title :**

1. Shelter Assistance to Vulnerable Populations.
2. Transitional Housing in NAD.
3. Rebuilding Acehese Communities through Permanent House Construction.
4. New Zealand Technical Support to IOM Post-Tsunami recovery Planning (NZTEC/NAD).
5. Transitional Shelter Assistance to Vulnerable Communities in Aceh (TSAVA).
6. Post - Tsunami Family Shelter and non-food items Project– Aceh.
7. Temporary Shelter in Nias.
8. Rebuilding Acehese Communities through Permanent House Construction.

### Description :

**INFRA 139 IG :** This project aims to support the Government of Indonesia's capacity to address the socio-economic recovery and restoration of civil services in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. Towards this end the project will provide approximately 287 transitional and permanent shelter units for civil servants who lost their housing as a result of the December 2004 earthquake and subsequent tsunami and who are currently living in temporary camps, public buildings or with host families. The provision of better living conditions will enable beneficiaries to more fully respond to the demands of their duties as health providers, teachers, social workers, police and other service providers. These functions are essential to the full restoration of civil service capacities and the provision of basic government services as Aceh rebuilds from the tsunami devastation.

**INFRA 337 IN :** IOM and ARC will assist populations displaced by the tsunami through the provision of transitional housing. Adequate water and sanitation will be provided by ARC through a partnership with IOM. Doing so will dramatically improve the living conditions of IDPs and help prevent the outbreak of diseases due to the lack of sanitary facilities and inadequate housing facilities. This action is critical for bridging the gap between immediate emergency response and longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction. The provision of transitional housing will allow IDPs to move out of a) temporary IDP camps where they stay in makeshift tents and are exposed to the elements; b) public buildings so that these can be used for their original purpose and; c) the homes of host families to allow the population at large in Aceh to begin rebuilding their lives. IOM is building shelter units on land provided either by hosting communities or by the government. It is conceivable that shelter units could be built on land where IDP's originated from.

**INFRA 343 IN :** As detailed in the project document and memorandum of understanding, IOM and Latter-day Saint Charities (LDSC) will assist populations displaced by the tsunami through the provision of permanent housing including appropriate sanitation facilities. Adequate water provision will be provided by IOM through a partnership with other donors. The project will dramatically improve the living conditions of displaced and vulnerable persons adversely affected by the December 2004 tsunami and earthquake and help prevent the outbreak of diseases due to the lack of sanitary facilities and inadequate housing facilities. The provision of permanent housing will allow displaced persons to move out of a) temporary camps exposed to weather and security risks; b) public buildings so that these can be used for their original purpose; and c) the homes of host families, to allow the population at large in Aceh to begin rebuilding their lives.

**INFRA 455 IN :** In order to further contribute to its immediate and medium-term humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Aceh Province, IOM requests the Government of New Zealand to provide support in order to carry out the following activities: 1. The set-up of a Housing Technical Site Management; 2. The construction of shelters for housing displaced civil servants; 3. The implementation of a rapid response to fight against trafficking with a primary focus on vulnerable IDP populations of women and children.

**INFRA 465 IN :** This project aims to provide up to 1000 transitional shelter units, each capable of housing a group of up to seven individuals. The unit design has been a collaborative effort with the Research Institute for Human Settlements of the Ministry of Public Works resulting in a unit ("Kopel Empat") that meets or exceeds SPHERE standards, is earthquake resistant tested, will provide temporary shelter for up to two years and can be assembled / disassembled (repeatedly) with local labor for eventual use in permanent shelter construction.

**INFRA 481 IN :** This project aims to assist the tsunami victims with the immediate and longer term recovery needs, facilitating the transportation and distribution of relief supply; provision of the transitional housing and construction of local community-related public infrastructure. The provision of transitional shelter units, each capable of housing a group of up to seven individuals. The unit design has been a collaborative effort with the Research Institute for Human Settlements of the Ministry of Public Works resulting in a unit ("Kopel Empat") that meets or exceeds SPHERE standards, is earthquake resistant tested, will provide temporary shelter for up to two years and can be assembled / disassembled (repeatedly) with local labour for eventual use in permanent shelter construction.



- INFRA 495 IN** : This project promotes socio-economic recovery in Nias by providing IDPs with appropriate temporary shelters as the first step toward recovery. Where feasible, IOM aims to integrate such temporary shelter assistance with its other core IDP project activities in Nias, namely livelihood support and disaster preparedness training. In accordance with standard procedure all activities will be coordinated with local and district government offices and the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR).
- INFRA 489 IN** : IOM with funding from Australian Government through AIPRD constructed 70 permanent houses which provide the accommodation for persons affected by tsunami. All the beneficiaries own the land on which their houses have been constructed and have land certificate to prove it. The houses are standard 38 square meters and consist of a central room with two bedrooms, and include household-level water and sanitation facilities. Five sub district offices in Aceh Barat and Aceh Jaya also have been constructed as the effort to redevelop government performance.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	130	130	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	127	92	72.44 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	30	30	100 %
Kab. ACEH SINGKIL	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	139	78	56.12 %
Kab. ACEH TIMUR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	40	40	100 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	225	85	37.78 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	539	407	75.51%
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	83	83	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	250	250	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	27	27	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	85	4	4.71 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	86	0	0 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	315	315	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	19	19	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	77	77	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	45	45	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	196	196	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	357	345	96.64 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	31	31	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	184	50	27.17 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	6	6	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	96	96	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	8	8	100 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	60	60	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	178	178	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	33	33	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	84	84	100 %
Kab. Aceh Utara	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	2	2	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	350	350	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	46	46	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	73	73	100 %
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	103	103	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	52	52	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	18	18	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of relocated houses built	77	77	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	155	155	100 %

- Environmental Assessment** : IOM's transitional housing program was designed in accordance with regulations and standards outlined in the Indonesian governments "Blueprint" for rebuilding Aceh. The design takes into account continuing seismic activity in the region, and adheres to environmental recommendations made by the World Wildlife Fund, Indonesia and the Indonesian policy-research institution Greenomics.
- Social Impact Assessment** : In view of longer-term planning, IOM has conducted a Needs and Aspirations Survey of IDP populations in 71 disaster affected sub-districts throughout Aceh to better determine IDP's forward needs and expectations with a specific focus on settlement and livelihood recovery .









# ISLAMIC RELIEF

[www.islamic-relief.com](http://www.islamic-relief.com)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 211 IN; INFRA 296 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 211 IN	01-Jun-05	12	1,184,000
INFRA 296 IN	09-Jun-06	12	3,687,412.71

Donor(s) : DEC UK (UK Disaster Emergency Committee); Islamic Relief.

Project Title : 1. Construction of Earthquake Resistant Homes.  
2. Shelter Reconstruction.

### Description :

**INFRA 211 IN** : Constructing Type 36 and Type 45 homes in Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat.  
**INFRA 296 IN** : Type 45 housing construction in Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	204	204	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	150	150	100 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	141	141	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	301	301	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				796

**Factors Causing Delays** : Land titling; Human Resources; Materials; Lack of Information.

**Environmental Assessment** : All materials used by Islamic Relief are environmental friendly.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Community will be able to rebuild their lives.





# ISTANBUL METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY IMM

www.ibb.gov.tr

**Reference Number** : INFRA 255 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 12-Dec-05 **Duration (Months)** 5 **Committed USD** 130.000

Donor (s) : **Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.**

Project Title : Syiah Kuala University Lecturers' Houses.

### Description :

Construction of 16 unit houses for a number of lecturers' and their families who have lost their houses as affected by the tsunami disaster on December 2004.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	16	16	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>16</b>

**Environmental Assessment** : The EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) has been granted by the University of Syiah Kuala.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Positive impact.

**Notes/Comments** : The plan of the project can be requested from our office. See our project plan in these attachments for details. The project has been finished on 1st March 2006 and submitted to the University authorities on 7th March 2006.





# ITALIAN COOPERATION

[www.italcoop.org.sz](http://www.italcoop.org.sz)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: HEAL 88 Bilat; INFRA 220 IN; INFRA 223 IN; CROSS 15 Bilat		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Sep-05	7	275,582.72
	01-Jun-05	3	13,913.58
	08-Aug-05	6	155,650
	01-Jun-05	12	2,469,136

Donor(s) : **Italian Cooperation**

Project Title : 1. Reconstruction of 1 Puskesmas, 1 Postu, 6 Polindes in Sub-district Peukan Bada.  
 2. Pilot Project Reconstruction of 2 permanent houses of 45 m2 in Blang Kubu Bireuen District.  
 3. Reconstruction of 30 permanent houses of 45 square meter in Rehum Baro Village of Bireuen District.  
 4. Emergency Program to Support the Indonesian People Tsunami strike AID number : 8160.

### Description :

1. Reconstruction and providing medical equipment of 1 unit of Puskesmas; 1 unit Pustu; 6 units Polindes; 4 houses for paramedics and provision of 9 Motorbikes and 1 Ambulance.
2. Reconstruction of 2 permanent houses 45 meter square .
3. Reconstruction of 30 permanent houses of 45 meter squares for fishermen in Rehum Baro Village.
4. Reconstruction of 48 Health Infrastructures, 408 Houses 45 meter square.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	4	4	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	2	2	100 %
Kab. BIREUN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	30	30	100 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	2	2	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	231	231	100 %
Households				269

**Environmental Assessment** : Utilization of local material and no negative impact on environment.

**Social Impact Assessment** : No negative impact on social structure.





<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 216 IN; INFRA 219 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 216 IN	01-May-05	27	6,754,565
INFRA 219 IN	01-Oct-05	24	6,890,000

Donor (s) : **Japanese Red Cross.**

Project Title : 1. Construction of Permanent Housing in Aceh Barat District.  
2. Housing in Simeulue: North half of Simeulue Tengah and Salang sub -districts.

**Description :**

**INFRA 216 IN** : The primary objective is to construct and provide earthquake resistant and locally adequate permanent houses to Tsunami and Earthquake victims in the sub-district of Woyla of Aceh Barat district.

**INFRA 219 IN** : 252 unit houses in North half of Simeulue Tengah. 373 houses in Salang.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,062	775	72.98 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				5,400
<b>Households</b>				1,062

**Factors Causing Delays** : Human Resources.

**Environmental Assessment** : Will be carefully considered. The house design will use minimum timbers material.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Will be carefully considered. Providing houses gives secure life for the community.







# JARINGAN KASIH JARKAS

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 90 IN; INFRA 479 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Sep-05	10	491,869.14
	01-Aug-06	12	253,941.98

Donor(s) : **Caritas Germany.**

Project Title : 1. Reconstruction of 90 houses Angkeo Simeulue.  
2. Reconstruction of 15 unit of two storey house in Salur Village, Reconstruction of 16 unit house in Luan Sorib Village, Water project in Angkeo Village.

### Description :

- INFRA 90 IN** : Rehabilitation of 85 unit houses according to the results of a preliminary project in which 5 model houses have been built in the same village during the past three months.
- INFRA 479 IN** : To reconstruct a decent houses for the 31 Tsunami affected household and underpin by providing clean water supply for the previous addressed beneficiaries and local community in Angkeo Village. It is expected that with a proper installation and implementation of water and sanitation project will created much healthier living environment and reduce the possibility of dangerous epidemic prevalence in the area; create a job opportunity in the area; increase local economic recovery by using local resources; promotes and strengthening the community participation, awareness and capacity. Possibility for further follow-up intervention in social development for the community will be implementing gradually through different program in the area strengthening the capacity of local communities.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	85	85	100 %
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	31	31	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>116</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Materials .

**Environmental Assessment** : Any possible impact on local natural resources is excluded by the construction approach. It is beyond this project framework to address any further impact in the environment, (eg: waste, garbage and disposal management, and drainage).

**Social Impact Assessment** : Community participate approach for the reconstruction of their houses is considered to form the basis of re-establishing the social fabrics of the society.





# JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE

JRS

[www.jesref.org](http://www.jesref.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 233 IN; INFRA 234 IN; INFRA 237 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 233 IN	15-Feb-05	22	1,740,000
INFRA 234 IN	25-Apr-05	20	250,000
INFRA 237 IN	01-Jun-05	14	313,528.30

Donor(s) : Caritas Network; Jesuit International.

Project Title : 1. Shelter Program in Pulo Aceh, Aceh Besar.  
2. Shelter Program in Pesantren Budi, Lamno Sub -District, Aceh Jaya.  
3. Shelter Shelter Project in Nagan Raya.

### Description :

- INFRA 233 IN** : Housing reconstruction assistance for 106 tsunami affected households on in Breuh Island, Pulo Aceh Sub-District of Aceh Besar Regency.
- INFRA 234 IN** : Housing reconstruction assistance toward informal Islamic boarding school (Pesantren) Budi in Lamno Sub-District of Aceh Jaya Regency. The housing assistance scheme aimed to reconstruct 100 units houses within the boarding school compound.
- INFRA 237 IN** : This project aimed to reconstruct 82 units house along with the water and sanitation provisions for tsunami affected households in Kula Tripa and Babah Lueng Villages in Nagan Raya Regency.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	106	106	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	102	102	100 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	82	82	100 %

**Factors Causing Delays** : Human Resources; Materials; Other.

**Environmental Assessment** : The housing reconstruction is taking into account any possible impact on the newly reconstruct human settlement area.

**Social Impact Assessment** : The housing program implemented through community participatory approach, which improving womens involvement during the overall decision-making and project implementation phases in-line with the local religious customary.













# KATAHATI INSTITUTE

[www.e-katahati.org](http://www.e-katahati.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 325 LN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 28-Mar-06    **Duration (Months)** 10    **Committed USD** 650,000

Donor (s) : **DEA (Diakonie Emergency Aid).**  
 Project Title : Rebuilding of House type 45 in Dusun Tgk. Tuan DiPulo

### Description :

The purpose of this program is to accelerate and facilitate the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh, it is expected that by this program intervention the tsunami victims who are still living in barracks or tents can be immediately re-house to the newly build houses by NGOs including the house which will be built by Katahati institute. On the first batch Katahati Institute will only build 75 units of houses with 45 square meter type in Dusun T. Tuan Dipulo, Lampulo Village, Kuta Alam district. These houses only provided for the beneficiaries who are still living in emergency tents.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	75	75	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				300
<b>Households</b>				75

- Environmental Assessment** : The housing assistance scheme which provided by Kata Hati Institute toward the beneficiaries who previously living on tents and barracks in Lampulo Village has given a significant influence in improving IDP's physical security and their socio -economic aspect .
- Social Impact Assessment** : During the construction process, the working team has faced several obstacles, one of them is the influence from the heavy rain that had damaged the road along the way to the construction site, this problem has compounded since most of the construction area is flooded. Those factors cause the delay in building material to the site and subsequently delayed the construction activities.





<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>INFRA 335 LN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		07-Feb-05	66	617,284

Donor(s) : **Foundation Howu- Howu .**

Project Title : Home and Livelihood.

### Description :

Howu-Howu started two projects which comprise a housing and livelihood assistance in southern of Nias. As per now Howu-Howu foundation has built 90 motorized fishing boats and 23 houses as well. On 17 September 2005, the boats and houses hand-over to the respective beneficiaries.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. NIAS SELATAN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	50	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,200
<b>Households</b>				203

**Environmental Assessment** : The impact of the project toward community socio-economy aspect has shown a very positive result in strengthening community social cohesiveness. For example, each fishing boat was provided to be own and operate by two fisherman households, this tailor-made intervention has ensure the revival of their origin income generation sector and simultaneously increasing the communities socio-economical ties.

**Notes/Comments** : Entire building materials are bought in Nias in-order to stimulate the local economic recovery.



# KOMITE REHABILITASI dan REKONSTRUKSI JAMBO MESJID

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 160 IN; INFRA 323 IN; INFRA 476 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 160 IN	01-Sep-05	6	214,350
INFRA 323 IN	01-Mar-06	7	345,679.01
INFRA 476 LN	01-Jan-07	9	291,358.02

- Donor (s)** : **Caritas Germany**
- Project Title** :
1. Housing Reconstruction Project for the most affected Tsunami victims - Jambo Mesjid Village - 2nd phase.
  2. Rehabilitation & Reconstruction of 52 houses in Jambo Mesjid Village - 3rd phase.
  3. Housing Reconstruction and Rehabilitation for 50 houses in Jambo Mesjid Village - 4th Phase.

### Description :

- INFRA 160 IN** : The projects concentrating on community building thru house reconstruction. The project will provide technical experience and social competence to the Village Committee in facilitating the cooperation with international donors.
- INFRA 323 IN** : The projects concentrating on community building thru house reconstruction. The project will provide technical experience and social competence to the Village Committee in facilitating the cooperation with international donors. In a long term view it is foreseen that after a successful reconstruction phases in Jambo Mesjid Village with the community participatory approach up to 104 families will have found a permanent place to live. The remaining 52 houses from the 2nd phase will be reconstructed and the new houses shall be built at the places of the old destroyed houses according to the wish of the villagers and due to the limited spatial possibilities between the coastline and the intensive use of the area with fish-ponds. Through the process of reconstruction the intention is to motivate the community to be proactive in the decision making process and through out the process of reconstruction. This intention will also strengthen the community participation and development. Future planning from this community building program is to broaden the area of working and planning for the future work in the village as part of the village development thru their income generation and social project.
- INFRA 476 LN** : Jambo Mesjid Village is one of the locations on the east coast of Aceh affected by the tsunami in 2004. 104 houses have been completed and occupied; remaining 41 houses are needed along with other 9 houses for repairs. The community has developed working group for income generation activity such as fish restoration, mats making, embroidery and cooking. The community also has repaired their meeting hall (Balai Desa) using the surplus of previous reconstruction projects.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	50	100 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	52	52	100 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	41	41	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damaged houses	9	9	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>152</b>

- Environmental Assessment** : Any possible impact on local natural resources is excluded by project approach. It is beyond this project framework to address any further impact in the environment, (e.g. waste, garbage and disposal management and drainage).
- Social Impact Assessment** : Community participate approach for the reconstruction of their houses is considered to form the basis of re-establishing the social fabric of the society.









## L'ARCHE de ZOE

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 420 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01 Jan 06	12	16,000

Donor(s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)**,  
 Project Title : The Report of Transitional Shelter Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

The Report of Transitional Shelter Per Implementing Partners - L'Arche de Zoe .

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	4	4	100 %



## LATTER-DAY SAINT CHARITIES

### LDSC

[www.lds.org.uk](http://www.lds.org.uk)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 178 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Feb-05	8	203,138.68

Donor(s) : **The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints**.  
 Project Title : Homes & Community Buildings – Banda Aceh.

### Description :

This project was completed for the First Lady of Indonesia, who wanted to provide to the people of Aceh a model temporary housing community specifically for women who lost their husbands in the tsunami and for their children. The First Lady personally participated in the design of the homes. In addition to 50 homes, LDSC provided two Meunasah (small mosques); a community center (used also as a sewing and skills training center); a water system (including 7 wells and water storage tanks); gravel pathways; and a children's recreation area. Each home has two bedrooms, a living room, water, electricity, bathroom, a cooking porch and a septic system. The homes are designed to be for 2 - 6 years lifetime of occupancy. The plan of the Office of the First Lady is to teach the women skills so that they can become self-reliant as a family and begin saving their own money for the purchasing a piece of land for building a permanent shelter. LDSC contracted the construction with Bekasi based company to construct the homes, meunasahs and community center.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota Banda Aceh	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	50	50	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				250
<b>Households</b>				50

**Environmental Assessment** : Drainage, septic systems, and gravel pathways will minimize any negative environmental.







# LEMBAGA PENCERAHAN & ADVOKASI MASYARAKAT NIAS

## LPAM

[www.lpamnias.org](http://www.lpamnias.org)

Reference Number : INFRA 103 LN  
 Project Type : On-budget  
 Project Period : Start Date 01-Jul-05 Duration (Months) 30 Committed USD 1,127,317.20

Donor (s) : Christian Aid;TDH Netherlands (Terre des Hommes Netherlands).

Project Title : School and House Reconstruction.

### Description :

This project targeted to build 5 elementary schools in 5 sub districts in Nias Selatan and to reconstruct 125 unit houses for the earthquake affected beneficiaries in 2 sub-districts as well. This project aims to support community recovery process by providing their basic needs for shelter and education facilities.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. NIAS SELATAN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	125	125	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	33	33	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,774</b>

Factors Causing Delays : Materials.







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**DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS**

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**Malteser International**

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**Medan Peduli**

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**Mercy Corps**

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**Mercy Malaysia**

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**Mercy USA**

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**Ministry of Environment**

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**Monjago Vano**

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**Muslim Aid Indonesia**

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<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 152 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	03-Feb-05	36	3,797,468.35

Donor (s) : **German Development Cooperation through KfW Development Bank (German Financial Cooperation).**

Project Title : Village reconstruction and livelihood assistance in Lancok and Jambo Timur.

**Description :**

Reconstruction of 306 type 42 square meter houses; Installation of biofil septic tanks for all houses built by Malteser International; rehabilitation of 12 houses; in co - operation with PDAM providing water supply intake connection; construction of village head office; construction of bridge (20 ton capacity); construction of salt containers; construction of wooden bridges as emergency escape / evacuation escape lane; providing micro credit schemes for aquaculture and local handicraft activities.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	306	306	100 %
Kab. LHOKEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	190	190	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	40	40	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,900</b>
<b>Households</b>				<b>536</b>







# MERCY CORPS

[www.mercycorps.org](http://www.mercycorps.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 61 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-05	25	2,300,000

Donor (s) :

Project Title : Support for Return and Village Recovery.

### Description :

The objectives of this project are :

1. To help displaced people return to their villages.
2. To prepare villages for revitalization and robust recovery. For the short - term the project is aligned with immediate needs the Master Plan outlines including :
  - Water and sanitation for those returning to villages including those in Temporary Living Centers and tents.
  - Promoting transparency and community decision -making.
  - Providing direct assistance in the form of community grants to support return at \$50 USD per person. These grants can be used based on community decision including individual distribution or a community project.
  - Supporting the building of individual housing through partnering with and supporting groups that are rebuilding individual housing.
3. In the longer-term recovery process the envisioned activities would be aligned with the master plan by :
  - Developing reliable and efficient community infrastructure through supporting quality engineering and community managed sustainability plans for infrastructure.
  - Rehabilitation of community infrastructure according to community priorities including: mosques access roads schools and local government offices.
  - Increasing the participation and empowerment of communities in their local governance and government including through finding ways to solve their own problems.
  - Requiring community contribution to projects including potential funds and/or non-technical labor.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	25	25	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	3	3	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing - Number of houses built	10	10	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	1	1	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				50,000

**Environmental Assessment** : As new villages are relocated into areas that were previously overgrown and wild and new roads are cut to service them, there will be some impact on the surrounding environment (albeit minor).

**Social Impact Assessment** : This project relies on the locally determined priorities and locally managed plans for village recovery.





<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 53 IN; INFRA 54 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
INFRA 53 IN	23-Apr-05	8	1,236,965
INFRA 54 IN	05-Mar-05	3	152,555

Donor(s) : **Malaysia (Other).**

Project Title : 1. Core House Desa Weu Raya, Aceh Besar Regency.  
 2. Relocation House Sebnun Ayun, Aceh Besar Regency.

**Description :**

**INFRA 53 IN** : Objective: To reconstruct 231 units of core houses with 52 square meter size and to rehabilitate 14 units of damaged houses.

**INFRA 54 IN** : To construct 88 units of relocation houses; unit of Small Mosque; 1 unit balai pendidikan; 2 units of public toilet and bathroom; 1 unit of pusat kesihatan satelit (PUKESLIT).

**Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	231	231	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damaged houses	14	14	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	88	88	100 %





<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 3 LN; INFRA 281 IN; INFRA 282 IN; INFRA 460 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 3 LN</b>	01-Aug-05	13	1,229,600.00
<b>INFRA 281 IN</b>	01-Jun-06	8	2,368,523.21
<b>INFRA 282 IN</b>	15-Aug-06	9	4,920,000.00
<b>INFRA 460 LN</b>	01-Jan-06	12	9,204,000

Donor(s) : **Muslim Aid; Oxfam International; ADB (Asian Development Bank); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)**

- Project Title : 1. Habitat (housing, water & sanitation) for fishing village communities.  
2. Habitat For Tsunami Survivors (Oxfam-Mai).  
3. Housing For Tsunami Survivors (ADB-Mai).  
4. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

**Description :**

**INFRA 3 LN** : Providing housing, including well, septic tank and bathroom for fishing communities in Banda Aceh. The concept design of the housing is based on a local Acehnese architecture design. The Tsunami survivors working together with architecture university students, this step was undertaken in order to ensure that the project is sourcing local talent, local skills, local materials and at the end will provide a housing product which is culturally sensitive and acceptable. The housing design uses traditional pillars and joints for the main structure which means that the building is elastic and therefore earthquake resistant. The involvement of the home owners in the work also provides 'diversional therapy', instills ownership, reinforces or revives traditional work skills. In this project Muslim Aid has allowed house owners to make individual design variation choices within the budget and basic design range. Muslim Aid has pioneered the introduction of insulation foil to reflect the heat from aluminum roofs and has used powder coated corrugated iron to prevent rusting.

**INFRA 281 IN** : This project is a twinning programme with Oxfam, providing housing, including well, septic tank and bathroom for communities whose homes were destroyed by the tsunami and earthquake. The concept design of the housing is based on a local Acehnese architecture design. The Tsunami survivors working together with architecture university students, this step was undertaken in order to ensure that the project is sourcing local talent, local skills, local materials and at the end will provide a housing product which is culturally sensitive and acceptable. The housing design uses traditional pillars and joints for the main structure which means that the building is elastic and therefore earthquake resistant. The involvement of the home owners in the work also provides 'diversional therapy', instills ownership, reinforces or revives traditional work skills. In this project Muslim Aid has allowed house owners to make individual design variation choices within the budget and basic design range. Muslim Aid has pioneered the introduction of insulation foil to reflect the heat from aluminum roofs and has used powder coated corrugated iron to prevent rusting.

**INFRA 282 IN** : Providing good quality housing for tsunami survivors as an implementing partner for Asian Development Bank.

**INFRA 460 LN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners - Muslim Aid.

**Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	172	172	100 %
Kota SABANG	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	65	40	61.54 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	206	9	4.37 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	104	0	0 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	488	0	0 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	53	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	75	0	0 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	40	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	464	464	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	311	311	100 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	61	61	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	341	341	100 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	826	826	100 %
Kota SABANG	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	251	251	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>3,179</b>
<b>Households</b>				<b>Temporary houses 2254, permanent houses 1221</b>



- Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes;  
**Environmental Assessment** : Overall projects are environmentally friendly.





# MINISTRY of ENVIRONMENT

[www.menlh.go.id](http://www.menlh.go.id)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 124 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
15-Sep-05                                      4                                      218,000

Donor (s) : **BCFII (British Columbia Forestry Innovation Investment).**

Project Title : British Columbia Demonstration Housing.

### Description :

British Columbia Forestry Innovation Investment funded the activities necessary to provide a total of ten wood frame houses from four separate manufacturers in British Columbia. Each structure will be pre-cut from pressure - treated lumber to withstand termites and tropical decay. Each structure has been designed to Canadian standards to ensure seismic resistance if the components are properly assembled.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	10	10	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				10

# MONJAGO VANO

**Reference Number** : INFRA 427 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01-Jan-06                                      12                                      304,000

Donor(s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners– Monjago Vano.

### Key Performance Indicators ( August 2008 ) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMELUE	(INFRA) Housing - Number of temporary houses built	76	76	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				76
<b>Household</b>				76









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**DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS**


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Netherlands Red Cross

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Nias Selatan Local Government

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# OBOR BERKAT INDONESIA

**OBI**

[www.obior.or.id](http://www.obior.or.id)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 266 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	28-Dec-04	61	4,200,000

Donor (s) : **Operation Blessing.**

Project Title : Yayasan Obor Berkat Indonesia - Health Project in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar; Housing Project in Aceh Besar and Aceh Jaya; Livelihood project in Aceh Jaya.

### Description :

1. Doctors Replacement Program at Puskesmas and Pustu.
2. Mosquito Fogging Program.
3. Food and Nutrition Program.
4. Mobile Clinic Program to Remote Areas.
5. Housing Program in Aceh Besar and Aceh Jaya.
6. Reconstruction of Fish Pond in Aceh Jaya.
7. Livelihood Program in Aceh Jaya.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	116	110	94.83 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	803	439	54.67 %
Kota BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	60	60	100 %
Variant Kabupaten			33	
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				5,000
<b>Households</b>				1,000

**Factors Causing Delays** : Building Materials availability.

**Environmental Assessment** : There is no significant environmental awful impact foreseen.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Helping people to revive their life and restart their income generating activities trough livelihood intervention. Rebuilding the communities houses directly will be as a stepping stone to rebuild communities live after the catastrophic disaster. Nevertheless, the health intervention program has serve people on their healthcare issues and simultaneously provides adequate nutrition improvement toward children on the affected areas.





# OXFAM

[www.oxfam.org](http://www.oxfam.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 301 IN; INFRA 302 IN; INFRA 304 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
<b>INFRA 301 IN</b>	01-Jan-05	36	6,872,883.93
<b>INFRA 302 IN</b>	01-Jan-05	34	6,876,689.29
<b>INFRA 304 IN</b>	01-Jan-05	27	7,024,196.43

- Donor(s) : **DEC-UK (UK Disaster Emergency Committee).**
- Project Title :
  1. Aceh Barat (Meulaboh) Tsunami Response Programme.
  2. East Coast Aceh (Lhokseumawe and Sigli) Tsunami Response Programme.
  3. Aceh Jaya (Lamno) Tsunami and Earthquake Humanitarian Response.

**Description :**

- INFRA 301 IN** : The Oxfam Meulaboh programme aims to reduce morbidity due to water and sanitation related diseases, as well as to strengthen capacities of tsunami-affected households to improve sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- INFRA 302 IN** : Oxfam's East Coast projects aim to reduce morbidity due to water and sanitation related diseases, to strengthen capacities of tsunami-affected households to improve sustainable livelihood opportunities, and to provide appropriate core shelter, basic infrastructure and equal rights to ownership and tenure security.
- INFRA 304 IN** : Oxfam Lamno projects aim to reduce morbidity due to water and sanitation related diseases, to strengthen capacities of tsunami-related households to improve sustainable livelihood opportunities, and to provide appropriate core shelter, basic infrastructure and equal rights to ownership and tenure security.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	33	33	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	24	24	100 %
Kab. ACEH UTARA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	256	256	100 %
Kota LHOKSEUMAWE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	16	16	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	215	156	72.56 %

- Environmental Assessment** : Seeds and chemicals for agriculture will follow Indonesian regulations. Through our public health activities we intend to improve the environment through adequate and appropriate waste disposal – including recycling, composting and rubbish pit digging.
- Social Impact Assessment** : Oxfam programmes are community driven. Communities are consulted and all activities are implemented in partnership. Oxfam strives to ensure that all vulnerable groups – eg very poor, female-headed households – are included in all consultation exercises.











# PALANG MERAH INDONESIA

## PMI

[www.palangmerah.org](http://www.palangmerah.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 339 IN; INFRA 344 IN; INFRA 345 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Oct-05	37	3,400,000
	22-May-06	33	7,335,273.68
	01-Jul-05	17	10,100,000

Donor(s) : Chinese Red Cross; Netherlands Red Cross; Hong Kong Red Cross.

Project Title :  
 1. China Indonesia Friendship Village (CPL 67).  
 2. Nias Rehabilitation and Development Programme (CPR 162/163).  
 3. Housing Rehabilitation Programme in Aceh Utara (CPR 101).

### Description :

- INFRA 339 IN** : **Location** : China Red Cross plans to build Desa Kuala of Lamno Sub-District and it will be formed to Friendship Village which providing Housing assistance for 300 households (T.42/200 m2); Public Facilities; Small Mosque; Village Office; Auditorium; Puskesmas; Preliminary School; Access Roads; Road way and other Utilities.
- INFRA 344 IN** : Construction of houses and schools in the Sub-Districts of Gomo and Lahusa on Nias Island. Next to the construction and rehabilitation of houses a Community Based first aid and water and sanitation program will be established in the same areas.
- INFRA 345 IN** : Providing permanent shelters for tsunami- affected population in order to expedite the rehabilitation of Aceh Utara district. Activities include to construct approximately 737 units of permanent houses.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,621	1,374	84.76 %
Household				1,621









# PLAN INTERNATIONAL

[www.plan-international.org](http://www.plan-international.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 482 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 22-May-06    **Duration (Months)** 9    **Committed USD** 760,000

Donor(s) : **Plan International.**

Project Title : Reconstruction of 100 unit houses at Peukan Bada Sub-District (partnership Plan International & UPLINK).

### Description :

In June 2006 Plan International has signed contract with UPC -UPLINK to build 100 unit houses at Peukan Bada sub -district. This project will deliver 100-unit houses with the public infrastructure (access road, clean water supply and sanitation facilities) at 11 villages in Peukan Bada. The house is build with 36 square meter size, a standard size for disaster affected -communities. The budget allocation per house is IDR 52,175,614 plus another IDR 17,824,434 for septic tank, water supply, drainage system & access road is. The total budget per house is IDR 70,000,000. Plan International will also underpin with hygiene promotion program to the beneficiaries in order to give information about healthy living and to maintain a good and sustainable environment.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	100	100	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>100</b>

**Environmental Assessment** : No negative impact expected. As the project will be constructing on land and in environment that was devastated by tsunami, the intention of the project is to improve the environment for the children and community to use in safe, healthy way.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Plan International Indonesia's mainstream the community involvement in all projects, including on the early housing designing phase. Social impacts are expected to be overall positive; the community should have a strong sense of pride and belonging with their new home.





# PREMIERE URGENCE

[www.premiere-urgence.org](http://www.premiere-urgence.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 56 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	28-Jan-05	17	2,273,913.04

Donor(s) : **DIPT (Délégation Interministérielle chargée de l'aide Post -Tsunami) (France); EC/ECHO; Fondation de France.**

Project Title : Shelter and Water & Sanitation project in Nagan Raya Regency.

### Description :

Première Urgence implements shelter reconstruction program in Nagan Raya Sub-District in five villages, which inhabitant by 250 household. These 5 villages are Padang Payang, Padang Rubek, Kuala Baro, Leung Teuke Ben and Drien Tujuh. Initial assistance provided through cash-for-work intervention, which provides an assistance scheme toward the affected-communities in order to revive their income generation sector; this activities also aiming to stimulate and strengthen beneficiaries' capacity to immediately leave the barracks and immediately rebuilt their origin villages. Première Urgence has implemented an integrated approach to support the re-housing activities toward the affected -communities; the first step is to provide adequate shelter to the beneficiaries; second step is to ensure access to safe water and sanitation while simultaneously assist the beneficiaries to sustain their needs during the work by distribution of a cash compensation scheme. Nevertheless, the targeted beneficiaries are completely involved in the work and in charge of the project implementation with the logistical and technical support provided from the Première Urgence.

### Key Performance Indicators(August) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	435	435	100 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	58	58	100 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	158	158	100 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of lightly damaged house(s)	276	276	100 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	100	100	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				5,089
<b>Households</b>				1,085

**Factors Causing Delays** : Building Materials; Others.

**Notes/Comments** : Local community support: Beneficiaries rebuilt their own houses by themselves. During the implementation period, the village leaders are highly engage and involved collaboratively in delivering the projects.



# PROFESSIONALS INTERNATIONAL

**Reference Number** : INFRA 82 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01 Jan 05                                      24                                      2,020,803

Donor(s) : **Private Funds;World Relief.**

Project Title : Kecamatan Batee Rehabilitation Program.

## Description :

The intervention comprising several activities, such as deep well drilling; septic tank system; water intake piping; Villages debris clearing, land filling; erosion prevention; housing construction; school construction; bridge construction; fish pond walling rehabilitation, fish ponds cleaning; developing new sustainable fish ponds; mangrove trees planting; salt flat walls rehabilitation.

## Key Performance Indicators (July 2007) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	137	137	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	227	227	100 %

**Environmental Assessment** : Deforestation issues, however the project is limiting the timber usage in house reconstruction and only purchasing legal timber.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Professionals International making every effort to incorporate the needs and wishes of the beneficiaries in our reconstruction/rehabilitation projects.











# REBUILD ACEH FOUNDATION

[www.rebuildaceh.org](http://www.rebuildaceh.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	:	<b>INFRA 359 LN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	:	On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	:	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
		01-Mar-06	7	669,642.86

Donor(s) : **Boulton Society, HSBC, UMRA -UK.**

Project Title : Neuheun Sub -Village planning-housing construction project.

## Description :

The project is fully supported both financial and technical from our main funding UMRA -United Kingdom. During its implementation the project has been highly communicate and coordinated with district, sub-district office of Aceh Besar, community leader as well the communities' members. The project is providing a support for community mapping and the sub village planning. The key main activities comprising: facilitation for resettlement for the internal displace peoples whom presently living in temporary shelters which located at NeuhenVillage; organizing and managing the reconstruction process by mobilizing the local communities which led by experienced engineers; reconstruction of 100 housing units with 3 6 square meter dimension, with a semi-detach model; Reconstruction of public facilities such as road, drainage system, water supply, electrical connection; Livelihood intervention will be conducted after the completion the physical reconstruction activities, this livelihood intervention expected to regenerate the communities income generating sector.

## Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	100	75	75 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				400
<b>Households</b>				200

**Notes/Comments** : Village sourced skilled and unskilled labor involved in the reconstruction process. The reconstruction process will be supervised by experienced engineers to gradually increase and improve their skill.









# SAMARITAN'S PURSE

[www.samaritanspurse.org](http://www.samaritanspurse.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 59 IN; INFRA 192 IN; INFRA 333 IN; INFRA 341 IN; INFRA 415 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Mar-05	18	7,499,738
	01-Nov-05	23	2,885,958
	01-Mar-05	29	3,871,183
	01-Mar-05	20	2,192,682
	01-Jan-07	8	1,235,992

Donor (s) : Samaritan's Purse; UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

Project Title : 1. Nagan Raya Reconstruction and Livelihood Recovery Program.  
2. Permanent Housing Program for Nias in the sub-districts of Hiliduho and Gunung Sitoli.  
3. Permanent Housing Program for Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh.  
4. Permanent Housing Program for Aceh Jaya, Kecamatan Panga.  
5. Permanent Housing Program for Lageun.

### Description :

**INFRA 59 IN** : To provide permanent houses and water/ sanitation facilities to 622 earthquake affected households in Nagan Raya regency. Each of the 622 households selected will receive a shelter, well, latrine, and septic tank provisions.

**INFRA 192 IN** : To provide permanent houses and water/sanitation facilities to 350 earthquake affected families in villages within the sub-district of Hiliduho and Gunung Sitoli. This September, 2007, Samaritan's Purse added 120 permanent homes. Total are 470 houses. Each of the 470 households selected will receive a shelter, well, latrine, and septic tank provision.

**INFRA 333 IN** : To provide permanent houses for 550 tsunami affected families in Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh.

**INFRA 341 IN** : To provide permanent houses for 950 households of tsunami affected families in Aceh Jaya. This February 2007, Samaritan's Purse added 65 permanent homes. Total is 1,015 permanent homes.

**INFRA 415 IN** : To provide permanent house for 163 tsunami affected families in Laguen.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	622	622	100 %
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	470	470	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	441	441	100 %
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	50	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,015	1,015	100 %
Kab. ACEH JAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	163	163	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>2,813</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Materials; Other

**Environmental Assessment** : 1. The projects aimed to provide houses made of shelter materials which are more earthquake resistant and environmentally sound than their former homes.  
2. Wood purchased for the construction of the roof trusses runs the risk of abetting illegal forestry which reduces trees in areas that are not properly monitored, possibly to the detriment of the immediate environment.  
3. There are little to no risks to the environment, and through a sustainable water and sanitation program, mitigation of current pollution to water suppliers is planned.

**Social Impact Assessment** : 1. Sometimes the locations of the houses are dictated by the government and the people disagree for various reasons such as the houses being too far from the ocean for fishermen - compromises between leaders and civilians need to be made.  
2. Through providing empowerment for women in traditional roles, a positive impact on cultural and religious environment is expected.  
3. Providing the effective transition phase and rehabilitation for those families desiring to return to their originated village.  
4. To cultivate a spirit of community and solidarity through the use of group building teams.







# SAVE THE CHILDREN

[www.savethechildren.org](http://www.savethechildren.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 58 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-05	36	40,300,000

Donor (s) : **DEC-UK (UK Disaster Emergency Committee); OFDA (Office of the US Foreign Disaster Assistance); Private Funds; Save the Children Norway; USAID (United States Agency for International).**

Project Title : Infrastructure, Construction and Engineering.

### Description :

To support the return of tsunami affected populations to their origin villages through the provision of housing and water and sanitation facilities that will help to restore and strengt hen communities in a manner that respects local culture and brings positive change to the lives of communities and children. Key Objectives: To provide temporary and permanent housing with livable spaces for children and their families; providing houses to water and sanitation facilities and infrastructure; Improve earthquake risk mitigation and awareness.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,025	844	82.34 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	50	50	100%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				55,000

**Environmental Assessment** : Deforestation of tropical forest, to be avoided at all costs through the procurement of sustainable and legal timber.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Social jealousy caused by different housing projects with different values in the same village or between neighboring villages. Land ownership disputes between surviving family members.







# SOROPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL OF JAKARTA

[www.soroptimistinternational.org](http://www.soroptimistinternational.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 317 LN  
**Project Type** : On budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 01-Apr-05 **Duration (Months)** 23 **Committed USD** 300,000

**Donor(s)** : **Netherlands Red Cross; Private Funds.**

**Project Title** : Rebuilding Lamreh Village (RLV).

### Description :

The overall goal of the RLV project is to provide proper housing and good access to primary education and health care for the people of Lamreh. By so doing, SIJ hopes to improve the villagers' welfare and quality of life to ensure they can all look forward to a more secure and meaningful future after the terrible tsunami disaster. The Rebuilding Lamreh Project (RLV) is a US\$1.3 million project, implemented with funds from Soroptimist Clubs and other donors worldwide. RLV is being fully implemented and managed by three members of the Soroptimist International of Jakarta Club, with the remaining eight active Club members playing an advisory and supportive role. Work commenced in May, 2005, in Lamreh. The official handing over of the village took place in Lamreh September 2006, with representatives from BRR, PMI, local government, donors and friends of SIJ present. In Phase I (completed) of the RLV Project, SIJ built 200 houses in the four hamlets of Lamreh: Malahayati; Ujung Padang; Ujung Lancang; and Bukit Soeharto. Initially, most of the construction work under RLV has been carried out by Acehnese contractors, engaged through a formal tendering process conducted by SIJ in March - April, 2005. Other project personnel, (e.g. on site assistant managers; liaison persons; drivers etc.) are also all Acehnese people. In addition to houses, under RLV, public facilities have also been built, including: primary school to accommodate 180 pupils; kindergarten; playground; library; clinic; community hall and women's centre. A market has also been built, at the request of the community. Electricity is provided to all of the households, through PLN. However, for the clinic, SIJ is using low cost and low maintenance solar and wind turbine systems. Between Phase I (Construction) and Phase II (Capacity Building/Community empowerment) there has been an interim phase designed to assist the Lamreh Villagers in the development of basic skills and positive attitudes towards maintaining a clean, hygienic environment and making proper, responsible use of the newly acquired public facilities. Sustainable waste management processes, maintaining cleanliness of homes and public facilities, and in general, adopting a sense of responsibility for the environment will be SIJ's key areas of focus during this interim phase. Emphasis on Phase II of RLV: capacity building/community empowerment, which will include a range of micro financing activities to promote sustainable livelihood recovery.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008):

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	200	200	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,200
<b>Households</b>				200

**Factors Causing Delays** : Building Materials.

**Environmental Assessment** : The Project will have no adverse environmental impact since the area to be rehabilitated has already undergone extremely severe deforestation and damage as a result of the tsunami in December, 2004.

**Social Impact Assessment** : At the completion of the project, it is expected that the targeted communities will have the necessary skills to enable them to become self-sufficient in a range of employment and income generating sector.

**Notes/Comments** : SIJ is now in the final stages of completion of this project in Aceh. As such, SIJ, as a tiny non-profit organization, is proud to have achieved much of what it set out.



# SOS DESA TARUNA

[www.sos-desataruna.org](http://www.sos-desataruna.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 265 LN; SOCI 189 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Apr-05	33	6,200,000
	22-Dec-05	49	10,000,000

Donor (s) : **SOS-KINDERDORF INTERNATIONAL.**

Project Title : 1. Permanent Housing Program; 3 Units of Elementary School; Clinic and Kindergarten Reconstruction, and Mosques Renovation.  
2. Construction and Operation of Children's Villages.

**Description :**

**INFRA 265 LN** : Reconstructing 523 units of permanent houses of type 45 (including furniture) and 3 units of Elementary School, clinic, kindergarten and 3 unit mosques.

**SOCI 189 LN** : Development of SOS Children's Villages (SOS Desa Taruna Indonesia), which located in Lamreung of Aceh Besar District and Cot Nibong (Lapang) of Aceh Barat District. Every village can hold approximately 150 Children.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	322	322	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	201	201	100 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	15	15	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	15	15	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	10	10	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,609</b>





# SPANISH RED CROSS

[www.cruzroja.es](http://www.cruzroja.es)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 398 IN; INFRA 478 IN; INFRA 488 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-06	12	3,364,000
	03-Oct-05	20	7,204,938.27
	01-Nov-05	26	685,411.11

Donor(s) : Spanish Red Cross ; IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

- Project Title :
1. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.
  2. Construction of 80 permanent houses in Teluk Dalam Sub-District for the families of IDP's affected by the tsunami on Nias Island.
  3. Permanent Shelter Reconstruction.

**Description :**

- INFRA 398 IN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners -Spanish Red Cross.  
**INFRA 478 IN** : Build 80 houses in Nias.  
**INFRA 488 IN** : Reconstruction of Communities. PMI - SRC will reconstruct houses damaged by tsunami or earthquake.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	535	380	71.03%
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of lightly damaged house(s)	37	37	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damaged houses	775	94	12.13%
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	841	841	100%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				921
<b>Households</b>				2,188











# TARUNA SIAGA BENCANA TAGANA

[www.tagana.wordpress.com](http://www.tagana.wordpress.com)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 319 LN  
**Project Type** : On budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01-Apr-06                              11                              379,012.35

Donor (s) : Caritas Germany.

Project Title : Rehabilitation Housing & Administration with of Local Structure: 50 Houses in Alue Deah Tengoh Village, Meuraksa Sub-District, Banda Aceh City.

### Description :

Reconstruction of 50 houses in Alue Deah. The houses shall be built at the origin site according to the wish of the villagers and due to the limited spatial space between the coastline and the intensive use of the area with fish-ponds. The reconstruction intention is to strengthen the community participation and development by motivating the community to be highly participate during the decision making process through out the overall reconstruction phase. Future planning from this community development program is to broaden the scope of working and planning for the further works within the village as an integrated part of the village development process through their income generation and other social project.


### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008 ):

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	50	100 %
<b>Households</b>				50

**Environmental Assessment** : Any possible impact on local natural resources is excluded by our approach. It is beyond this project framework to address any further impact in the environment (e.g. waste management, garbage disposal and drainage system).

**Social Impact Assessment** : Community participation approach for the reconstruction of their houses is considered as basis of re-establishing the social cohesiveness and social ties amongst communities. The intervention has been done through the embracement of local traditional values such as through a community gathering in decision-making process and apprehends the integration of community local wisdom.





# TERRE DES HOMMES

TdH ITALY

[www.tdhitaly.org](http://www.tdhitaly.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 76 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 01-Jul-05    **Duration (Months)** 9    **Committed USD** 461,304.94

Donor (s) : Italian Cooperation.

Project Title : Supporting the return of displaced families to their origin villages.

### Description :

Reconstruction of 50 Houses through CFW scheme in Samalanga Sub-District, Bireuen Regency.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	50	50	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,600
<b>Households</b>				50

**Factors Causing Delay s** : Human Resources; Materials.

**Environmental Assessment** : No Negative impacts are expected, the close cooperation with the Public Works Department secures an environmentally friendly impact.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Beneficiary families will be selected with the help of and in agreement with the local community.

**Notes/Comments** : The Public Work Department will ensure coordination with/amongst organizations dealing with similar activities, in order to avoid inconsistencies, dispute and overlapping.







# TEARFUND UK

[www.tearfund.org](http://www.tearfund.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 80 IN; INFRA 290 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	29-Jul-05	18	1,116,992
	20-Feb-06	14	1,560,000

**Donor(s)** : Tearfund Netherlands; Tearfund International.

**Project Title** : 1. Johan Pahlwan Community Shelter.  
2. Arongan-Lambalek Community Housing Project.

**Description :**

**INFRA 80 IN** : This shelter project aimed to reconstruct 146 units house for tsunami affected household in Johan Pahlwan sub-district of Aceh Barat Regency.

**INFRA 290 IN** : The shelter project is divided into three villages comprising of 195 community houses. The house distribution broken -down as follows: Kubu (159); Simpang Peut (5); Teupin Peuraho (31) units. The three villages are located in Arongan - Lambalek Sub-District.

**Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	146	146	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	195	195	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	61	54	88.52 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,462
<b>Households</b>				402

**Factors Causing Delays** : Land Titling.

**Environmental Assessment** : There is potential for negative impact in relation to ongoing illegal logging and forestry issues. Currently World Relief is working closely with a number of Environmental agencies such as the World Wildlife Fund, Timber for Aceh and Greenomics to mitigate the negative impact of this specific issue.









# THE SALVATION ARMY

[www.salvationarmy.org](http://www.salvationarmy.org)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 369 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01 Jul 05                              12                              2 100 000

Donor (s) : **The Salvation Army.**

Project Title : Housing Reconstruction in Suak Ribe Village and Suak Sigadeng Village, Johan Pahlawan Sub-District, Aceh Barat Regency.

### Description :

500 unit housing reconstruction scheme for tsunami affected communities.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	500	500	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	250	250	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing - Number of relocated houses built	500	0	0 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				1,500







# TURKISH RED CRESCENT

[www.kibristurkkizilayi.org](http://www.kibristurkkizilayi.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 435 IN; EDUC 219 IN; SOCI 179 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	12-Aug-05	17	1,600,000
	20-Oct-05	24	8,840,000
	24-Aug-05	29	858,500

Donor (s) : **Turkish Red Crescent.**

Project Title : 1. Permanent housing units for IDP's in Bitai Sub-District in Banda Aceh and for IDP's in Desa Lampuuk Lhoknga Sub-District of Aceh Besar Regency.  
2. Education Support Project.  
3. TRCS Psychosocial.

### Description :

**INFRA 435 IN** : To reconstruct 1200 housing units including their infrastructure (sewer system, electric and sanitary system).  
**EDUC 219 IN** : Constructing of school buildings by considering the basic educational needs of Lhoknga in Banda Aceh with the help of Governmental Office of Aceh Besar, which including a teacher's housing units.  
**SOCI 179 IN** : The RCS Psychosocial Program still continues under the direction of Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), in the frame of Sultan II Selim Aceh Community Center which has open at 26 December 2006.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	700	696	99.43 %
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	350	350	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	16	16	100 %
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	4	4	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing - Number of heavily damaged houses repaired	142	142	100 %











# UNITED METHODIST COMMITTEE ON RELIEF

## UMCOR

[www.gbgm-umc.org/umcor](http://www.gbgm-umc.org/umcor)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 112 IN; INFRA 293 IN; INFRA 501 IN; INFRA 503 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-May-05	23	5,100,000
	01-Feb-06	14	1,543,421
	01-Apr-07	14	626,515
	01-Apr-07	14	1,710,393

Donor (s) : **United States of America (Other); UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief).**

Project Title : 1. Integrated Rehabilitation of Tsunami Affected Communities (IRTAC) Project  
 2. (UMCOR) Integrated Support for Improved Temporary Accommodation Centers (ISITAC) Project.  
 3. Housing and Infrastructure Reconstruction for Tsunami-Affected Communities (HIRTAC) Project.  
 4. Revitalization of Aceh Communities (RAC) Project.

### Description :

**INFRA 112 IN** : The purpose of the IRTAC Project is to revitalize tsunami affected communities in Bireuen District by empowering community members to re-establish their homes and livelihoods. The project objectives is to provide long-term shelter solutions for up to 524 families in Bireuen through reconstruction of 433 destroyed homes and repair of 91 structurally damaged houses; rehabilitation of key community infrastructure in five target villages; and regeneration of livelihoods for up to 250 community members in four target villages through technical assistance and business -related inputs.

**INFRA 293 IN** : The purpose of this project is to facilitate and support the sustainable return of displaced families in Baitussalam and Lhoknga Sub-Districts to their communities of origin. The project objectives are to support improved living conditions for displaced families remaining in the Desa Kueh and Perumahan Cadek Permai TLCs pending return to their community of origin; to promote a sustainable living environment for 70 returning and 30 especially vulnerable families in six villages in Aceh Besar regency by the end of the project; and facilitate an improved learning environment for 160 children through construction of a new pre-school in Lhoknga Sub -District by the end of the project.

**INFRA 501 IN** : Through the HIRTAC project, UMCOR will construct 60 new 45 square meter permanent houses (including septic tanks, dug wells or access to PDAM) in Aceh Besar for tsunami -affected families. Additionally, UMCOR will rehabilitate one community center in Banda Aceh.

**INFRA 503 IN** : UMCOR will construct 80 new 45 square meter permanent houses (including septic tanks, dug wells or access to PDAM) in Aceh Besar and Bireuen for tsunami -affected families and implement four community infrastructure rehabilitation projects. Through the RAC project, UMCOR will also provide approximately 400 entrepreneurs with business skills training and distribute 130 income generation business packages to enable beneficiary families to launch new businesses. Finally, UMCOR will provide new books for the Almuslim University library in Bireuen.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BIREUEN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	368	368	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damage houses	91	91	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of relocated houses built	65	65	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	40	40	0 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	70	70	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	60	0	0 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	40	40	0 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	270	0	0 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>60,446</b>
<b>Households</b>				<b>10,964</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Land titling.

**Environmental Assessment** : 1. Prior to initiation of shelter and infrastructure rehabilitation activities at both temporary location centers, UMCOR -Indonesia will conduct an environmental impact assessment of the project sites.  
 2. UMCOR will seek minimal negative impact on the environment through this project. Timber used in house or community center construction will be legally certified.

**Social Impact Assessment** : 1. The ISITAC Project will be adapted to the local context in Indonesia. Families accommodated in the TLCs will be expected to form community development committees in order to guide project implementation.

2. UMCOR will work closely with local government and local community members, and will establish voluntary community committees to mitigate any potential community disgruntlement or negative social impact.





# UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME UN-HABITAT

[www.unhabitat.org](http://www.unhabitat.org) / [www.unhabitat-indonesia.org](http://www.unhabitat-indonesia.org)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 165 UN; INFRA 416 UN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Apr-05	30	24,889,734
	01-Jan -06	12	800,000

**Donor (s)** : **UNDP (United Nations Development Programme); Temporary Shelter: IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), ADB (Asian Development Bank).**

**Project Title** : 1. Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Programme (ANSSP).  
2. The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

**INFRA 165 UN** : The Aceh-Nias Settlement Support Programme (ANSSP) will provide:

- Financial and technical support to selected communities to meet rehabilitation/reconstruction of community housing/infrastructure needs. The support will be based on the CAP (Community Action Plan) process in which communities themselves dictate the direction and monitoring of the reconstruction. ANSSP staff will provide the technical know-how and facilitation of the process.
- Coordination support for the shelter sector. Although hundreds of organizations are involved in the shelter reconstruction and rehabilitation an effective recovery in Aceh and Nias is not possible without proper coordination. ANSSP will support this coordination effort through :
  - Housing policy formulation support to the BRR;
  - Chairing of the SWG (shelter working group) – a forum where all UN/NGO involved in the shelter sector can come together for sharing of ideas and information and;
  - Monitoring and evaluation of the sector progress.
- Technical support to local government and communities to address issues of land and security of tenure spatial planning and relocation as well as risk mitigation measures.

**INFRA 416 UN** : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners-UN HABITAT.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. SIMEULUE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	627	626	99.84 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	113	113	100 %
Kab. PIDIE	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,142	1,140	99.82 %
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1,388	1,385	99.78 %
Kab. NIAS	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	109	109	100 %
Kab. NIAS SELATAN	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	63	62	98.41 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	850	397	46.70 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				4,492
<b>Households</b>				4,492

**Environmental Assessment** : The project relies on traditional materials and appropriate technology but also augments this with the introduction of new building practices (where appropriate and required). Households are encouraged to reconstruct/repair with sustainable materials from an appropriate legal source.

**Social Impact Assessment** : The programme provides grants for housing and community infrastructure but through an approach which focuses on community empowerment or a people driven approach. The process is participatory and encourages the strengthening the communities and it's of local institutions as well.

**Notes/Comments** : The Aceh Settlements Support Programme (ASSP) addresses the housing and community Infrastructure component of UNDP's Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme. It aims to assist approximately 6100 households in 40 communities affected by tsunami and earthquake disaster both in Aceh and Nias.











# UPC – UPLINK INDONESIA

## UPLINK

[www.urbanpoor.or.id](http://www.urbanpoor.or.id)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 311 LN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 03 Jan 06      **Duration (Months)** 21      **Committed USD** 19,454,752

**Donor(s)** : Canadian Government; Misereor,  
**Project Title** : Pembangunan Aceh kembali (Pembangunan 3.500 rumah).

**Description :**

Reconstruction 3 ,500 unit houses with public infrastructure provision, public facilities and amenities for tsunami affected communities in Meuraxa sub-district. Peukan Bada sub-district, Jaya Baru sub-district.

**Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	2,069	2,069	100 %
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	893	893	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	405	302	
<b>Households</b>				<b>3,500</b>

- Factors Causing Delays** : Building Materials.
- Environmental Assessment** : The environmental Impact Assessment has been conducted with a professional support which appointed by UPLINK technical team. Particularly for the EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment), UPLINK was working collaboratively in conjunctions with Institute Technology of Bandung and University Pharayangan Bandung.
- Social Impact Assessment** : Housing as basic needs has become a major necessity for the tsunami-affected communities in order to continue their socio-economic recovery activities.











# WAHANA LINGKUNGAN HIDUP

WALHI

[www.walhi.or.id](http://www.walhi.or.id)

**Reference Number** : ECON 77 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
01-May-05                              24                              141,912.85

Donor(s) : UAA-APHEDA .

Project Title : Environmental resource centre development and capacity building project .

### Description :

Main activities include the construction of the Environmental Resource Centre, which will include the WALHI office, a library, 6 rooms for members to stay in on visits, as well as training halls.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Number of land titles issued	1	1	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				350

**Factors Causing Delays** : Government of Indonesia processes; Land titling.







**Reference Number :** INFRA 13 IN; INFRA 16 IN; INFRA 17 IN; INFRA 19 IN; INFRA 20 IN; INFRA 23 IN; INFRA 417 IN

**Project Type :** On-budget

Project Period	Start Date	Duration (Months)	Committed USD
	01-Aug-05	23	10,000,000
	07-Jul-06	18	3,600,000
	01-Mar-05	7	400,000
	01-Aug-05	26	2,800,000
	11-Sep-05	13	500,000
	01-Oct-05	24	12,996,953
	01-Jan-06	12	1,752,000

**Donor(s) :** CIDA (Canadian International Development Agencies); WVI (World Vision International); DEC-UK (UK Disaster Emergency Committee); EOM / SHO (EU Election Observation Mission / Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties); NZAID (New Zealand Aid); PwC (Price Waterhouse Cooper); ADH (Aktion Deutschland Hilft); IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

**Project Title :**

1. Aceh Besar Permanent Housing Reconstruction Project.
2. Lamno Permanent Housing Reconstruction Project.
3. Lamno Temporary Living Centers Project.
4. Lhoong Permanent Housing Reconstruction Project.
5. Lhoong Temporary Living Shelter Project.
6. Meulaboh Temporary & Permanent Housing Project.
7. The Report of Transitional Shelter's per Implementing Partners.

#### Description :

**INFRA 13 IN :** Key main activities: Construct 1275 houses; Construct 59 community halls that will initially be used as temporary living centers.

**INFRA 16 IN :** Key main activities: Construct 396 houses; Construct 415 temporary houses; Construct primary and secondary drainage systems for 4 villages; Construct water and sanitation facilities for 419 houses.

**INFRA 17 IN :** Key main activity: Construct 3 Temporary Living Centers.

**INFRA 19 IN :** Key main activity: Construct 359 houses and 6 communities.

**INFRA 20 IN :** Key main activities: Site clearing and preparation; Hire Contractor and Architect; Employ necessary staff; Construct 11 Temporary Living Centers; Provide family with household kits / utensil.

**INFRA 23 IN :** Key main activities: Construct 1536 permanent houses; Construct 14 community halls that will initially be used as temporary living centers.

**INFRA 417 IN :** The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per implementing Partners - World Vision.

#### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	3,757	3,534	94.04 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	859	859	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>5,618</b>

**Environmental Assessment :**

1. Potential negative environmental impacts include illegal timber, improper wastewater and solid waste management. WVI is currently conducting an environmental assessment in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar to assist in determining the best ways to mitigate these environmental issues.
2. There are potential negative impacts on the environment in the dealing with the rubbish generated by the communities on the Temporary Living Centers. WVI will mitigate this through the provision of garbage disposal assistance.

**Social Impact Assessment :** There is the potential for tension to arise between communities who receive houses first and those that have to wait a little longer.

**Notes/Comments :**

1. Economic multiplier: There will be a number of jobs created in the communities to assist the communities in designing and building their homes.
2. Assessments are being conducted to ensure a minimal adverse impact on the environment. Communities are being consulted to take into account local conditions and design preferences.









# Y

## DIRECTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION ORGANISATIONS

Yakum Emergency Unit (YEU)

Yayasan Berkati Indonesia (YBI)

Yayasan Budha Tzu Chi Indonesia

Yayasan Dinamik Sistim

Yayasan Holi' Ana'a

Yayasan Jambo Minda

Yayasan Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil

Yayasan Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammad Al Tani

Yayasan Sosial Kreasi

Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia

Youth of The Street



# YAKKUM EMERGENCY UNIT YEU

[www.yeu.or.id](http://www.yeu.or.id)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: INFRA 166 LN; INFRA 468 LN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	28-Dec-04	36	1,920,180
	02-Jan-06	24	223,333

Donor(s) : **ACT International (Action by Churches Together Alliances); KNH (Kindernothilfe).**

Project Title : 1. ASRE 51: Emergency Response in Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya and Aceh Utara - Shelter Sector.  
2. Project ASRE 51: Emergency Response in Nias-Shelter Sector.

### Description :

**INFRA 166 LN** : The Shelter assistance scheme provides the decent and healthy housing for IDP's in Kayu Jati Blang Ulam Lhok Mee (Banda Aceh) Tanah Anoe and Lhok Puuk (Aceh Utara) Kuala Bubon (Aceh Barat).

**INFRA 468 LN** : The Shelter assistance scheme provide a provision of housing in the area of Moawo, Lahewa, in Nias island.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	503	484	96.22 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,500</b>

**Environmental Assessment** : The shelter unit conducts a preliminary assessment prior to the shelter construction commencement and ensures the environmental friendly construction is being implemented. The shelter program integrated the overall activities with health and water sanitation provisions program.

**Social Impact Assessment** : The design and construction methodology adjusted based on local cultures, for instance the house model in Lhokseumawe is different with in Aceh Besar - where the houses are on stilled. This condition also applied on Nias, whereas local customary is taking into account within the house design and construction processes.





# YAYASAN BERKATI INDONESIA

**YBI**

[blessindonesiatoday@bigpond.com](mailto:blessindonesiatoday@bigpond.com)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 167 LN; INFRA 375 LN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	10-Jul-05	12	1,050,000.00
	01-Aug-06	8	800,000.00

Donor (s) : **Christian Aid.**

Project Title : 1. YBI Housing Reconstruction Project.  
 2. YBI Housing Construction Project –Renters Reinstatement Program.

**Description :**

- INFRA 167 LN** : The project is aimed to reconstruct houses that were lost due to the tsunami disaster. The construction will be managed by YBI team with the work done with paid local construction labors and volunteers from within the organization. The houses will be given to recipients that own or lived on the land prior to the tsunami disaster.
- INFRA 375 LN** : The Project is aimed to provide assistance toward renters who also lost their assets during the tsunami disaster. The construction will be managed by YBI team with the work done with paid local construction labors and volunteers from within the organization. The houses will be given to recipients that landless (renter) prior to the tsunami disaster.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. BANDA ACEH	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	190	190	100 %
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	100	0	0 %
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing –Number of relocated houses built	82	82	100 %







# YAYASAN BUDHA TZU CHI INDONESIA

[www.tzuchi.or.id](http://www.tzuchi.or.id)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 180 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date**      **Duration (Months)**      **Committed USD**  
15-Aug-05                                      19                                      37,000,000

Donor(s) : Yayasan Budha Tzu Chi.

Project Title : Proyek Pembangunan Perumahan Cinta Kasih Tzu Chi di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.

## Description :

This project aimed to provide assistance toward local governments in Aceh rehabilitation and reconstruction activities and simultaneously aimed to provide shelter and non -shelter assistance schemes toward tsunami affected communities in 4 District in Aceh Province.

## Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	2,668	2,348	88 %
<b>Households</b>				2,668

**Environmental Assessment** : Conserving existing trees in the project sites in order to promotes the natural and/or passive environment cooling system is undertaken seriously.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Small Mosque is developed in to obey and respect toward local religious customary; it is also underpinned with the establishment of local fostering house and women center to support local women activities.





# YAYASAN DINAMIK SISTIM YDS

**Reference Number** : ECON 105 LN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 15-May-06      **Duration (Months)** 12      **Committed USD** 827,500

**Donor(s)** : Australian Government; General Donations; Opportunity International; Opportunity International Australia; R & D STEVE Goode; United States of America (Other).

**Project Title** : Enterprise Development Centers in Aceh.

**Description :**

YDS Enterprise Development Centre aim to empower the poor particularly victims of Tsunami in Aceh who's social and economic conditions adversely affected, release them into the workforce and develop independent and productive lives in their communities.

**Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :**

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	10	5	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing – Number of heavily damaged houses	5	3	60%
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				30,250
<b>Households</b>				15

**Factors Causing Delays** : Human Resources; Materials.

**Notes/Comments** : YDS Construction Training Centre aims to rebuild businesses that produce housing components which are critically needed in Aceh.







## YAYASAN JAMBO MINDA

**Reference Number** : INFRA 451 LN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 15-Jan-07    **Duration (Months)** 4    **Committed USD** 300,000

Donor (s) : Westerkirk Capital.

Project Title : Weu Raya, Lhoknga House.

### Description :

The project aimed to reconstruct 20 units house for tsunami affected households in Weu Raya village, Lhoknga Sub-District of Aceh Besar Regency. The housing frame will be constructed on wooded-based structure, and the infill will be in a form of bricks installation and/or a concrete form. All timbers and other wooden materials will be imported from Canada.

### Key Performance Indicators (August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	20	0	0 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				51
<b>Households</b>				20

**Factors Causing Delays** : Visa; Government of Indonesia processes; Customs.

**Environmental Assessment** : Since the timber will be imported from Canada, it won't affect illegal logging activity in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh.

**Social Impact Assessment** : Training on construction techniques will be provided to the community, and the tolls sets will be handover to the local people for future house construction, improvement and development.





# YAYASAN MASYARAKAT MAKMUR MITRA ADIL MAMAMIA

[www.gitec-rrhs-aceh.com](http://www.gitec-rrhs-aceh.com)

**Reference Number** : INFRA 89 IN  
**Project Type** : On-budget  
**Project Period** : **Start Date** 01-Jan-05      **Duration (Months)** 15      **Committed USD** 3,054,720

**Donor(s)** : Caritas Austria; Caritas Germany.

**Project Title** : Program Rekonstruksi Rumah Lhoong (PRR-L).

### Description :

In 15 villages of the northern part of the Subdistrict Lhoong 985 permanent houses are in the process of being built for tsunami victims.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	985	985	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				985

**Factors Causing Delays** : Other.





# YAYASAN SHEIKH EID BIN MOHAMMAD AL THANI

<b>Reference Number</b>	: EDUC 140 IN; INFRA 269 IN		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Mar-06	22	2,666,666.67
	02-May-06	20	100,000

Donor(s) : **Qatar Government; Yayasan Sheikh Eid Bin Muhammad Al Thani.**

Project Title : 1. Pembangunan Islamic Center di Montasik, Aceh Besar.  
2. Proyek Pembangunan Perumahan.

### Description :

**EDUC 140 IN** : Islamic Center development for orphanages integrated complex which comprise a mosques, teacher's housing, student dormitory, multi-purpose building, sport facilities, elementary school, junior high school and high school.

**INFRA 269 IN** : Housing reconstruction assistance scheme provided for the most vulnerable and poorest peoples which in a need of shelter assistance. This scheme targeted the beneficiaries who doest not yet occupied a house or not yet having adequate fund to reconstruct their house.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	16	0	0 %
Kab. ACEH BARAT	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	31	31	100 %
Kab. NAGAN RAYA	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	1	1	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				<b>1,000</b>

**Factors Causing Delays** : Visa; Government of Indonesia processes; Land titling.

# YAYASAN SOSIAL KREASI

kreasi@mailboxes.biz

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 37 LN; INFRA 477 LN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Feb-05	4	10,550
	31-Aug-05	17	666,400

Donor(s) : **Private Funds.**

Project Title : 1. Shelter Reconstruction Project.  
2. Housing Reconstruction in Lam Ujong, Baitussalam.

### Description :

**INFRA 37 LN** : Restore dignity and improve quality of life for villagers currently living in tents by providing housing assistance for two small families in District of Aceh Besar.

**INFRA 477 LN** : Provide 119 unit houses for tsunami affected households in Lam Ujong of Aceh Besar District.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing– Number of houses built	5	5	100 %
	(INFRA) Housing– Number of houses built	119	119	100 %
Other Locations	(INFRA) Housing– Number of houses built	7	7	100 %
<b>Households</b>				<b>131</b>





# YAYASAN TANGGUL BENCANA INDONESIA YTBI

[www.ytbindonesia.org](http://www.ytbindonesia.org); [ytb\\_indonesia@yahoo.com](mailto:ytb_indonesia@yahoo.com)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 191 LN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	22-Apr-06	24	1,501,276.37

Donor(s) : **ACT International (Action by Churches Together Alliances).**

Project Title : Program Penanggulangan Bencana Gempa Bumi dan Tsunami Aceh dan Nias I.

### Description :

This program aimed to provide shelter and non-shelter assistance toward tsunami and earthquake affected households in Aceh and Nias, including the housing reconstruction support in Aceh Barat and Aceh Jaya District.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Various Kabupaten	(INFRA) Housing – Number of houses built	185	185	100 %

**Environmental Assessment** : YTBI prevent any possibilities of illegal timber usage for its construction purpose. The timbers will be legally sourced and procured from sustainable managed forest and legal timber suppliers. This step is undertaken in order to prevent any further impacts toward the natural environment.

**Social Impact Assessment** : In order to prevent unwanted social impacts during the reconstruction process, YTBI will apply the ACT Code of Conduct in Humanitarian activities which does not in whatsoever related to any religious or missionaries activities.



Youth Off The Streets

# YOUTH OF THE STREET

[www.youthoffthestreets.com.au](http://www.youthoffthestreets.com.au)

<b>Reference Number</b>	: <b>INFRA 422 IN</b>		
<b>Project Type</b>	: On-budget		
<b>Project Period</b>	: <b>Start Date</b>	<b>Duration (Months)</b>	<b>Committed USD</b>
	01-Jan-06	12	80,000

Donor(s) : **IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).**

Project Title : The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners.

### Description :

The Report of Transitional Shelter's Per Implementing Partners - Youth of The Street.

### Key Performance Indicators(August 2008) :

DISTRICT	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS	TARGET	PROGRESS	PERCENT
Kab. ACEH BESAR	(INFRA) Housing – Number of temporary houses built	20	20	100 %
<b>Beneficiaries</b>				20
<b>Households</b>				20











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In mid 2007, the BRR Housing Deputy asked HABITAT to document the post-Tsunami housing reconstruction programme in Aceh and Nias. The report aims to be a resource for future evaluations and decision making. The evaluation focuses on two key questions: what were the success factors in achieving housing recovery in the particular context of the reconstruction in Aceh and Nias; and what can be learned about the role of government and civil society in order to achieve successful housing recovery in the future.

For the latter question the evaluation also draws on experiences in Sri Lanka (post-Tsunami), Pakistan (2005 earthquake) and Yogyakarta (2006 earthquake) disaster contexts where UN-HABITAT also had advisory or implementation roles. A comparative approach has been instructive, as the Aceh post-disaster context is complex and likely unique especially with regard to the influx of many international organisations.

The book also documents the UN-HABITAT monitoring programme on housing and settlement recovery, implemented with the Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh from 2005 to 2008. Finally, it provides a comprehensive and illustrated directory of all housing implementing organisations active in the reconstruction of housing: Indonesian governmental and non-governmental organisations, international NGOs, multilateral organisations and Red Cross movements alike.

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